VIRGINIA PARKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, VOLUNTEER SERVICES BUREAU, DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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A worker's compensation claimant appeals a decision classifying her as a volunteer for a private entity, which would exclude her from workers' compensation coverage. The court reversed, holding that because the claimant's volunteer work was performed entirely under the direction and control of a governmental entity, she qualifies as a volunteer worker for a governmental entity and is therefore entitled to workers' compensation protection.
The claimant is a volunteer worker for the governmental entity and therefore falls within the statutory definition of employee under section 440.02(13)(d)3, Florida Statutes, which includes volunteers for governmental entities. The intent of the parties to avoid coverage does not control; rather, the analysis focuses on which entity's control and direction governed the work performed.
[1] A volunteer worker for a governmental entity is included within the statutory definition of employee for workers' compensation purposes.
[2] An arrangement where a governmental entity sends a volunteer to a private entity, with the understanding of referral back to the governmental entity, does not preclude an…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“volunteer, except a volunteer worker for the state or a county, city or other governmental entity”
The statutory exemption from the definition of employee that the court interpreted to include the claimant
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceVirginia Parker offered her volunteer services to a governmental entity, which then sent her to work for a private entity with the understanding she w…
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ALLEN, Judge.
The claimant appeals a workers’ compensation order by which she was found to be a volunteer worker for a private entity, so as to be excluded from the statutory definition of employee by section 440.02(13)(d)3, Florida Statutes (1991). We conclude that the claimant was a volunteer worker for a governmental entity, so as to be included in the definition of employee.
The claimant offered her volunteer services to a governmental entity which sent her to the private entity, with the understanding that the claimant would be referred back to the governmental entity. This arrangement was apparently undertaken by the governmental entity with the hope of avoiding workers’ compensation coverage by invoking section 440.02(13)(d)3, which provides that the statutory definition of employee does not include a “volunteer, except a volunteer worker for the state or a county, city or other governmental entity.”
In finding that the claimant was a volunteer worker for the private entity which referred her back to the governmental entity, the judge gave effect to the governmental entity’s apparent intent in this regard. But such intent does not resolve the question of whether there was an employment relation with the governmental entity. See Herman v. Roche, 533 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The claimant’s volunteer work was performed entirely for, and under the direction and control of, the governmental entity in circumstances closely analogous to the use of a worker obtained from a labor service. Such workers are routinely found to be employed by the entity for which the work is ultimately performed. See Maxson v. Air Products and Chemicals, 554 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Rumsey v. Eastern Distribution, 445 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 451 So. 2d 850 (Fla.1984). Because the pertinent indicia of employment resided with the governmental entity in the present case, the claimant should have been found to be a volunteer worker for the' governmental entity. As such, the claimant is within the statutory definition of employee under section 440.02(13)(d)3.
The order is reversed and the case is remanded.
BARFIELD and KAHN, JJ., concur.
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Fleming Cos., Inc. v. Moreira, 690 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…consistently interpret this statute to apply to companies hiring workers through temporary employment agencies. See B.E.T. Plant Services, Inc. v. Dyer, 678 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1996); Parker v. State Dep’t of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 649 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In Booher v. Pepperidge Farm, the Supreme Court of Florida granted immunity from a temporary employee’s tort suit where the temporary employment agency provided workers’ compensation coverage. 468 So. 2d 985 (Fla.1985). The cour…
Authorities Cited
- Rumsey v. E. Distrib., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Zachery Herman v. Roche, 533 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Rosen v. Rosen, 554 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)