ROBERT WELLS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1995-04-19
No. 94-2179
Before BARKDULL, GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ.
654 So. 2d 146 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1995) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Robert Wells was convicted of indirect criminal contempt for violating a domestic violence injunction. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed his conviction, finding that the trial court erred by excluding relevant evidence regarding a subsequent court order that placed Wells in his girlfriend's custody, which was material to whether he willfully violated the injunction.


Holding

The court reversed Wells' conviction, holding that the trial court erred by excluding the traffic court order as irrelevant because intent is an essential element of indirect criminal contempt, and evidence of the subsequent court order granting custody to the girlfriend was directly material to whether Wells willfully violated the injunction.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court properly denies a jury trial in a contempt proceeding where the maximum term of imprisonment is limited to six months.

[2] Evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact is considered relevant.

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Key Quotes

“Here the allegation of indirect criminal contempt requires the willful violation of a court order.”

Establishes that willfulness is a required element of indirect criminal contempt

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Facts & Procedural History

On August 25, 1993, Wells was served with an injunction prohibiting him from abusing, threatening, or harassing his girlfriend and from having any con…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Robert Wells (Wells), appeals his conviction of indirect criminal contempt for violating a domestic violence injunction. We reverse.

On August 25, 1993, Wells was served with an injunction prohibiting him from “abusing, threatening or harassing” his girlfriend. Further, he was prohibited from “having any contact, direct or indirect” with the girlfriend, or from “entering onto [her] residential premises.” On October 17, 1993, Wells was arrested for violating the injunction when police found him shaking the girlfriend’s apartment door and rattling her doorknob.

The trial court, after denying Well’s request for a jury trial, conducted a bench trial. At trial, Wells argued that the evidence was circumstantial and insufficient to establish Wells’ intent to violate the injunction. In his defense, Wells sought to introduce a court transcript of an August 26, 1993, court appearance in front of another judge. At this other post injunction court hearing, Wells was ordered into the girlfriend’s custody.

The trial court ruled that the transcript was irrelevant, refused to consider it, and found Wells in contempt. Wells was sentenced to one year probation with counseling and served sixty-one days in jail.

Wells first cites error in the trial court’s denial of a jury trial. His contention of error, however, is incorrect. The denial of a request for a jury trial in a contempt proceeding limits the maximum term of imprisonment to six months on a finding of guilt. Aaron v. State, 284 So. 2d 673 (Fla.1973); Floyd v. Bentley, 496 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 767 (Fla.1987).

Here, Wells had served only sixty-one days of imprisonment as part of a sentence including one year probation. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Wells’ request for jury trial. We further note that even though Wells’ sentence involved a one year probationary term, his total maximum term of imprisonment would still be six months even on a probation violation. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975).

Wells’ second contention that the trial court refused to consider relevant evidence, merits discussion and reversal. Wells sought to introduce, and proffered, a transcript of a traffic court proceeding before another judge, which occurred shortly after the domestic violence injunction was entered. The transcript reflected that Wells was ordered into his girlfriend’s custody, with her consent. The trial court determined this evidence to be irrelevant.

Relevant evidence is “evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact.” § 90.401, Fla.Stat. (1993). Here the allegation of indirect criminal contempt requires the willful violation of a court order. See Romano v. Russo, 620 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Scrimshaw v. State, 592 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Hunnefeld v. Futch, 557 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Intent necessarily is an essential element of contempt. Paul v. Johnson, 604 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Thomson v. State, 398 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

The traffic court order granting custody and supervision to the girlfriend, clearly goes to Wells’ intent to violate the injunction, and thus the trial court’s determination of irrelevancy was incorrect. Even a judge educated in the nuances of domestic violence, would need to consider whether a violation of an injunction was intentional in light of diametrically opposed court orders.

Accordingly, we reverse Wells’ conviction of indirect criminal contempt and remand for the trial court to conduct a new trial inclusive of all relevant evidence.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Cordova v. State, 675 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
    …r fact which the finder of fact is free to disregard despite the defendant’s failure to introduce evidence to the contrary. In the instant ease, the trial court sat as the finder of fact. Cordova was not entitled to a trial by jury. Wells v. State, 654 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Thus, a question arises as to whether the foregoing principles, grounded in the Sixth Amendment right to a [*636] jury trial, are applicable in a case such as this where the right does not attach. Conclusive judicial notice enjo…
  • Gratz v. State, 84 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
    …aring. The issue in this case was not the act (which Gratz acknowledged), but whether the act was committed in willful disobedience of the court’s orders (which Gratz denied). Willfulness is an essential element of criminal contempt, Wells v. State, 654 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), and, [*1223] like any other element, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911); Parisi v. Broward Cnty., 769 So. 2d 359 (Fla.2000). Defense…
  • Curry v. Robbins, 744 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
    …The former wife was at work when the incident occurred. As a result, the former wife, impermissibly, is being held in contempt in the absence of any record evidence that she had the intent necessary to support the contempt order. See Wells v. State, 654 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(intent essential element of contempt). “For a person to be held in contempt of a court order, ... the behavior of the person must clearly violate the order.” Paul v. Johnson, 604 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)(emphasis added)…

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