ANN ELAINE CASTRO, PETITIONER,
v.
HONORABLE RICHARD A. LUCE, AS CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ann Castro, a lawyer, challenged the designation of Judge Luce to hear an indirect criminal contempt proceeding initiated by Judge Case based on her alleged disrespect toward the court. The court held that Florida law requires the Chief Justice to designate a successor judge when contempt charges involve disrespect or criticism of the initiating judge, regardless of whether the initial judge voluntarily or compulsorily recuses himself.
The court held that Rule 3.840(e) applies regardless of whether the initial judge voluntarily or compulsorily recuses himself. When contempt charges involve disrespect or criticism of a judge, the Chief Justice must designate the successor judge, and the initial judge's voluntary compliance with disqualification does not eliminate this requirement.
[1] A judge who initiates an indirect criminal contempt proceeding involving allegations of disrespect or criticism of that judge must disqualify himself.
[2] When a judge disqualifies himself from presiding over an indirect criminal contempt proceeding that involves disrespect or criticism of that judge, another judge must be…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, the judge shall disqualify himself or herself from presiding at the hearing. Another judge shall be designated by the chief justice of the supreme court.”
The controlling statute requiring Chief Justice designation of successor judges in contempt cases involving disrespect or criticism
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJudge James R. Case presided over an emotional child custody hearing on February 25, 1994, where Ms. Castro, a Florida Bar member representing the mot…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.830 cases and more on FLexlaw
ALTENBERND, Judge.
The petitioner, Ann Elaine Castro, seeks a writ of prohibition to review an order denying disqualification of the judge assigned to hear an indirect criminal contempt proceeding. That judge was assigned to hear the case by the same judge who initiated the proceeding. Because the proceeding involves allegations of disrespect or criticism of the initial judge, Ms. Castro was entitled to have the successor judge designated by the Chief Justice of The Supreme Court of Florida.
According to an order to show cause issued by Judge James R. Case, he presided over an emotional hearing on February 25, 1994, involving a child custody issue. Ms. Castro, a member of The Florida Bar, represented the mother at that hearing. During and after the hearing, Ms. Castro engaged in conduct that Judge Case regarded as disrespectful or critical of the court, rising to the level of both direct and indirect contempt.
Judge Case did not proceed summarily under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.830 on the charge of direct contempt. That decision was prudent because he may have “enmeshed himself as the trier of fact and law in a controversy in which he was at the epicenter.” Mann v. State, 476 So. 2d 1369, 1375-76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Instead, Judge Case entered an order to show cause on March 31, 1994. At that time, he was Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit. He voluntarily recused himself and assigned Judge Richard A. Luce to hear the case. Ms. Castro filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding on grounds that included the failure of Judge Case to comply with the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840(e). Before the court ruled on this motion, Ms. Castro also moved to disqualify Judge Luce on the ground that he had not been lawfully designated to hear the case by the chief justice as required by rule 3.840(e). Rule 3.840(e) states: “If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, the judge shall disqualify himself or herself from presiding at the hearing. Another judge shall be designated by the chief justice of the supreme court.” When the motion to disqualify was denied, Ms. Castro filed this petition for a writ of prohibition.
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to disqualify a trial judge on a timely petition for writ of prohibition. See Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla.1978); Brewton v. Kelly, 166 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). It is arguable that Judge Luce, as a judicial officer, could have exercised the power to punish for contempt in this case if the issue had not been properly preserved in the trial court and if this petition had not been filed in this court. See Bumgarner v. State, 245 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). The possibility that Judge Luce could have validly exercised power in the absence of an objection does not render prohibition an improper writ to test this issue.
On the merits, we initially observe that not all indirect contempt proceedings involve disrespect to or criticism of the judge who initiates the proceeding. See Lowe v. State, 468 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Judge Case voluntarily disqualified himself without any announced explanation. Judge Luce concluded that rule 3.840(e) applies if the initial judge is compelled to disqualify himself, but does not apply if that judge voluntarily recuses himself. Accordingly, he denied the motion to disqualify.
The allegations in Judge Case’s order to show cause do involve disrespect or criticism of him. Under rule 3.840, he correctly disqualified himself. The fact that he voluntarily complied with the law does not eliminate Ms. Castro’s right to a judge designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida.
Accordingly, we order the Chief Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit to request the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Flori da to designate a judge to hear this proceeding. We assume that the formal issuance of the writ will be unnecessary.
The petition for writ of prohibition is granted.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Pierce v. State, 873 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…ourt erred in denying his facially sufficient motion to disqualify the trial judge. A writ of prohibition is the appropriate avenue for relief after the denial of a motion to disqualify a trial judge because of bias or other reasons. Castro v. Luce, 650 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). A judge considering a motion to disqualify shall not look beyond the facial sufficiency of the motion. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(f); Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla.1978). Because Mr. Pierce’s motion to disqualify was…
-
Jimenez v. Rateni, 967 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…awfully. This is akin to the injury of being required to try a case before a judge who has improperly denied a motion for disqualification of the judge, an injury for which interlocutory relief is available by way of prohibition. See Castro v. Luce, 650 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). It is also akin to the injury of being required to try a case where the trial court has erred in its disposition of a motion for disqualification of counsel, an injury for which certiorari relief is available. See Gonzalez ex rel…
-
Yacenda Hudson and Amina McNeil v. Marin, 259 So. 3d 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…etitioners, and therefore prohibition is an appropriate remedy in this case. In addition, prohibition will lie to prevent a contempt proceeding from going forward at a hearing before a judge that should be disqualified. Id. at 782 ; Castro v. Luce, 650 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). For analogous reasons, we also conclude that prohibition is also an appropriate remedy where the attorney appointed by the trial court to serve as the special prosecutor at the contempt hearing should be disqualified. B. N…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Sanford Freed, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1978)
- Brewton v. Kelly, 166 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Bumgarner v. State, 245 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Mann v. State, 476 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Lowe v. State, 468 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)