WILLIE MAY ROBINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE LOUIS ROBINSON, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case involving a 40-year marriage, the Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the wife's interest in the husband's vested retirement plan and remanded for proper consideration using the deferred division method. The court also found the trial court failed to make required statutory findings regarding disputed marital assets.
The trial court erred in denying the wife any interest in the vested retirement plan, which is a marital asset, and should have reserved jurisdiction to distribute a fixed percentage of benefits upon actual retirement. The trial court also failed to make required findings under Florida Statute section 61.075 identifying and valuing marital and non-marital assets, particularly regarding the retirement plan, auto repair shop interest, and savings account.
[1] A vested retirement plan is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution in a dissolution of marriage action.
[2] A trial court may reserve jurisdiction to distribute a fixed percentage of retirement benefits upon actual retirement, rather than awarding a present cash value.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court did not consider reserving jurisdiction to distribute a fixed percentage of the benefits upon actual retirement”
Establishes that the trial court had an available alternative remedy it should have considered for distributing retirement benefits
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWillie May Robinson and George Louis Robinson were married for 40 years. At dissolution, the husband had a vested retirement plan. The wife also claim…
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PER CURIAM.
In this appeal of a final order of dissolution of a 40 year marriage, appellant challenges the trial court’s decision declining to award appellant/wife any interest in appellee/hus-band’s vested retirement plan based on a finding that appellant “did not prove with definiteness what amount the Husband would be entitled to receive upon his retirement; the present value of his entitlement, if any; or the value of her entitlement, if any.” The tidal court did not consider reserving jurisdiction to distribute a fixed percentage of the benefits upon actual retirement, see Kirkland v. Kirkland, 618 So. 2d 295, 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (DeLoach equally applicable to vested benefits), and DeLoach v. DeLoach, 590 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (approving deferred division of benefits on fixed percentage basis).
Appellant asserts she did not seek a cash award, but wanted to establish her right to payment upon appellee’s retirement.
We agree that the trial court erred in denying appellant any interest in the vested retirement plan, which is a marital asset, and remand for further consideration according to the method set forth in DeLoach.
Appellant further contends the trial court failed to make required findings in accordance with section 61.075, Florida Statutes, clearly identifying marital and non-marital assets and establishing values and valuation dates for marital assets. In particular, appellant challenges the lack of findings as to two additional potential marital assets which were in dispute: husband’s alleged interest in an auto repair shop, in which wife worked during the marriage, and husband’s $10,000 savings account accumulated during the marriage.
We agree that the order does not contain the required findings and decline to speculate on the trial court’s reasons for omitting discussion of these items from the final order. See generally Eady v. Eady, 624 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (appellate court might be able to justify quid pro quo if sitting as trier of fact, but declined to speculate on what trial court intended without guidance from the final judgment).
We reverse and remand for additional evidence and appropriate findings consistent with Kirkland and DeLoach, as well as Dyson v. Dyson, 597 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (findings as to valuation), and Smith v. Smith, 571 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (identification of marital and non-marital property). See also Glover v. Glover, 601 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (trial court cannot meet its burden under section 61.075 if parties fail to provide required information); and Moon v. Moon, 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BOOTH, JOANOS and MINER, JJ., concur.
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Boyett v. Eldis Raymell Boyett, 683 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…ICT CERTIFIED. HARRIS, J., concurring, with opinion. GRIFFIN, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part, with opinion. . The First District again cited DeLoach with approval in a case involving a vested retirement plan. See Robinson v. Robinson, 652 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (finding that the trial court erred in denying appellant any interest in her husband’s vested retirement plan and remanding "for further consideration according to the method set forth in DeLoach ”).…1 / 2
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The Bd. OF Comm'rs OF Brevard v. Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…on or surrender of a defendant, in that a statutory graduating scale calculates the percentage of the forfeiture remittable according to the amount of time that has passed after forfeiture, until a defendant is returned to justice. (emphasis added) 652 So. 2d 466. In order to be “returned to justice” an absconding defendant must be returned to the jurisdiction of the bailing court to face those charges for which the bond was set. Barber argues that the time limits in section 903.28 reference the time that a…
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Wolf v. Wolf, 979 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…ourt wholly fails to account for an asset about which the parties have presented evidence, appellate courts will generally remand for the trial court to value the asset and distribute it accordingly. Ritter, 690 So. 2d at 1375; Robinson v. Robinson, 652 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Glover v. Glover, 601 So. 2d 231, 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). However, when the parties fail to present evidence concerning the value of the assets and liabilities at issue, they effectively prevent the trial court from disch…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- DeLOACH v. Ruthie Mae DeLOACH, 590 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Moon v. Moon, 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Dyson v. Dyson, 597 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Glover v. Glover, 601 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Kirkland v. Kirkland, 618 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Eady v. Eady, 624 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- In re the Marriage of John Henry Clay Smith, Jr. v. Smith, 571 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)