YOLANDA SANGIOVANNI, WIFE, AND DOMENICO SANGIOVANNI, HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
EDWARD W. STENGLE, JANET WALKER AND WADLEY'S FLOWERS, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, APPELLEES
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The Sangiovannis appeal summary judgment dismissing their personal injury suit based on a general release form. The court reversed, holding that a material issue of fact remained regarding whether the plaintiffs intended to release all potential defendants or only those specifically named, precluding summary judgment.
Summary judgment was improper because a material issue of fact existed as to whether the plaintiffs intended the general release clause to discharge all potential defendants or only those specifically named in the blanks. The presence of both a written (blanks for specific names) and printed (general release clause) release within a single form creates at least latent ambiguity, and whether such a general release is effective to discharge non-named tort-feasors is a question of fact for the jury.
[1] A latent ambiguity exists in a contract when its language is clear but extrinsic evidence creates a need for interpretation or a choice between multiple meanings.
[2] A latent ambiguity in a contract generally precludes summary judgment because it creates a genuine issue of material fact.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The presence of the two types of release, one printed and one written, within a single form creates at least a latent ambiguity.”
Establishes that the form's dual nature (specific names plus general clause) creates ambiguity about parties' intent
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThree-car collision resulted in personal injuries to the plaintiffs. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiffs signed a standard printed release form conta…
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FULMER, Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal from a final summary judgment based on a general release given by the plaintiffs to some of the potentially liable parties in a personal injury action. Because an issue of material fact remained as to whether the plaintiffs intended to release all potential defendants or only those specifically named in the release, summary judgment was improper. This case arose from.a three-car collision. Prior to filing a lawsuit for personal injuries, the plaintiffs signed a release which was a standard printed form that contained blanks for the names of those specifically discharged followed by a printed general release clause stating that the release applied to “all other persons, firms and corporations who might be liable.... ”
When the plaintiffs later filed suit against the appellees, whose names did not appear in the release, the appellees asserted the release as an affirmative defense and subsequently as a basis for summary judgment. No affidavits or sworn testimony was offered either in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
Concluding that the plain language of the release controlled, the trial court granted summary judgment. Under these circumstances, however, summary judgment was error. “The presence of the two types of release, one printed and one written, within a single form creates at least a latent ambiguity.” Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla.1980). “[W]hether a general printed release is effective to discharge tort-feasors other than those specifically named is a question of fact precluding summary judgment.” Flanagan v. State Dept. of Transp., 532 So. 2d 714, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
Therefore, a question of fact existed in this case as to whether the plaintiffs intended to release all persons or just those specifically named in the release. The Florida Supreme Court stated in Hurt that “the better rule in these particular circumstances is to allow extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.” 380 So. 2d at 434. Here the parties did not file any affidavits or other extrinsic evidence to support their interpretation of the release form. In the absence of any evidence, the question of fact remained, and summary judgment was improper. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
RYDER, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur.
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Citator
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Ila Abis v. Tudin, D.V.M., P.A., 18 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…iguous and thus, that summary judgment could not be entered where releases contained blank spaces for parties to hand-write the names of specifically listed parties but also contained typewritten general provisions); see also Sangiovanni v. Stengle, 652 So. 2d 897, 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (same); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 782 So. 2d 445, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (same). However, in this case, the release was completely typewritten. The reference in the release to “all other persons, f…
Authorities Cited
- Nolan Hurt and Florence Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1980)
- Flanagan v. The State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp., 532 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)