EDWARD TAYLON SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Edward Smith appeals his conviction for grand theft and dealing in stolen property, challenging his sentencing as a habitual offender. The court affirms the convictions but reverses the habitual offender sentence due to the trial court's failure to make required statutory findings and improper consideration of a prior conviction, and also reverses the restitution order due to insufficient evidence.
The court affirmed the convictions but reversed the habitual offender sentence because the trial court failed to make the required specific findings and improperly considered the 1982 conviction since Smith was on community control rather than probation. The restitution order was also reversed due to insufficient evidence of the amount owed.
[1] A trial court must make specific findings pursuant to section 775.084(3)(d), Florida Statutes, to sentence a defendant as a habitual offender.
[2] Penal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the accused.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree that the trial court failed to make the required findings to sentence appellant as a habitual offender. After the state presented evidence of appellant's prior convictions, the trial court merely stated that appellant qualified as a habitual offender. This does not satisfy the statutory requirement for specific findings.”
Establishes that the trial court's failure to make specific findings pursuant to section 775.084(3)(d) was reversible error.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith was convicted of grand theft and dealing in stolen property involving video machines. The trial court merged the grand theft conviction with the…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Dealing In Stolen Property cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Edward Taylon Smith, challenges his conviction and sentence for grand theft and dealing in stolen property. After his conviction, the trial judge “merged” the grand theft conviction with the charge of dealing in stolen property, adjudicated appellant guilty and sentenced appellant to twelve years in prison as a habitual offender. We find no merit in the issues he raises regarding his conviction for stealing and selling video machines.
We do, however, find merit in appellant’s argument that he should not have been sentenced as a habitual offender since the trial court failed to make the required specific findings pursuant to section 775.084(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1991). Appellant also contends that he was on community control for a prior 1982 conviction in which adjudication of guilt was withheld. As such, he argues that the conviction should not have been considered for purposes of habitualization since he was not on probation as specified in section 775.084(2).
We agree that the trial court failed to make the required findings to sentence appellant as a habitual offender. After the state presented evidence of appellant’s prior convictions, the trial court merely stated that appellant qualified as a habitual offender. This does not satisfy the statutory requirement for specific findings. See Livernois v. State, 625 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
The trial court also found that the intent of the habitual offender statute is that probation and community control are to be treated synonymously. In Overstreet v. State, 629 So. 2d 125 (Fla.1993), the supreme court stated that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused. The court also stated that the plain language of the statute includes only those offenses occurring while on probation, and that the court would decline to add words to a statute where the language is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, we agree that the trial court should not have considered appellant’s 1982 conviction since he was on community control ánd not probation when the instant offense was committed. Upon remand, the trial court may sentence appellant as a habitual offender after making the requisite findings if such factors are present.
Finally, we agree that the state failed to present sufficient, competent evidence of the amount of restitution. The state failed to introduce receipts or inventories for the items and simply stated that the amount of restitution was stated in the PSI. This is not sufficient and requires reversal of the restitution order. The trial court may hold another hearing where the state can present competent evidence of the victims’ loss. See Winborn v. State, 625 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
Appellant’s convictions are affirmed, but his sentences are reversed and remanded for treatment consistent herewith.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2000)…in part, dissenting in part). Moreover, the Trotter I majority specifically held, “[P]ro-bation is not equivalent to being under sentence of imprisonment, for the appellant was not incarcerated.” Trotter, 576 So. 2d at 694. See also Smith v. State, 651 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(finding in a pre-Trotter II decision that the trial court improperly entered a habitual offender sentence when the habitual offender statute referred to probation and defendant was on community control). In light of the distincti…
-
Fisher v. State, 722 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…, see Moore v. State, 664 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), we opt instead to reverse and remand so that a new restitution hearing regarding the value of the jewelry can be held. See Tullis v. State, 692 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Smith v. State, 651 So. 2d 1218, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); C.S. v. State, 617 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. MINER, WEBSTER, JJ„ and SMITH, LARRY G., Senior Judge, concur.…
-
Bellamy v. State, 712 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…gs on the record that a defendant qualifies for habitual offender treatment. The judge here merely stated that he found “a factual basis for him to be treated as an Habitual Felony Offender.” This did not comply with the statute. See Smith v. State, 651 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We realize that a failure to make specific findings in such matters can be harmless error. See Herrington v. State, 643 So. 2d 1078 (Fla.1994). But in Bellamy’s case the dates of his previous convictions could have been more than…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Overstreet v. State, 629 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1993)
- Winborn v. State, 625 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- State v. Bradford Sutton, 625 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Livernois v. State, 625 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)