RONALD SPRING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ronald Spring appealed a denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that victim injury points were improperly assessed under Karchesky v. State. The court held that Karchesky does not apply to defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere and agree to victim injury point assessments, but remanded because the record did not clearly show whether Spring had agreed to such assessment.
Karchesky does not directly control cases where defendants plead guilty or nolo contendere and agree to the assessment of victim injury points or a fixed sentence based on such points. However, if a pleading defendant only agrees to a guideline sentence without agreeing to the specific assessment of victim injury points, he may challenge that assessment. The case must be remanded because the record does not clearly show whether Spring agreed to the victim injury point assessment.
[1] Victim injury points may not be assessed for penetration that does not cause ascertainable physical injury.
[2] A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to sexual offenses and agrees to the assessment of victim injury points or to a fixed sentence based on those points cann…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“penetration, which does not cause ascertainable physical injury, does not result in victim injury as contemplated by the rule for which victim injury points may be assessed”
The Karchesky rule that the appellate court here found inapplicable to plea cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSpring pled nolo contendere to armed sexual battery, armed burglary, armed kidnapping, and attempted first-degree arson, and was sentenced to 80 years…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant Ronald Spring pled nolo conten-dere to numerous offenses of armed sexual battery, armed burglary, armed kidnapping, and attempted first-degree arson, and was sentenced to 80 years’ incarceration to be followed by 15 years’ probation. Spring filed a 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that victim injury points were improperly assessed against him under Karchesky v. State, 591 So. 2d 930 (Fla.1992). The trial court summarily denied Spring’s motion by order dated July 2, 1992, and this appeal followed.
In Karchesky, the Florida Supreme Court held that “penetration, which does not cause ascertainable physical injury, does not result in victim injury as contemplated by the rule for which victim injury points may be assessed.” Id. at 932. Significantly, however, Karchesky involved a defendant who was tried and convicted of the sexual crimes charged.
Thus, Karchesky does not directly apply to or control cases in which a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to sexual offenses and agrees to the assessment of victim injury points or to a fixed sentence based on assessed victim injury points. See Boerstler v. State, 622 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (affirming denial of 3.800(a) motion alleging Karchesky error where the defendant had agreed to a 19-year sentence and his plea agreement did not reflect that his plea was conditioned on the 19 years being within the sentencing guidelines: “Thus the sentence, imposed in accordance with a valid plea agreement, is not rendered illegal due to the circumstance that, because of a seoresheet error, it exceeded the actual guidelines range.”); Perryman v. State, 608 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (affirming direct appeal alleging Karchesky error where the defendant did not raise seoresheet objection, advised the court that the computation was correct, and expressly agreed to the assessment of points for victim injury; under such circumstances, issue not preserved for appellate review), rev. denied, 621 So. 2d 432 (Fla.1993).
In such cases, the defendant, by his plea, renders proof relating to victim injury points unnecessary, and the defendant may not subsequently challenge the assessment of these points by direct appeal or collateral attack.
However, if a pleading defendant only agrees to a guideline sentence (as opposed to agreeing to the assessment of victim injury points or to a fixed sentence based on assessed victim injury points), he may be entitled to challenge the assessment of victim injury points. See, e.g., Harper v. State, 632 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Scott v. State, 638 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
In short, this appeal turns on whether Spring agreed to the assessment of victim injury points. Because the record is not revealing in this regard, we must REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.
BOOTH, ALLEN and BENTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Echols v. State, 660 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…es to this type of error where the defendant’s plea is premised upon a guideline sentence, as opposed to entering an “open plea” or one not dependent upon sentencing within the guidelines, as had the defendant in Boerstler. See also Spring v. State, 647 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Here, appellant entered his plea of nolo contendere to the sexual offenses and agreed to a sentence within the recommended range of the sentencing guidelines. Furthermore, this court and other district courts have concluded that…
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Montague v. State, 656 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…case has overruled another), and because Karchesky sentencing errors will continue to plague the appellate courts in postconvietion proceedings even after the enactment of section 921.001(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), see, e.g., Spring v. State, 647 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) and Trevino v. State, 647 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), we certify the following question of great public importance: HAS PINACLE V. STATE, 20 FLA.L.WEEKLY S196 [654 SO.2d 908] (FLA. APR. 27, 1995), OVERRULED LINKOUS V STATE,…
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Greenler v. State, 923 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Spring v. State, 647 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). ERVIN, PADOVANO and HAWKES, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Karchesky v. State, 591 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1992)
- Boerstler v. State, 622 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Perryman v. State, 608 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Royce Glenn Harper v. State, 632 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Johnson v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 638 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)