CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Christopher Williams appealed his sentence for cannabis manufacture, challenging both the length of community control imposed and special probation conditions not orally pronounced at sentencing. The court reversed the sentence because the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure sentence, and struck probation conditions that were not orally pronounced.
The sentence was reversed because the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure, which is required even when a plea bargain justifies departure from guidelines. Additionally, special conditions of probation that were not orally pronounced at sentencing must be stricken.
[1] A trial court must provide written reasons for a departure sentence, even when the departure is based on a plea agreement.
[2] A trial court is limited to twenty-two months of community control when the sentencing guidelines range is any nonstate prison sanction, unless the defendant negotiated f…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A plea bargain between the state and the defendant is a valid reason to depart from the guidelines. Quarterman v. State, 527 So.2d 1380 (Fla.1988); State v. Esbenshade, 493 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). However, even under these circumstances the sentencing document must reflect a reason for departure.”
Establishes that while plea agreements can justify departures from sentencing guidelines, written reasons must still be provided in the sentencing order
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was charged with manufacture of cannabis, possession of cannabis, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The state dropped the possession of c…
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QUINCE, Judge.
Appellant, Christopher Williams, appeals the trial court’s sentence of two years’ community control followed by two years’ probation imposed for manufacture of cannabis. He also challenges some of the conditions of probation contained in the written sentencing order. Because the trial court did not give a written reason for the departure sentence, we remand for resentencing. The trial court must also strike special conditions of probation not orally pronounced at sentencing.
Appellant was charged by information with manufacture of cannabis, possession of cannabis and possession of drug paraphernalia. The state dropped the possession of cannabis count, and pursuant to negotiations, appellant pled nolo contendere to the other two counts. In the plea agreement and at sentencing, appellant agreed to two years’ community control acknowledging this was a departure from the guidelines. The recommended sentence, under the recommended range and the permitted range of the sentencing guidelines, is any nonstate prison sanction. Appellant was sentenced to two years’ community control followed by two years’ probation on the manufacturing offense and one year probation on the possession count to run concurrent with the community control.
Appellant argues the two years’ community control portion of his sentence should be reversed because it exceeds the maximum which can be imposed when the guidelines range is any nonstate prison sanction. We held in Thompson v. State, 617 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), that a trial court is limited to twenty-two months’ community control when the guidelines range is any nonstate prison sanction. See also § 948.01(4), Fla.Stat. (1991). However, Thompson did not involve a situation where the defendant had negotiated for a particular sentence.
A plea bargain between the state and the defendant is a valid reason to depart from the guidelines. Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988); State v. Esbenshade, 493 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). However, even under these circumstances the sentencing document must reflect a reason for departure. No reason is stated in the court’s written sentencing order. Because no written reason was given for the departure sentence, we reverse the sentence imposed. On remand, the trial court must comply with our Thompson decision. Appellant also challenges some of the conditions of probation contained in the written sentencing order. We strike the following conditions: 1) appellant must not use intoxicants to excess; 2) appellant must submit to and pay for random testing for alcohol; 3) appellant shall not consume, possess, or associate with persons who use alcohol or frequent places where alcohol is the main source of business; 4) appellant must submit to and pay for an evaluation to determine whether or not he has any treatable alcohol problem,1 and 5) appellant must pay for any drug or alcohol treatment program. These are special conditions of probation which must be orally pronounced at sentencing. See Nunez v. State, 683 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Tomlinson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Nank v. State, 646 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Since these conditions were not orally pronounced, they must be stricken.
This case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with Thompson and to strike the special conditions of probation not orally pronounced.
RYDER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur. . These same conditions were imposed in regard to illegal drugs but are valid conditions of probation.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996)…e, 637 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Christobal v. State, 598 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Cumbie v. State, 597 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Rowland v. State, 548 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Second District: see, e.g., Williams v. State, 653 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), quashed, 667 So. 2d 191 (Fla.1996); Nank v. State, 646 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Peterson v. State, 645 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Turchario v. State, 616 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Tillman v. State, 592 So. 2d 767 (F…
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State v. Williams, 667 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1996)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Williams v. State, 653 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), which expressly and directly conflicts with our opinion in Smith v. State, 529 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.1988). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash Williams and hold that a departure sentence imposed pursuant to…1 / 3
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Deldesondro Callaway v. State, 658 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ubstances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used.” That portion of condition (5) which provides that appellant shall not use intoxicants to excess is a special condition of probation which must be orally pronounced at sentencing. Williams v. State, 653 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Since it was not, it must be stricken. However, we affirm the remaining portion of that condition prohibiting appellant from visiting places where intoxicants are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used since it is valid as a more pr…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Mullins, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988)
- Nank v. State, 646 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Tomlinson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Claydean Goggans v. Kalp, 493 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Barron Thomas Thompson, Jr. v. State, 617 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)