IN RE ESTATE OF BONNIE REBECCA WOODRUFF, DECEASED. WILLIAM WOODRUFF, INDIVIDUALLY AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BONNIE REBECCA WOODRUFF, DECEASED, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM JAMES WOODRUFF, III, DECEASED, AND REBEKAH LILLIAN WOODRUFF, BY AND THROUGH WILLIAM WOODRUFF, HER FATHER, NEXT FRIEND AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, APPELLANTS,
v.
HENKELS & MCCOY, INC., A FOREIGN CORPORATION AUTHORIZED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA AND GARY NELSON WILLIAMS, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1994-12-21
No. 93-3291
HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
647 So. 2d 1045 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1994) Caution
Cited by 5 cases

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Holding

A personal check is not sufficient to satisfy a judgment because it does not constitute final payment until it clears, and the judgment creditor is entitled to interest accrued during that period.

Facts & Procedural History

Judgment creditors received payment for a multi-million dollar judgment via personal check. They argued they were deprived of interest that accrued wh…

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Topics
Final Payment Accrued Interest Conditional Payments Satisfaction Of Judgment

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Opinion of the Court
KLEIN, Judge.

KLEIN, Judge.

We are presented with a question of first impression in Florida: whether a personal check is sufficient to satisfy a judgment. The trial court held that payment by personal check was sufficient and ordered the judgment satisfied. The judgment creditors appeal, arguing that because the check included interest which accrued only up to the date of delivery they were wrongfully deprived of interest on their multimiUion dollar judgment during the several days it took the check to clear. We agree that they are entitled to the interest and reverse.

In Hudgins v. Florida Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 399 So. 2d 990, 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), the court explained why a personal check could not be used to exercise the right of redemption in a foreclosure action, where the documents required cash or certified funds, stating:

Tender of a personal check is not the equivalent of cash or a certified check. The delivery of a personal check is at best “conditional” payment because whether or not it is drawn on a trust account or escrow account, it is not “finally paid” until the conclusion of the “settlement” process and in the interim, the account may fluctuate in amount, it may be garnished, set off by the Bank, or the drawer may stop payment on the check. (Footnotes omitted).

By way of dicta, the court observed in Hudgins that a judgment creditor would unquestionably be entitled to insist on cash or certified funds, and we fully agree. See Noyes v. Habilitation Resources, Inc., 49 Cal.App.3d 910, 123 Cal.Rptr. 261 (1975); Dunn v. Ligón, 430 S.W. 2d 704 (Tex.Civ.App. 1968); and Altenau v. Masterson, 161 Misc. 433, 292 N.Y.S. 299 (1936). We therefore reverse for entry of a judgment compensating appellants for the interest they did not receive on the funds during the time it took the personal cheek to clear. HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • D.S. Keanie v. Goldy, 698 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …d without condition or reservation by the attorneys’ representing the judgment creditor, satisfies any further obligation of the insurer to pay post judgment interest. We believe it does. We recognize that the Fourth District in Estate of Woodruff, 647 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), in rebanee on our case of Hudgins v. Florida Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 399 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), made a contrary ruling. But in Hudgins, there was a stipulation that payment would be either in cash or certified f…
  • Michael Acri Boxing Promotions, Inc. v. Miles, 758 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See §§ 77.01, 77.06, Fla. Stat. (1997); see also In re Estate of Woodruff, 647 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Hudgins v. Florida Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 399 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Gelco Corp. v. United Nat’l Bank, 569 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). DELL and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. STONE, J., concurs specially with opinion.…
  • Castor v. City of Plantation (S.D. Fla. 2025)
    …tructors, Inc. v. Yacht Club Se., Inc., 839 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (noting that a judgment creditor has the right to refuse a personal check to satisfy a judgment and insist on payment by cash or certified funds); In re Est. of Woodruff, 647 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (same). Proffer of a personal check is not the equivalent of cash or a certified check. Keanie v. Goldy, 698 So. 2d 1264, 1267 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). A personal check, for example, does not offer a guarantee that the funds wi…

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