MARTHA ANN AGEE, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES G. AGEE, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the wife's request for reimbursement of maintenance expenses on the marital residence, finding that a stipulation required the husband to pay one-half of reasonable maintenance costs. The court also remanded for findings justifying the trial court's reduction of alimony and affirmed the attorney's fees award.
The trial court erred in denying reimbursement of any portion of the claimed maintenance expenses without determining whether those expenses were reasonable and necessary, and must remand to determine which expenses constitute reasonable maintenance and award the wife one-half thereof. The court remanded for findings justifying the alimony reduction. The award of attorney's fees requiring the husband to pay approximately one-half was affirmed.
[1] A trial court must award one-half of reasonable maintenance expenses for a marital residence pending sale when parties stipulate to split such costs, even if the court re…
[2] A trial court must make findings justifying a reduction in permanent periodic alimony.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although the husband agreed by stipulation to pay one-half of the maintenance expenses, this does not automatically entitle the wife to one-half of the expenses which she presently claims. Even when the parties agree to split the maintenance expenses, the trial court retains discretion to award only those expenses which are reasonable and necessary.”
Establishes that stipulated expense splits do not override the trial court's duty to ensure expenses are reasonable and necessary
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties stipulated that the former wife would remain in the marital residence pending its sale, with each party responsible for one-half of taxes,…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the wife from an order granting modification of an amended final judgment and order on rehearing in a dissolution case wherein the trial court denied the wife’s request for reimbursement of one-half of the expenses she claimed as maintenance of the marital residence pending its sale and reduced the husband’s obligation for permanent periodic alimony from $3,000 to $1,500 per month. The wife’ also appeals the trial court’s order directing the husband to pay one-half, rather than 100 percent, of the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs. Because the parties agreed by stipulation that the husband would pay one-half of the taxes, insurance and maintenance, we reverse the trial court’s failure to award the wife one-half of what the trial court determines to be reasonable maintenance expenses paid by the wife on the marital residence pending its sale. Because we are unable to determine from the trial court’s order the basis for its reduction of alimony from $3,000 to $1,500 per month, we remand for findings by the trial court justifying this reduction in permanent alimony. We affirm the trial court’s award as to attorney’s fees.
The parties entered into a stipulation, adopted in the trial court’s order, that, pending the sale of the marital residence, the former wife would continue to reside there and that each party would be responsible for one-half the taxes, insurance and maintenance. The trial court awarded the former wife reimbursement of one-half of the taxes and insurance, but denied reimbursement of one-half of the $11,248.53 spent on lawn care, the $1,359 spent on pest control, and the $865.75 spent on repairs and professional cleaning.
Although the trial court delineated these expenses in its order, in disallowing reimbursement for one-half of these expenses, the trial court made no finding that these expenses were not maintenance costs under the parties’ stipulation, nor did it determine that these expenses were unreasonable. We are unable to discern from the order or record the basis for the trial court’s denial of payment of any portion of these expenses to the wife. Although the husband agreed by stipulation to pay one-half of the maintenance expenses, this does not automatically entitle the wife to one-half of the expenses which she presently claims. Even when the parties agree to split the maintenance expenses, the trial court retains discretion to award only those expenses which are reasonable and necessary. See Romans v. Romans, 611 So. 2d 92, 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (remanding for trial court “to determine which of the costs of repairs and expenses made by the former husband pursuant to the oral agreement are reasonable and necessary ...”).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order insofar as it fails to award any portion of the maintenance expenses claimed, and remand with directions to determine which of these expenses are reasonable maintenance expenses, and to award the wife one-half of that amount. The trial court is further directed to make findings justifying the reduction of permanent periodic alimony. The order requiring the husband to pay approximately one-half of the wife’s attorney’s fee is affirmed.
ALLEN, WEBSTER and DAVIS, JJ., concur.