PATRICK J. BRIGGS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant committed an aggravated battery when he was 17 years old. By the time he was sentenced, the defendant was already 19, and the trial court decided to impose adult sanctions. On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposition of adult sanctions as well as his responsibility for restitution to be paid “as directed by your probation officer.”
We affirm the imposition of adult sanctions, finding that the trial court’s written order satisfies the requirements of section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes (1993). Concerning restitution, however, it was improper for the trial court to delegate to the probation officer the responsibility for fashioning a payment plan. See Thomas v. State, 635 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); White v. State, 606 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Consequently, we remand the case for further proceedings so that the trial court may fashion a plan for payment of restitution.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.
MINER, WEBSTER and DAVIS, JJ., concur.
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Guinn v. State, 652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…tion of each order setting forth the amount of restitution. However, Guinn correctly argues and the state concedes that the trial court improperly delegated to the probation officer the determination of Guinn’s payment schedule. See Briggs v. State, 647 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Accordingly, we reverse that portion of each order delegating to the probation officer the determination of the restitution payment schedule and remand to the trial court to establish the payment schedule and to enter the approp…
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Tilden Lee Fichera v. State, 688 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…evidence in the record supporting the assessment. We agree, however, that the trial court improperly delegated to Fiehera’s probation officer the responsibility for creating a schedule of payments consistent with his ability to pay. Briggs v. State, 647 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Bowers v. State, 596 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Smith v. State, 589 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The restitution order must be remanded with directions to strike this language. On remand, if the trial court determines th…
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Pearce v. State, 968 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…judicial responsibility that cannot be delegated. Lewellen v. State, 685 So. 2d 1367, 1368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Douglas v. State, 664 So. 2d 1099, 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Guinn v. State, 652 So. 2d 902, 902 [*94] (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Briggs v. State, 647 So. 2d 182, 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Thomas v. State, 635 So. 2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (finding error where the trial court revoked probation based on the defendant’s failure “to follow a payment schedule established, not by the trial court,…
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- White v. State, 606 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Thomas v. State, 635 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)