ROBERT LEE FORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Ford appeals his conviction and habitual offender sentence, arguing that the trial court erred in designating him a habitual offender based on three prior convictions all entered on the same date. The appellate court found that the habitual offender statute, as amended in 1993 before Ford's crime, requires prior convictions to be sentenced separately, and therefore vacated his sentence.
The sentence was imposed in violation of section 775.084(5), Florida Statutes, because the 1993 statutory amendment requiring prior convictions to be sentenced separately applies to Ford's September 2, 1993 crime, and his three convictions all entered on the same date do not satisfy this requirement.
[1] A prior felony conviction cannot be counted for habitual offender sentencing if it was not sentenced separately from any other felony conviction that is also counted as a…
[2] The statutory amendment requiring prior felony convictions to be sentenced separately for habitual offender status applies to offenses committed after the amendment's eff…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to be counted as a prior felony for purposes of sentencing under this section, the felony must have resulted in a conviction sentenced separately prior to the current offense and sentenced separately from any other felony conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony.”
The statutory amendment to section 775.084(5) that changed the requirement to mandate separately sentenced convictions rather than merely sequential convictions.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFord was convicted by jury of robbery on September 2, 1993. At sentencing, the state presented three prior convictions all entered on September 8, 199…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Sequential Conviction Requirement cases and more on FLexlaw
WOLF, Judge.
Ford appeals from a final judgment and sentence adjudicating appellant guilty of one count of robbery and imposing a sentence as a habitual offender. The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in finding appellant to be a habitual offender where all of his prior convictions were entered on the same date. We find that the sentence was imposed in violation of section 775.084(5), Florida Statutes (1998).
The appellant was convicted by a jury of a robbery which occurred on September 2, 1993. Before trial, the state filed a notice of its intent to seek habitual offender status, and at sentencing the state introduced, without objection, three prior convictions which were all entered on September 8,1992: Case no. 92-93-CF for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; case no. 92-153-CF for burglary of a structure; case no. 88-189-CF for two counts of possession of a controlled substance. Certified copies of those convictions were submitted to the court and marked as state exhibits. No other convictions were presented. The prosecution stated that although the defendant had other felony convictions, they had occurred more than five years ago. The appellant was sentenced as a habitual offender to 20 years in prison followed by five years’ probation.
On appeal, the appellant argues that prior to the date of the crime for which he was convicted, the Legislature altered the habitual offender statute to require prior convictions to be entered on different days. The appellant, therefore, argues that he did not qualify as a habitual offender since the prior convictions presented to the court here to support the habitual offender status were all entered on the same date. In response, the state relies on State v. Barnes, 595 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1992), and argues that the habitual offender statute does not require sequential convictions to support habitual offender sta tus. The state acknowledges that the Legislature has modified the holding of Barnes and that the effective date of the changes made to the statute is prior to the crime committed by the appellant, but nevertheless argues that the amendment to the habitual offender statute does not require reversal in this ease.
In State v. Barnes, 595 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1992), the supreme court held that the habitual offender statute did not require sequential convictions. In Barnes, however, the court wrote that the requirement of sequential convictions had formerly served as an important justification for a habitual sentence, and the court suggested that the Legislature reexamine the statute. In response (presumably in reaction to Barnes), the habitual offender statute was amended in 1993 to make it clear that sequential convictions are necessary. Ch. 93-406, § 2, Laws of Fla. That statutory amendment was effective June 17, 1993. The amendment reads as follows:
In order to be counted as a prior felony for purposes of sentencing under this section, the felony must have resulted in a conviction sentenced separately prior to the current offense and sentenced separately from any other felony conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony.
§ 775.084(5), Fla.Stat. (1993) (emphasis added). Because the effective date of the statutory amendment precedes the September 2, 1993, crime for which the appellant was convicted in the instant case, the amendment applies.
We, therefore, vacate the habitual offender sentence and remand for resentencing.
ERVIN and MINER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Ransom Louis Collins, 985 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2008)…f of critical dates); Stephenson v. State, 666 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (resentenc-ing ordered where State failed to provide sufficient evidence that defendant committed present offenses within five years of release from prison); Ford v. State, 652 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (resentenc-ing ordered where State improperly introduced prior convictions that had not been sentenced separately); Louis v. State, 647 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (resentenc-ing ordered where State failed to prove proper finge…
-
Wainer v. State, 798 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…2d 1246 (Fla.2001) (although sentencing for separate convictions arising out of unrelated crimes can take place on same day, sentences cannot be part of same sentencing proceeding to qualify for habitual felony offender sentence); see Ford v. State, 652 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (habitual offender sentence could not be based on prior convictions entered on same date; sequential convictions were required to support habitual offender status); see also Adkinson v. State, 743 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…
-
Prince v. State, 684 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…g defendant to raise postconviction relief claim regarding whether he qualified for habitual offender sentence). Section 775.084(5), Florida Statutes (1993), requires sequential convictions to qualify for habitual offender sentencing. Ford v. State, 652 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). This requirement became effective June 17, 1993. Therefore, if the offenses in case 95-5215 were committed after June 17, 1993, sequential convictions would be required for habitual offender sentencing. Because the record atta…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Barnes, 595 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1992)