CLINT A. JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jones was convicted of robbery with a firearm and challenged the jury instruction that his knowledge of his codefendant's firearm was unnecessary for conviction. The court affirmed, holding that under accomplice liability principles, all participants in a robbery are guilty as principals if any participant carried a firearm, regardless of whether the aider and abettor knew of the weapon.
The jury instruction was proper: when a firearm is possessed by a defendant's accomplice during a robbery, the defendant's knowledge of the firearm is not necessary for conviction if he aided and abetted the accomplice. The accomplice's knowledge of every detail is unnecessary so long as there is evidence of intent to participate. Evidence of the stolen credit card's use was admissible under Florida Statutes section 812.022.
[1] A defendant can be convicted of armed robbery even if they did not personally possess a firearm, provided their accomplice possessed one during the commission of the crim…
[2] Under Florida law, if any participant in a robbery carries a firearm, all participants are guilty as principals of armed robbery.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If a firearm is in the possession of a defendant's accomplice and the defendant aids and assists in the accomplice's commission of the crime of robbery with a firearm, then, the defendant's knowledge of the accomplice's possession of a firearm is not necessary for a defendant to be guilty of the crime of robbery with a firearm.”
This is the jury instruction given by the trial court, which the appellate court found to be correct statement of law regarding accomplice liability.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo men approached the victim and her friend in a parking lot. One man (Jones's codefendant) brandished a gun. Witnesses testified that Jones was reac…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence for .robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), rejecting his contention that the trial' court erred in instructing the jury that appellant’s knowledge of the codefendant’s use of the firearm was not required in order to convict appellant.
The victim of this robbery and her friend both testified that they were in a parking lot talking when two men came from behind some bushes. The men passed but then turned around. One of them, appellant’s eo-defendant, brandished a gun. At that point the friend saw appellant reaching for her purse, but the victim set off a personal alarm, dropped her own purse and everyone scattered. The appellant and his codefendant ran, with the codefendant picking up the dropped purse.
During jury deliberations the jury asked whether or not the appellant had to know whether the eodefendant had a firearm in order to convict him of armed robbery. In answer to the question, the trial court informed the jury that If a firearm is in the possession of a defendant’s accomplice and the defendant aids and assists in the accomplice’s commission of the crime of robbery with a firearm, then, the defendant’s knowledge of the accomplice’s possession of a firearm is not necessary for a defendant to be guilty of the crime of robbery with a firearm.
We find no error in the instruction. First, if any one participant in a robbery carried a firearm during the commission of the crime, all of the participants are guilty as principals under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1993). See § 812.13(2)(a)(1993); • Hicks v. State, 583 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Hough v. State, 448 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Second, it is sufficient for the jury to find that appellant aided and abetted the eodefendant to find him also guilty of any crime committed by the codefendant in pursuance of the common scheme. Davis v. State, 275 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). To be found guilty as a principal it is not necessary for the aider and abettor to know of every detail of the crime so long as there exists evidence of the aider’s intent to participate. In the instant case, the victim’s friend testified that appellant was grabbing for her purse when the victim’s alarm went off. This sufficiently evinces an intent by the appellant to participate in the crime to uphold the jury’s determination of his guilt. See Busch v. State, 355 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), vacated on other grounds, 446 U.S. 902, 100 S.Ct. 1826, 64 L.Ed.2d 255 (1980).
Appellant also complains that the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning the use of the victim’s stolen credit card at a store the day after the robbery. Such evidence was admissible pursuant to section 812.022, Florida Statutes (1993).
Affirmed.
GLICKSTEIN, WARNER and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
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Valease Jackson v. State, 662 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Indeed, one may be convicted of armed robbery with a deadly weapon if the weapon is carried by an accomplice during the robbery, notwithstanding lack of knowledge that the accomplice has the weapon. E.g., Jones v. State, 648 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). To accept appellant’s argument would lead to the anomalous result that, while one may be convicted of armed robbery with a deadly weapon in the circumstances just cited, he or she may not be convicted of that offense when a moto…
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Nation v. State, 668 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…APON UNDER SECTION 812.13(2)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993)? . Jackson, 662 So. 2d at 1371. . Jaclcson, 662 So. 2d at 1372 (citing Thomas v. State, 589 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); State v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Jones v. State, 648 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)).…
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T.B. v. State, 732 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…se in carrying out the carjacking of that same vehicle and the kidnapping of its owner was sufficient evi [*1167] dence of defendant’s knowledge of Reese’s criminal deeds and defendant’s intent to participate in those criminal acts); Jones v. State, 648 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The parties agree that the written juvenile disposition order must be corrected.1 False imprisonment is a third-degree felony “punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years.” §§ 787.02(2) & 775.082(3)(d), Fla. S…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brewster v. State, 448 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Tondrick Hough v. State, 448 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Davis v. State, 275 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Gunter v. Gunter, 275 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Zachery Hicks v. State, 583 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Busch v. State, 355 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Jackson v. Wisconsin, 446 U.S. 902 (U.S. 1980)
- Busch v. Florida, 446 U.S. 902 (U.S. 1980)