WILLIE F. DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Davis appeals his convictions for attempted robbery, resisting arrest with violence, and depriving an officer of communication. The court reverses and orders a new trial because the trial court failed to conduct a Faretta hearing before proceeding to trial after the defendant requested to discharge his public defender and subsequently absented himself.
The trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta hearing. When a defendant requests discharge of court-appointed counsel, the trial court must first determine whether adequate grounds exist for replacement, and if not, must advise the defendant that he would be representing himself and conduct a Faretta hearing to determine whether he is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel. This error requires reversal and a new trial.
[1] A trial court must conduct a Faretta hearing when a defendant attempts to dismiss court-appointed counsel and exercise the right to self-representation.
[2] When a defendant requests to discharge court-appointed counsel, the trial court must first determine if adequate grounds exist for replacement.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when a defendant requests the trial court to discharge his court-appointed attorney and replace him with another court-appointed attorney, the trial court should first determine whether adequate grounds exist for replacement of the defendant's attorney”
Establishes the first step in the required procedure when a defendant seeks to discharge court-appointed counsel
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavis was scheduled for trial on July 22, 1993. On that date, he requested that the trial court remove his public defender. The trial court denied bot…
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DANAHY, Acting Chief Judge.
The appellant asserts various trial errors and insufficiency of the evidence as grounds for reversal of his convictions for attempted robbery, resisting arrest with violence and depriving an officer of communication. The appellant raises five issues. We find error requiring reversal and a new trial as to the first issue raised. Thus it is not necessary that we address the other four issues.
The appellant’s case was set for trial on July 22, 1993. On that date, the appellant requested that the trial court remove the public defender who was representing the appellant. The trial court denied the appellant’s request as well as the public defender’s motion to withdraw. The appellant then voluntarily absented himself from trial and the trial court proceeded to trial without the presence of the appellant.
In Matthews v. State, 584 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), this court held that when a defendant requests the trial court to discharge his court-appointed attorney and replace him with another court-appointed attorney, the trial court should first determine whether adequate grounds exist for replacement of the defendant’s attorney. In this case, the trial court obviously determined that there were no adequate grounds for replacement.
In Matthews, this court further held that if the trial court finds that the defendant has no legitimate complaint, it is then required to advise the defendant that if his request to discharge his attorney is granted, the court is not required to appoint substitute counsel and the defendant would be exercising his right to represent himself. At this point, if the defendant still desires to discharge his counsel, the court must determine whether the defendant is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel. The court must conduct a hearing as required by Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). See also State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla.1993), in which the supreme court stated that when a defendant attempts to dismiss his court-appointed counsel, it is presumed that he is exercising his right to self-representation. The trial court must then conduct a Faretta hearing.
In this case, the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta hearing. That error requires reversal and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and a new trial granted.
SCHOONOVER and FULMER, JJ„ concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Davis v. State, 669 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…FRANK, Judge. Willie Davis’ original convictions were reversed by this court in Davis v. State, 648 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Upon retrial, he was convicted of attempted robbery and resisting an officer with violence and sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty years in prison as a habitual felony offender. He has again appealed and his counsel has filed…
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Smith v. State, 677 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…y is granted, the court is not required to appoint substitute counsel and the defendant would be exercising his right to represent himself. Matthews v. State, 584 So. 2d 1105, 1106-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (citations omitted). See also Davis v. State, 648 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In the present case, the trial judge repeatedly informed Smith that he had “no choice” and had to proceed with his attorney. Because Smith did have a choice, self-representation, the trial judge erred by telling Smith that he cou…
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1993)
- Matthews v. State, 584 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)