GERALD JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE (TWO CASES)
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Gerald Jones appeals two criminal convictions, challenging whether the trial court properly complied with Faretta requirements before allowing him to represent himself pro se. The court reverses and remands both cases for new trials because the trial court failed to obtain a clear and unequivocal request for self-representation, failed to inform Jones of the disadvantages of self-representation, and failed to renew the offer of counsel at subsequent proceedings.
The court holds that the trial court failed to comply with Faretta requirements in both cases because: (1) the record does not reflect a clear and unequivocal request for self-representation; (2) the trial court did not inform Jones of the disadvantages of self-representation; and (3) the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel before voir dire and trial. These failures constitute reversible error regardless of the strength of the evidence.
[1] A defendant's request to proceed pro se must be clear and unequivocal.
[2] A trial court must inform a defendant of the disadvantages of self-representation before allowing them to proceed pro se.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant's request to proceed pro se must be clear and unequivocal.”
Establishes the foundational requirement for a valid pro se waiver
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones was tried by jury in two separate criminal cases. During the proceedings, he apparently sought to represent himself, but the record does not cle…
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LAZZARA, Judge.
Appellant challenges the judgments and sentences imposed after jury trials in two separate eases.1 He argues that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), before allowing him to represent himself.2 We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial in each case. We affirm, however, the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress when appellant was represented by counsel.
A defendant’s request to proceed pro se must be clear and unequivocal. Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071 (Fla.1988). Once such a request is made, a trial court, consistent with Faretta, must inform a defendant of the disadvantages of self-representation. A failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Hayes v. State, 566 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Additionally, assuming a proper Faretta inquiry, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d) requires a trial court to “renew the offer of assistance of counsel at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without counsel.” Pall v. State, 632 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
In neither case does the record reflect that the appellant clearly and unequivocally expressed a desire to represent himself. Nor does the record in each case reflect that the trial court properly informed the appellant of the disadvantages of self-representation. Finally, the record in each case is clear that the trial court failed to renew the offer of assistance of counsel prior to voir dire and the evidentiary portion of the trial.
Our supreme court has recently held that the harmless error rule does not apply when a trial court fails to conduct a proper Faretta inquiry. State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla.1993). The court concluded, in that regard, “that the United States Supreme Court decision in Faretta, and our own rule 3.111(d) require a reversal when there is not a proper Faretta inquiry.” 626 So. 2d at 657. Accordingly, we are compelled to reverse the appellant’s judgment and sentences in both cases and remand for new trials.
In light of the supreme court’s recent pronouncement in Young, we emphasize that it is imperative that trial courts strictly adhere to the requirements of Faretta and rule 3.111(d) when faced with a defendant’s apparent request for self-representation, especially when different judges are involved in the pre-trial and trial proceedings. See Pall v. State, 632 So. 2d 1084. We recognize that compliance with these requirements often involves a tedious, time-consuming, and sometimes frustrating process. Based on Young, however, an appellate court faced with a record of non-compliance has no alternative but to reverse and remand for a new trial, as in these cases, no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt may be, at great expense to judicial economy and resources.
Suppression order affirmed, but reversed and remanded for new trials.
PATTERSON, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur. . We consolidated the cases for purposes of this opinion because they raised identical issues.
. Appellant’s counsel initially filed briefs in both cases pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), alleging no meritorious grounds in support of reversal. In accordance with State v. Causey, 503 So. 2d 321 (Fla.1987), however, we directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the Faretta issue.
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Citator
Cited By
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Vera v. State, 689 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…379, 1380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The trial court was required as part of the Faretta inquiry to apprise Vera of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and to warn him of the severity of the charge and its possible penalty. Jones v. State, 650 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (trial court’s failure to inform defendant of disadvantages of self-representation is reversible error; harmless error rule does not apply). There is no indication in the record that the trial court apprised Vera of the dangers of…
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Hutchens v. State, 730 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…ourt to safeguard the accused’s constitutional right to self-representation. The failure to conduct a proper Faretta inquiry is reversible error and the harmless error doctrine is inapplicable. See State v. Young, 626 So. 2d at 657; Jones v. State, 650 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Neeld v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D549, 729 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We point out once again: We realize that the procedures mandated by these cases will often involve a tedious [*827] and time consuming process designed…
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Neeld v. State, 729 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…nefits and dangers of self-representation. See Vera v. State, 689 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The failure to make an inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), is reversible error. See Jones v. State, 650 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). This court has previously noted the burden placed on trial courts by the requirements of Faretta: We realize that the procedures mandated by these cases will often involve a tedious and time-consuming process designed to test t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Causey, 503 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1987)
- Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1993)
- Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Hayes v. State, 566 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Pall v. State, 632 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)