CARLOS TROTMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carlos Trotman appeals his convictions for armed robbery and armed burglary. The Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District reverses because the trial court admitted hearsay testimony implying that an unidentified, non-testifying juvenile had identified the defendant as the perpetrator, violating the Postell rule.
The admission of the detective's testimony about what the unidentified juvenile allegedly told him was reversible error because it constituted hearsay. The logical implication of the testimony was that the non-testifying witness had provided evidence of the defendant's guilt, which violated the Postell rule and denied the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Because victim identification was the only other evidence, the error was not harmless.
[1] Testimony by a police officer that he arrested a defendant after speaking with an unidentified, non-testifying witness constitutes inadmissible hearsay when the logical i…
[2] When the logical implication from police testimony leads the jury to believe a non-testifying witness has provided evidence of the accused's guilt, such testimony should…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused's guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay.”
This is the core statement of the Postell rule that prohibits hearsay evidence implying a non-testifying witness's identification of the defendant.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA police detective testified as the first witness that he interviewed an unidentified juvenile, and then went to the location where the victim's stole…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The defendant appeals from his convictions for armed robbery and armed burglary. We are compelled to reverse because of a violation of the Postell1 rule.
The first witness in the case was the investigating and arresting police officer. Without any evidence concerning the circumstances of the offense, he was permitted to testify, over timely objection, that, after speaking to an unidentified and non-testifying “juvenile,” he went to the location of the victim’s stolen car and arrested the defendant.2 It takes no imagination whatever to realize that the only thing that the juvenile could have told the detective was that the defendant was involved in the crime. Since that information was imparted by a person who did not himself testify and was not therefore subject to cross examination, the alleged conversation was no more than hearsay. Reversal is therefore required.
As we have repeatedly held:
When the logical implication to be drawn from the testimony leads the jury to believe that a non-testifying witness has given the police evidence of the accused’s guilt, the testimony should be disallowed as hearsay.
Postell v. State, 398 So. 2d 851, 855 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (citing State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 307 A. 2d 65 (1973)), review denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (Fla.1981); accord Bell v. State, 595 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), review denied, 604 So. 2d 488 (Fla.1992); Davis v. State, 493 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Molina v. State, 406 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); see State v. Baird, 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla.1990). This principle is clearly applicable here. Moreover, since the only other evidence against the defendant was a victim identification, the error may not be regarded as harmless and a new trial is required. See Bell, 595 So. 2d at 234; Davis, 493 So. 2d at 13; Molina, 406 So. 2d at 58.
Reversed and remanded.
. Postell v. State, 398 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (FIa.1981).
. The colloquy in question was as follows:
Q. On that day how did you become involved in this case? A. I interviewed a juvenile.
Q. Detective, who did you interview? A. A juvenile. Q. After you interviewed this juvenile, where did you go? A. To 50th Street and approximately 14 Avenue. Q. And what did you find there? A. A vehicle. Q. Whose vehicle? A. The victim's vehicle. Q. Did you have an opportunity to speak with the victim on that day? A. Yes, I did. Q. And what did the victim tell you?
A. He advised me that his vehicle had been taken from him. Q. What did he you tell you in reference to that particular vehicle? A. That was his vehicle. Q. After that, where did you go on the next day? A. To the defendant’s home. Q. And what did you do there? A. Placed the defendant under arrest.
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Citator
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Norton v. State, 709 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1997)…vicinity, he could not find anyone who sold tires to defendant. The detective’s conclusion is predicated on information he secured from someone else, and, therefore, constitutes hearsay to which no exception was offered. See, e.g., Trotman v. State, 652 So. 2d 506, 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (re-, versing conviction where police officer offered hearsay testimony as to what non-testifying, unidentified witness had told him about defendant’s involvement in crime); Bell v. State, 595 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 199…
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Schaffer v. State, 769 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…” [f.o.] 674 So. 2d at 118-119; see also Tumblin v. State, 747 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (trial court improperly allowed officer to testify that he arrested the defendant after talking with a non-testifying eye-witness); Trotman v. State, 652 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (trial court erred in permitting officer to testify that he went to the location of crime and arrested defendant after speaking to unidentified, non-testifying witness). Even more recently in Keen v. State, No. SC88802, 2000…
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Andres v. State, 254 So. 3d 283 (Fla. 2018)…icinity, he could not find anyone who sold tires to defendant. The detective's conclusion is predicated on information he secured from someone else, and, therefore, constitutes hearsay to which no exception was offered. See, e.g. , Trotman v. State, 652 So. 2d 506, 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (reversing conviction where police officer offered hearsay testimony as to what non-testifying, unidentified witness had told him about defendant's involvement in crime); Bell v. State , 595 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Baird, 572 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1990)
- Postell v. State, 398 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Molina v. State, 406 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Davis v. State, 493 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Bell v. State, 595 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)