OLIVER TODD, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Todd appeals the denial of a writ of coram nobis after pleading guilty to trafficking in hydromorphone. He argues that hydromorphone does not meet the specific chemical definition in the trafficking statute (morphine, opium, or their salts/isomers), making his conviction factually impossible. The court affirms, holding that even if the statute's language is ambiguous, Todd failed to exercise due diligence by not discovering this defect before pleading guilty.
The court affirmed the denial of coram nobis relief. Although the court did not determine whether Diloreto was correctly decided, it held that Todd failed to satisfy the fundamental prerequisite of 'due diligence' for coram nobis relief because the chemical composition of Dilaudid could easily have been discovered at the time of the plea. Additionally, Todd was not 'an innocent man' but rather clearly guilty of simple possession of a designated controlled substance for which he could have been properly convicted.
[1] A writ of coram nobis requires the petitioner to demonstrate due diligence in discovering the grounds for relief.
[2] Failure to timely assert a defect in the specific offense to which a defendant pled precludes relief via a writ of coram nobis.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“One of the fundamental prerequisites for coram nobis relief, 'due diligence,' was therefore not satisfied.”
Establishes that Todd failed to meet the essential due diligence requirement for coram nobis relief because the chemical composition could have been discovered before the plea.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1988, Todd pleaded guilty to trafficking by possession of over 28 grams of hydromorphone (Dilaudid), a controlled substance. After serving his sent…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Writ Of Error Coram Nobis cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of coram nobis. We affirm.
In 1988, Todd pled guilty to the alleged crime of trafficking by possession of over 28 grams of hydromorphone (Dilaudid) in asserted violation of Florida Statute § 893.135(l)(c). After serving his sentence, he brought the present application on the claimed, and now admitted, ground that Dilaudid is neither “morphine, opium, or any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof, including heroin” as specifically set forth in § 893.135(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1987).1 Relying on State v. Diloreto, 600 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), which held that possession of a substance which did not meet this chemical definition could not justify a conviction for violation of section 893.135(l)(c), even though it was, like hydromorphone, specifically designated in section 893.03(2)(a), he argues that he could therefore not factually have been convicted of the crime and that the writ of .coram nobis should therefore have been granted. See Malcolm v. State, 605 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
In rejecting the appellant’s claim for reversal, we find it unnecessary to determine whether Diloreto was correctly decided.2 This is because the composition of Dilaudid could easily have been discovered by the defendant and his attorney at the time of the plea. One of the fundamental prerequisites for coram nobis relief, “due diligence,” was therefore not satisfied. See Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1979), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla.1991). While Malcolm saw fit to “relax” — read “forego” — this requirement “to correct the conviction of an innocent man,” 605 So. 2d at 948, Todd does not fit that description and therefore does not qualify for that indulgence. To the contrary, he was clearly guilty of the felony of simple possession of a substance designated in section 893.03(2)(a)l.k.3 for which he could have appropriately been convicted and sentenced. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the defendant’s failure timely to assert the alleged defect in the specific offense to which he pled precludes his right to relief. See Hallman, 371 So. 2d at 482. Cf. Janes v. State, 585 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Leonetti v. State, 418 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Wood v. State, 354 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 836 (Fla.1978).
Affirmed.
.The pertinent provisions of the statute provide:
(c) Any person who knowingly sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, 4 grams or more of any morphine, opium, or any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in s. 893.03(l)(b) or (2)(a), or 4 grams or more of any mixture containing any such substance, is guilty of a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in illegal drugs.” If the quantity involved:
3. Is 28 grams or more, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 calendar years and to pay a fine of $500,000.
. The prosecution rather persuasively argues that . Diloreto improperly reads "as described in s. 893.03(l)(b) or (2)(a)” out of the statute.
. This provision reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any of the following substances, whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin or independently by means of chemical synthesis:
1. Opium and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium, except isoquinoline alkaloids of opium, including but not limited to the following:
k. Hydromorphone.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Roan Peart v. State, 756 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2000)…nd guilty at trial and therefore would be facing the same consequence of deportation. See generally Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla.1991); State v. Fox, 659 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 668 So. 2d 602 (Fla.1996); Todd v. State, 648 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Requiring that the defendants establish that they most probably would have been acquitted is concordant with this court’s conclusion that these motions must be brought within two years after judgment and sentence become final, a…
-
Roan Peart v. State, 705 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…at trial and [*1064] therefore would be facing' the same consequence of deportation. See generally Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla.1991); State v. Fox, 659 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), review denied, 668 So. 2d 602 (Fla.1996); Todd v. State, 648 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Requiring that the defendants establish that they most probably would have been acquitted is concordant with this court’s conclusion that these motions must be brought within two years after judgment and sentence become final, a…
-
COX v. State, 75 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…thing else in his vehicle that could get him in trouble, the appellant answered that he had Dilaudid in his gym bag. Hydromor-phone, also known as Dilaudid, is a Schedule II controlled substance. § 893.03(2)(a)l.k., Fla. Stat. (2008); Todd v. State, 648 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); State v. Gillum, 428 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). A subsequent search of the gym bag disclosed drug paraphernalia and a pill bottle containing Dilaudid, on which the State based new charges. Because the appellant admitted the p…
Authorities Cited
- Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991)
- Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1979)
- Vernal Earle Malcolm v. State, 605 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- State v. Diloreto, 600 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Wood v. State, 354 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- McATEE v. McATEE, 585 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Janes v. State, 585 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Pasquale Thomas Leonetti v. State, 418 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)