EDWARD EARL JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1995-04-12
No. 94-1618
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and JORGENSON and GREEN, JJ.
653 So. 2d 1074 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1995) Negative Treatment
Cited by 13 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Edward Earl Johnson was convicted of manslaughter after being denied the opportunity to cross-examine a detective about a formal exculpatory statement he gave at the police station, after the State introduced his earlier informal statement to police. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court abused its discretion by limiting cross-examination in violation of the rule allowing defendants to present the complete context of statements.


Holding

The trial court abused its discretion in limiting Johnson's cross-examination. When the State introduces part of a defendant's statement, the defendant is entitled to cross-examine the witness about other relevant statements made in that conversation or related conversations necessary for the jury to understand the complete context.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by limiting a defendant's cross-examination of a witness when the State has introduced part of a statement and the defense seeks to in…

[2] When the State introduces a party's partial statement, the adverse party may require the introduction of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement that in…

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement that in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously.”

Establishes the statutory basis for allowing defendants to present complete context of statements when the State introduces part of a statement

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Upon arrest, Johnson told a police officer he had been in a fight with the victim over a broken watch and hit the victim with a stick. Later at the po…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Edward Earl Johnson appeals from a judgment of conviction for manslaughter. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Upon Johnson’s arrest, he stated to the police officer that he had been in a fight with the victim over a broken watch, and that he had hit the victim with a stick. Later at the police station, Johnson gave a formal statement that he had hit the victim only after the victim had threatened to have dogs attack him, and after the victim had first hit j1jIQi

At trial, the court refused to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the detective concerning the formal statement after the State had introduced Johnson’s first, informal statement.

The trial court abused its discretion in thus limiting defendant’s cross-examination of the witness. “When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement that in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously.” § 90.108, Fla. Stat. (1993). Although a defendant’s out-of-court, self-serving exculpatory statements are usually considered inadmissible hearsay, “where the state has opened the door by eliciting testimony as to part of the conversation, defendant is entitled to cross-examine the witness about other relevant statements made during the conversation.” Guerrero v. State, 532 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). This rule is not limited to segments of one conversation, but also allows admission of “other related conversations that in fairness are necessary for the jury to accurately perceive the whole context of what has transpired between the two.” Eberhardt v. State, 550 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 560 So. 2d 234 (Fla.1989). See generally, Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 108.1 (1995 ed.).

Johnson should have been allowed to cross-examine the officer regarding the formal statement given at the police station, as that statement served to amplify or explain the earlier statement. Standing alone, the earlier statement left the jury without a complete picture of the defendant’s behavior. Moreover, it cannot be said that here is no “reasonable possibility that the error did not affect the verdict.” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986).1

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

. We need not reach the other issue on appeal.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2001)
    …the police investigation had produced evidence that defendant was the murderer). Finally, we reject Evans’ reliance upon Sweet v. State, 693 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), Williams v. State, 689 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), and Johnson v. State, 653 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), for the proposition that the “rule of completeness” demands that Evans be allowed to elicit hearsay in cross-examination based upon the statements made in the direct examination. The purpose of the “rule of completeness” is “to a…
  • Williams v. State, 689 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
    …90.108(1)). By introducing Alexander’s identification of the ear’s color as gold, the defense opened the door thereby entitling the state to cross-examine the witness about other relevant contemporaneous statements. Id. at 401-402; Johnson v. State, 653 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Eberhardt v. State, 550 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), review denied, 560 So. 2d 234 (Fla.1990). Alexander’s statements introduced by the state demonstrated to the jury that the credibility of his recollection of the…
  • Harmon v. State, 854 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
    …state’s case under the “rule of completeness.” Where the state has elicited testimony about part of a conversation, a defendant is entitled to cross examine the witness about other relevant statements made during the conversation. Johnson v. State, 653 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The defense has the right to present the whole of the conversation, Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 [*702] (Fla.1982), as a matter of fairness, Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 402 (Fla.1996). See also Sweet v. State,…

Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw