RONNIE PLATT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ronnie Platt appeals a trial court's order assessing public defender fees and costs against him over five years after sentencing. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, finding the state waived its right to seek such fees by failing to provide timely notice at sentencing and exceeding the statute of limitations.
The state waived its right to seek public defender fees and costs by failing to provide timely notice at sentencing as required by statute and rule, and the statute of limitations had run. The trial court's order assessing such fees was therefore reversed, though the court found Charlotte County was the proper entity to seek the lien.
[1] A state waives its right to seek imposition of a lien for public defender fees and costs if it fails to provide notice to the defendant at sentencing of their right to co…
[2] A statute of limitations may bar the assessment of public defender fees and costs if a significant period of time elapses between sentencing and the filing of a proper no…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court having jurisdiction over any defendant who has been determined to be guilty of a criminal act by a court or jury or through a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and who has received the assistance of the public defender's office ... may assess attorney's fees and costs against the defendant. At the sentencing hearing or at such stage in the proceedings as the court may deem appropriate, the public defender, ... representing such defendant shall move the court to assess attorney's fees and costs against the defendant.”
Establishes statutory requirement that public defender fees must be addressed at or near sentencing
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlatt pled nolo contendere to second degree murder, burglary with assault, robbery, and burglary charges on March 25, 1988, and was sentenced that sam…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Ronnie Platt, challenges the trial court’s final judgment which ordered the assessment of public defender fees and costs against the appehant and in favor of Charlotte County. We find that the trial court was untimely in ordering the assessment of public defender fees and costs and, accordingly, reverse the final judgment.
The appellant pled nolo contendere to the crimes of second degree murder, burglary of a dwelling with an assault, robbery, and burglary of a dwelling, in violation of sections 782.04, 810.02, and 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985). On March 25, 1988, the trial court adjudicated him guilty of those crimes and the appehant was sentenced. At the sentencing hearing, there was no discussion regarding public defender fees and costs or the appellant’s right to a hearing to contest the amount of the lien. More than five years later, on May 3, 1993, the Charlotte County Attorney’s Office filed what they referred to as an amended notice of hearing for the assessment of public defender fees and costs. The trial court subsequently ordered the assessment of attorney’s fees in the amount of $2087.50 and costs in the amount of $3961.35 against the appehant and in favor of Charlotte County. The appehant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The appehant first contends, and the state concedes, that the state waived its right to seek the imposition of a lien for public defender fees and costs. We agree with the appellant’s contention.
Section 27.56(l)(a), Florida Statute (1985), provides in part that: The court having jurisdiction over any defendant who has been determined to be guilty of a criminal act by a court or jury or through a plea of guilty or nolo conten-dere and who has received the assistance of the public defender’s office ... may assess attorney’s fees and costs against the defendant. At the sentencing hearing or at such stage in the proceedings as the court may deem appropriate, the public defender, ... representing such defendant shall move the court to assess attorney’s fees and costs against the defendant.
In addition, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1) provides that notice of the accused’s right to a hearing to contest the amount of the lien for public defender fees and costs shall be given at the time of sentencing. See Drinnon v. State, 598 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
In the instant case, the state waived its right to seek the imposition of a lien for public defender fees and costs because it failed to give notice to the appellant, at sentencing, of his right to contest the amount of the lien and to have it set for a hearing. Furthermore, since over five years had elapsed from the time of the appellant’s sentencing until the proper notice was filed regarding the assessment of the lien, the statute of limitations had run pursuant to section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1985).
The appellant next contends that the request for the imposition of a lien for public defender fees and costs was improperly initiated by Charlotte County. We reject that contention since section 27.56(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that when the payment of attorney’s fees or costs has been ordered by the court, a lien is created in the name of the county in which such assistance was rendered.
We, accordingly, reverse and remand with instructions to strike the imposition of pubhe defender fees and costs against the appellant.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PARKER and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Raimondo v. State, 666 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…itionally, the court imposed a lien for attorney’s fees and costs, but the record does not reflect that it gave Raim-ondo notice of its intent to impose these fees or the opportunity to object. We strike these fees and costs as well. Platt v. State, 647 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We also note that the attorney’s fee order was improperly entered by a judge who had previously recused himself. [*181] Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. THREADGILL, C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.…
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Taylor v. State, 664 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…n. See Reyes; Barnes v. State, 658 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The court imposed a fee of $300.00 for the public defender’s services without giving Taylor prior notice or the opportunity to be heard. This fee is also stricken. See Platt v. State, 647 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The state concedes that, under the plea agreement, the sentences in this case were to run concurrently with sentences imposed in a previous case, and that the sentencing documents do not completely reflect this arrangement. The…
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Owen v. State, 906 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…a lien for fees against appellant. We reverse the order because of the lack of notice. See Lang v. State, 856 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Because the statute of limitations has run, we direct the trial court to vacate its order. Platt v. State, 647 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). WARNER, GROSS and MAY, JJ„ concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Drinnon v. State, 598 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)