ALLEN O'NEAL, LOUIS TOTARO, THEODORE J. HINTZKE III AND RUBEN RODRIGUEZ, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Four defendants appealed county court convictions for driving with a suspended license, arguing that their identities obtained during allegedly illegal stops should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal held that a defendant's actual identity is not suppressible regardless of how the police officer came to observe the defendant, even following an unlawful stop.
The court answered the certified question in the negative and held that a defendant's identity cannot be subject to suppression, regardless of whether the officer's opportunity to observe the defendant resulted from an unjustified stop. The identity of a defendant obtained during a stop is not subject to suppression even if the stop was unlawful.
[1] A defendant's identity, even if discovered through an illegal stop, is not suppressible as fruit of the poisonous tree when the officer had no prior knowledge of the defe…
[2] The identity of a defendant obtained during an unjustified stop is not subject to suppression.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is clear to us that the "identity" of a defendant cannot be subject to "suppression," however the officer's occasion to observe him came about, and, specifically, even if it occurred after an unjustified stop.”
Establishes the core holding that defendant identity is never suppressible regardless of the legality of the stop
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellants were convicted in county court of driving with a suspended license. The convictions arose from stops in which police officers identifie…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
These are appeals from county court convictions for driving with a suspended license, in which it certified the following question to this court:
Is the actual identity of a defendant obtained pursuant to an illegal stop suppressible as a fruit of the poisonous tree where the police officer had no knowledge of the defendant’s identity prior to the stop?
We assume jurisdiction, see Fla.R.App.P. 9.160, answer the question in the negative, and thus affirm the convictions under review.
It is clear to us that the “identity” of a defendant cannot be subject to “suppression,” however the officer’s occasion to observe him came about, and, specifically, even if it occurred after an unjustified stop. The United States Supreme Court so held in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 3483-84, 82 L.Ed.2d 778, 786 (1984) and this court reiterated the principle in State v. Ramos, 598 So. 2d 267, 268 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“Whether or not the stop was lawful, the identity of the defendant obtained during the stop is not subject to suppression.”) (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039-40, 104 S.Ct. at 3483-84, 82 L.Ed.2d at 786) and State v. Leyva, 599 So. 2d 691, 694 n. 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“[T]he identity of a defendant is not subject to suppression, even if the identity was learned as a result of an unlawful arrest.”) (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039, 104 S.Ct. at 3483, 82 L.Ed.2d at 786).
See also State v. E.T., 560 So. 2d 1282, 1284-85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).1 Contra Robinson v. State, 617 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
Affirmed.
. The defendants' attempt to analogize the situation to the cases which "suppress” a witness's in-court identification on the ground that it was induced by unlawfully suggestive police conduct, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), is fallacious. In those situations, the in-court identification is not permitted because the unlawful actions of the police have resulted in a substantial likelihood that the identification is inaccurate or incorrect. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228, 87 S.Ct. at 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1158 ("A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification."); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 301-02, 87 S.Ct. at 1972-73, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1206 (criminal defendant has due process right not to be identified prior to trial in manner "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification”).
These cases do not apply here, however, because there is no question whatever that the respective defendant — and not some other person — was the one driving the vehicle without a license.
In contrast, the cases which do apply are those which hold that the fact that an un lawful arrest of the defendant has resulted in his being placed in a fair and untainted lineup does not invalidate the subsequent identification. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039-40, 104 S.Ct. at 3483-84, 82 L.Ed.2d at 786; United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980).
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Ware v. State, 679 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…s exceeded anything permitted by Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1741, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). Nevertheless, the county court concluded that the motion to suppress must be denied on the authority of O’Neal v. State, 649 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 659 So. 2d 272 (Fla.1995). In O’Neal the Third District held that “the ‘identity’ of a defendant cannot be subject to ‘suppression,’ however the officer’s occasion to observe him came about, and, specifically, even if it…
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State v. Will Perkins, 760 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2000)…PER CURIAM. We have for review the Fourth District’s decision in Perkins v. State, 734 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which certified conflict with the Third District’s decision in O’Neal v. State, 649 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), and the Second District’s decision in Ware v. State, 679 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2nd DCA 19.96). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow we approve Perkins, and disapprove O’Neal and Ware. The res…1 / 2
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Will Perkins v. State, 734 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…s showed that the officer had no probable cause to stop the vehicle. Nevertheless, the trial [*481] court denied Perkins’ motion to suppress, acknowledging the binding authority of Ware v. State, 679 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), and O’Neal v. State, 649 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). In Ware and O’Neal, the Second and Third Districts decided that the identity of the defendant is not subject to suppression under the same circumstances found in this case. Both cases relied on the United States Supreme Court op…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1967)
- Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (U.S. 1967)
- Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (U.S. 1984)
- United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (U.S. 1980)
- State v. Wilfredo Leyva, 599 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- State v. E.T., 560 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- State v. Ramos, 598 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Robinson v. State, 617 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)