STANLEY HELM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1995-02-15
No. 94-00059
RYDER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur.
651 So. 2d 142 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1995) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Stanley Helm, a licensed attorney, was convicted of grand theft for allegedly misappropriating a $7,000 down payment from clients. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence that Helm stole the money rather than properly forwarding it to the property owner as he claimed.


Holding

The conviction must be reversed because the state failed to present evidence inconsistent with Helm's theory that he properly converted the cash to a cashier's check and mailed it to Hughes. The state did not exclude every reasonable inference except guilt, which is required in circumstantial evidence cases.


Headnotes

[1] Where evidence of intent to participate in the commission of a crime is entirely circumstantial, the evidence must be consistent with guilt and exclude every reasonable h…

[2] Mere presence at the scene of a crime, handling of a weapon, and a parent's return of the weapon are insufficient to eliminate a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

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Key Quotes

“A trial court should grant a judgment of acquittal "in a circumstantial evidence case if the state fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt."”

Establishes the legal standard for sufficiency of evidence in circumstantial cases.

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Facts & Procedural History

In February 1983, the Gayfers gave Helm a $7,000 down payment to hold while purchasing a home from Derek Hughes in England. Helm testified he immediat…

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Opinion of the Court
QUINCE, Judge.

[*143] QUINCE, Judge.

Stanley Helm (Helm) appeals his conviction for grand theft. Because there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict, we reverse.

Helm was a licensed Florida attorney in 1983. On February 23, 1983, Sally and Donald Gayfers (the Gayfers) went to Helm’s law office to sign a purchase contract on a home they wished to buy. Prior to their visit, they had learned the home was owned by Derek Hughes (Hughes), who lived in England. While they were at Helm’s office, they executed a contract to purchase and gave Helm a down payment of $7,000.00. The contract was witnessed by Helm and his secretary.

About a month later, the Gayfers received a call from Hughes which caused them some concern about their down payment. They returned to Helm’s office, and found it closed. Helm never returned to his office after the Gayfers’ second visit, and his secretary subsequently closed his office.

At trial, Helm testified that he was acquainted with Hughes, and that Hughes never retained him as counsel. A mutual Mend asked him to facilitate the sale of Hughes’ house by drafting a contract and accepting the down payment. Helm stated he received the down payment from the Gayfers and took the cash immediately to the bank. He testified he got a cashier’s check made out to Hughes and forwarded the contract and the check to Hughes. Helm indicated no arrangement was made for any further involvement by him in the sale.

There was no testimony or evidence that Hughes did not receive the down payment. The only testimony alluding in any way to nonreceipt of the money was a statement by Mr. Gayfer that he was required to pay an additional $3,500.00 to close the sale. Hughes did not testify in person or by deposition.

A trial court should grant a judgment of acquittal “in a circumstantial evidence case if the state fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla.1989). The court went on to say where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id.

Helm testified he sent Hughes the money received from the Gayfers. There is nothing in the record to negate this assertion. Neither Hughes nor the Gayfers ever said Hughes did not receive the money. While Mr. Gayfer’s statement that he had to pay Hughes an additional $3,500.00 might be interpreted to mean he believed Hughes never received all of the money, this testimony fails to exclude other reasonable possibilities for the location of the money. Just as Mr. Gayfer’s statement is susceptible of that interpretation, it could also be inferred that Hughes simply asked for more money.

Although the state does not have to rebut conclusively every possible variation of events which could be inferred from the evidence, the state must introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with defendant’s theory of events. Naumowicz v. State, 562 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA1990), rev. denied, 576 So. 2d 289 (Fla.1991). Since the state failed to exclude every reasonable inference except that of guilt, a judgment of acquittal should have been granted. There was no competent evidence to rebut Helm’s allegations that he changed the Gayfers’ down payment to a cashier’s check and mailed it to Hughes. Because there was no way to determine from the evidence whether the money was missing due to Helm’s conduct or due to other reasonable possibilities, it was error to convict Helm of grand theft.

We reverse Helm’s conviction for grand theft and remand with instructions to the trial court to discharge Helm on this offense. Since we are reversing on sufficiency grounds, we do not comment on Helm’s second issue concerning the statute of limitations.

RYDER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Luscomb v. State, 660 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
    …reshold burden is met, it becomes the jury’s duty to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, [footnote omitted] Law, 559 So. 2d at 188-189.1 See also Helm v. State, 651 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Hale v. State, 651 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Helton v. State, 641 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), rev. den., 651 So. 2d 1194 (Fla.1995); Lee v. State, 640 So. 2d 126, 127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Viewing the evidence in a li…
  • J.R.S. v. State, 702 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …2d 187 (Fla.1989). While under Law, 559 So. 2d 187, the state is not required to rebut every conceivable variation of [*541] events, it must introduce competent evidence that is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of events. See Helm v. State, 651 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We conclude that the state did not meet its burden here. Appellant’s theory of events is that he only went to the victim’s home to see if the teenage son was home. After knocking on the front door and getting no response, he tri…

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