YVETTE WALLER, APPELLANT,
v.
ERNEST WALLER, APPELLEE
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The court held that an order granting a plaintiff's motion to amend a complaint and extend time for service is a nonfinal, nonappealable order.
[1] An order granting a motion to amend a complaint and add a party as a defendant is not an appealable nonfinal order.
[2] An order granting an extension of time for service of process is not an appealable nonfinal order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff filed a complaint, which was dismissed for failure to serve the defendant within 120 days. The plaintiff then moved to amend the complaint t…
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DANAHY, Acting Chief Judge.
The appellee (the plaintiff) originated this action by filing a complaint against the appellant (the defendant) and another party on August 31, 1990. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on July 22,1993, alleging that the initial complaint was filed but never served on her within 120 days as required by Florida Rule Civil Procedure 1.070(i). The trial court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, reconsideration and leave to amend his complaint, essentially requesting that the appellant be added again as a defendant to the pending action. In his motion the plaintiff also filed a motion to extend time for service. An order was entered on June 20, 1994, granting the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and to add the appellant as a defendant, and granting an extension of time within which to serve the appellant. The appellant seeks to bring this order before us for review. We find both dispositions in the order to be nonfinal and nonap-pealable. Accordingly, we dismiss.
In Khandjian v. Compagnie Financiere Mediterranee Cofimed, S.A, 619 So. 2d 348 (Fla.2d DCA 1993), this court adopted the position that an order denying a motion to dismiss under rule 1.070(i) is not an appeal-able nonfinal order because it does not involve a question of personal jurisdiction. Thus, such an order does not fall within any of the categories listed in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3).
We believe the analysis in Khandjian requires us to hold that the granting of the plaintiffs request to amend his complaint and to add the appellant again as a defendant does not involve a matter of personal jurisdiction. Neither that part of the order nor the part granting an extension of time within which to serve the appellant is appealable under rule 1.930(a)(3).
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal because the order sought to be reviewed is a nonfinal, nonappealable order. Appeal dismissed.
CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
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Brent D. Schlapper, D.O. v. Maurer, 687 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…tion of a discoverable fact, especially when the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation already possesses the correct information. Finally, I would dismiss the appeal of the order allowing the Maurers to amend their complaint. Waller v. Waller, 650 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a), State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lenard, 531 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). . The trial court made no finding in this regard. . Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is substantially…
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Gomez v. Leyda Ana Gomez, 702 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…llee-wife’s motion to join the appellant, her brother-in-law, as a defendant in her dissolution action. The order does not, as the appellant claims, “determine ... jurisdiction of [his] person” under Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i); Waller v. Waller, 650 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); National Lake Devs., Inc. v. Lake Tippecanoe Owners Ass’n, Inc., 395 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), approved, 417 So. 2d 655 (Fla.1982), and is not otherwise appealable. Hence, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.…
Authorities Cited
- Berge O. Khandjian and Tuula Khandjian v. Compagnie Financiere Mediterranee Cofimed, S.A., 619 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)