BONNIE DEHLER, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD DEHLER, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision to limit the custodial mother's occupancy of the marital home until a balloon mortgage payment came due in 1997, holding that the custodial parent should retain exclusive use and possession until the child reaches majority absent compelling financial reasons. The court also reversed on three other issues: failure to properly apply child support guidelines with adequate findings, failure to address medical insurance availability, and failure to account for a marital vehicle's value in equitable distribution.
The court held that the custodial parent should be awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the minor children reach majority or become emancipated, or the former spouse remarries, absent compelling financial reasons, and that a balloon mortgage does not constitute such a compelling reason. The court also held that the trial court must provide either a written order or specific findings on the record explaining any departure from child support guidelines, must inquire into and determine the status of medical insurance for the child, must allocate responsibility for medical expenses, and must account for the value of all marital assets including the disputed vehicle when computing equitable distribution.
[1] The custodial parent should generally be awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the minor children reach majority or become emancipated, or the cu…
[2] A balloon mortgage payment is not a compelling financial reason to deny the custodial parent exclusive use and possession of the marital home.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The general rule is that absent compelling financial reasons, the custodial parent should be awarded the exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the minor children reach majority or become emancipated, or the former wife remarries.”
Establishes the presumptive rule for allocation of the marital home in custody situations and what constitutes compelling financial reasons for departure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBonnie and Richard Dehler were divorced after a three-year marriage with one child. The marital residence was encumbered by a mortgage with a balloon …
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HERSEY, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgement dissolving a three year marriage. The parties have one child.
The former wife, Bonnie Dehler, raises eight issues in her brief. We find four of those to have merit.
The marital residence was encumbered by a mortgage which balloons, or requires payment in full, in 1997. Apparently, because it was not evident from the testimony of the parties that appellee, the former husband, would be able to pay this debt when it came due or to refinance the mortgage, the trial court ruled that appellant and the minor child should have occupancy only until the date when payment would be required. This was error. The general rule is that absent compelling financial reasons, the custodial parent should be awarded the exclusive use and possession of the marital home until the minor children reach majority or become emancipated, or the former wife remarries. Kanouse v. Kanouse, 549 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (citing Zeller v. Zeller, 396 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)); Neustein v. Neustein, 503 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Cabrera v. Cabrera, 484 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The existence of a mortgage calling for a balloon payment is not such a “compelling financial reason,” although it may furnish the basis for a modification at the appropriate time. In any event, we understand from comments of counsel at oral argument that this issue may have become moot.
We next address the amount of child support. Pursuant to section 61.30(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), the child support guidelines presumptively establishes the amount the trier of fact shall order as child support in an initial proceeding for such support.... The trier of fact may order payment of child support in an amount which varies more than 5 percent from such guideline amount only upon a written finding, or a specific finding on the record, explaining why ordering payment of such guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate.
As we pointed out in Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), this statute requires either a written order or specific findings on the record before the trial court may depart from the guidelines. Id. at 868. We cannot tell from the final judgment whether appellant’s income figures are gross or net. In addition, no reasons are given to support a departure from the amount specified in the guidelines. On remand, both of these oversights should be corrected.
The final judgment fails to explain the status of any medical insurance which may be reasonably available for the child, as required by section 61.13(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1993). See Butler v. Brewster, 629 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Nor does it determine responsibility for the child’s medical care. On remand the trial court should inquire into the availability of medical insurance and, in addition, should allocate responsibility for the child’s reasonable medical expenses between the two parties.
Finally, despite uncontroverted evidence that the 1968 GTO automobile was a marital asset, the trial court awarded it to appellee without taking its value into account for computing equitable distribution. This, too, was error. Macaluso v. Macaluso, 523 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.1988). On remand, the trial court should make an adjustment consistent with section 61.075, Florida Statutes (1991).
In all other respects we affirm the final judgment.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
GLICKSTEIN and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
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Schumaker v. Schumaker, 931 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…t is sold. Absent compelling financial reasons, the custodial parent should be awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital residence until the children reach majority or become emancipated or the custodial parent remarries. Dehler v. Dehler, 648 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The cost of the indirect support must be added to the amount of direct support awarded in calculating child support,2 although that could be balanced by giving the custodial parent credit against carrying charges on the property…
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Martin v. Martin, 959 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…cumstances. See Martinez v. Martinez, 573 So. 2d 37, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) rev. denied 581 So. 2d 1309 (Fla.1991). The parties’ relative financial positions along with other considerations may constitute special circumstances. See Dehler v. Dehler, 648 So. 2d 819, 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Here, the short duration the parties resided in the marital residence, the lack of other significant marital assets, and the large differential in relative earning power together constitute special circumstances. Based upo…
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Morrow v. Frommer, 913 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…ther argues that the trial court did not err in failing to order him to pay health insurance because the mother did not ask for any relief in regard to this matter in her answer brief, or within her pleadings at trial. The case of Dehler v. Dehler, 648 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), involved a dissolution of marriage where the final judgment failed to explain the status of any medical insurance which may have been reasonably available for the child, as required by Florida statutes. In that situation, t…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Zeller v. Zeller, 396 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Kanouse v. Kanouse, 549 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- Cabrera v. Cabrera, 484 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Butler v. Lavonne Brewster, 629 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Fica v. State, 523 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- MacAluso v. MacAluso, 523 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Dean v. Dean, 503 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Neustein v. Monroe Neustein, 503 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)