WILLIE JAMES WYATT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Willie James Wyatt's convictions, habitualized sentence, and the trial court's imposition of attorney's fees and costs with an accompanying lien. The court resolved a jurisdictional question regarding whether a trial court retains authority to assess fees and costs after a notice of appeal is filed, holding that it does.
The trial court retains jurisdiction to assess attorney's fees and costs after a notice of appeal is filed, and the filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of this jurisdiction. Express reservation of jurisdiction to assess fees and costs is not required, and fees and costs may be assessed as a collateral and independent claim within a reasonable time.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to assess attorney's fees and costs after a notice of appeal has been filed.
[2] A post-judgment motion for attorney's fees raises a collateral and independent claim over which the trial court has continuing jurisdiction.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Roberts, 260 So.2d at 494, indicates that costs "may be adjudicated after final judgment, after the expiration of the appeal period, during the pendency of an appeal, and even after the appeal has been concluded."”
Establishes that filing a notice of appeal does not divest trial court jurisdiction to assess costs and fees
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWillie James Wyatt was convicted and received a habitualized sentence. The trial court imposed attorney's fees and costs against him with an accompany…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PER CURIAM.
We affirm appellant’s convictions, habitual-ized sentence, imposition of attorney’s fees and costs, and the accompanying lien against appellant.
With respect to the attorney’s fees and costs, the state failed to respond to appellant’s position that the notice of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction and vested exclusive jurisdiction here, and his reliance upon Gatlin v. State, 618 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).1 Nevertheless, we conclude appellant’s position is not persuasive in light of Roberts v. Askew, 260 So. 2d 492 (Fla.1972), and Finkelstein v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d 1241 (Fla.1986).
‘ Roberts, 260 So. 2d at 494, indicates that costs “may be adjudicated after final judg ment, after the expiration of the appeal period, during the pendency of an appeal, and even after the appeal has been concluded.
However, the motion to tax costs should be made within a reasonable time after the appeal has been concluded.” (emphasis added).
Thus, Roberts indicates that the filing of a notice of appeal does not preclude the trial court from assessing costs, and presumably also fees, regardless of whether the motion for costs or fees was filed before or after the notice of appeal. See also McGurn v. Scott, 596 So. 2d 1042 (Fla.1992) (discussing Roberts); Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (noting that filing of appeal does not divest trial court of jurisdiction to rule on previously filed motion for fees and costs).
In Finkelstein, the supreme court concluded “that a post-judgment motion for attorney’s fees raises a ‘collateral and independent claim’ which the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to entertain within a reasonable time, notwithstanding that the litigation of the main claim may have been concluded with finality.” 484 So. 2d at 1243 (citation omitted).2 No appeal was taken from the final judgment in Finkelstein. Although the final judgment stated that “[c]osts will be taxed at a later date upon appropriate motion,” it did not expressly reserve jurisdiction to assess fees. The court determined that such magic words were not critical.
Thus, Finkelstein suggests that the failure to expressly reserve jurisdiction does not preclude a later assessment of fees, and also presumably costs. McAskill Publications, Inc. v. Keno Bros. Jewelers, Inc., 647 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), confirms this understanding. See id. at 1012 n. 1 (trial court need not reserve jurisdiction to award fees to prevailing party because “any post-judgment motion for attorney’s fee would raise a ‘collateral and independent claim’ ” (citing Fink-elstein, 484 So. 2d at 1243)).
We read Roberts and Finkelstein together to permit the trial court to assess fees and costs after the notice of appeal has been filed, even where the trial court did not expressly reserve jurisdiction to do so.
GLICKSTEIN, STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . The second district's position is that the filing of the notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to assess fees and costs and that fees and costs may only be reassessed on remand if the trial court had reserved jurisdiction to do so at the sentencing hearing. See Sewar v. State, 640 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Although the Sewar case relied upon Gatlin, the latter relied upon the fourth district's opinion in Gonzalez v. State, 384 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Gonzalez does stand for the general proposition that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Gonzalez, however, did not involve the assessment of costs or fees.
. The court distinguished fees to a prevailing party from fees granted in a dissolution case where such fees are intended to equalize the financial positions of the parties and are part of the property distribution, and therefore should be settled in the final judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Woods v. State, 879 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…notice of appeal had been filed. There is a split of authority regarding this issue. The Fourth District Court has adopted the view that jurisdiction remains with the trial court. See Lee v. State, 785 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Wyatt v. State, 652 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The Second District Court adopts the view that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction. See Kit v. State, 705 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Sewar v. State, 640 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We adopt the view espoused by…
-
Katz v. N.M.E. Hosps., Inc., 842 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…f jurisdiction to enter a fee award); Ruby Mountain Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. [*855] Raymond, 409 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)(finding that discovery and enforcement permissible pending appeal of unsuperseded judgment); see also Wyatt v. State, 652 So. 2d 453, 453-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(explaining that a motion for fees may be considered while an appeal is pending, even if there has been no specific reservation of jurisdiction). We also reject Greenblatt’s suggestion that an item listed in the subpoena…
-
LEE v. State of Fla. & Palm Beach Cnty., 785 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…filed a notice of appeal of his conviction. We disagree. A trial court retains jurisdiction to assess fees and costs after a notice of appeal has been filed, even where the trial court did not expressly reserve jurisdiction to do so. Wyatt v. State, 652 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Although the trial court had jurisdiction to consider a motion to assess costs and impose a lien, section 938.29, Florida Statutes (1997), does not authorize the assessment of costs under the facts of this case. Accordingly, th…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McGURN v. Scott, 596 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1992)
- Finkelstein v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1986)
- Roberts v. Reubin O'D. Askew, 260 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1972)
- Amlan, Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 651 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Fuse v. State, 384 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- McASKILL Publ'ns, Inc. v. Keno Bros. Jewelers, Inc., 647 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Gatlin v. State, 618 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Sewar v. State, 640 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)