STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
TODD RUBEL, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed trial court's dismissal of charges against defendant removed from pretrial intervention program, holding that the state attorney, not the trial court, has final authority to determine whether prosecution shall continue under section 948.08(5).
The trial court lacks authority to dismiss charges in a pretrial intervention case; the state attorney has final determination authority under section 948.08(5), Florida Statutes.
[1] In a pretrial intervention program case, the state attorney possesses final determination authority to decide whether prosecution shall continue, and a trial court lacks…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The state attorney shall make the final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue.”
Section 948.08(5), Florida Statutes, establishing prosecutorial authority in pretrial intervention cases.
Todd Rubel entered into a deferred prosecution agreement requiring participation in a pretrial intervention program with the understanding that charge…
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FRANK, Chief Judge.
Todd Rubel and the state executed a deferred prosecution agreement contemplating his entry into a pretrial intervention program. The agreement provided that if Rubel met its terms, the charges would be dismissed. Rubel was removed from the program as a result of his failure to satisfy a worthless check and to make certain payments prescribed in the agreement.
This proceeding implicates the purpose and application of section 948.08(4), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides that the:
Resumption of pending criminal proceedings shall be undertaken at any time if the program administrator or state attorney finds such individual is not fulfilling his obligations under this plan or if the public interest so requires.
In spite of the state’s objection, the trial court, without explaining an acceptable reason for its behavior, granted Rubel’s oral motion to dismiss. Here, as occurred in State v. Turner, 636 So. 2d 815, 816-17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), the trial court’s action
represents an unjustified judicial interference with the prosecutorial function which is not only unwarranted as a general proposition, but is ... in direct contradiction with the explicit statutory admonition that, whenever a defendant has entered and completed a pretrial intervention program, “[t]he state attorney shall make the final determination as to whether the prosecution shall continue.”
See § 948.08(5), Fla.Stat. (1991).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CAMPBELL and BLUE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Batista v. State, 951 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…orial function, and is non-reviewable. Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, 653 (Fla.1982). In Virgo v. State, 675 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), the Third District held that termination from such a program is also non-reviewable. In State v. Rubel, 647 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), the Second District reversed a trial court’s dismissal of charges against a defendant after his termination from a PTI program. There, however, Rubel knew why the state terminated his participation in the program. In Board, the…
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State v. Simons, 22 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…discretion ... to admit [*739] or to terminate PTI”); Virgo v. State, 675 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (finding the state has “non-reviewable” discretion to terminate a defendant’s PTI at any time, even after the program has begun); State v. Rubel, 647 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (finding the state’s termination of a defendant’s PTI is a prosecutorial decision to be kept free from judicial interference); State v. Board, 565 So. 2d 880, 881 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (finding “the statute creating the PTI pro…
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State v. Higgins (Fla. 6th DCA 2025)
Authorities Cited
- State v. Turner, 636 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)