CAROL ANN WRIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
MALCOLM JOHN WRIGHT, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution action, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order suspending the husband's temporary support obligation, holding that the modification violated procedural due process because the wife was not given adequate advance notice of the motion to modify or a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
A trial court may modify temporary support before final judgment, but only when the other spouse receives adequate advance notice of the specific relief sought, including service of an appropriate pleading seeking modification and adequate advance notice that the hearing will address modification, absent emergency circumstances. The trial court's suspension of support violated procedural due process.
[1] A trial court may modify a temporary support award before entry of final judgment.
[2] Procedural due process, including notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, applies to support modification proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“elementary notions of procedural due process which include notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard apply to support modification proceedings”
Establishes that due process protections apply to temporary support modifications.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court ordered the husband to pay $1,500 per week in temporary support on October 19, 1994. On October 28, 1994, the husband served notice of…
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COBB, Judge.
In this dissolution action, the wife has taken an interlocutory appeal from an order suspending the obligation of her husband to make temporary support payments.1
The trial court, by amended interim order dated October 19, 1994, and pursuant to the husband’s agreement, ordered that the husband pay $1,500.00 per week for the temporary maintenance of his wife and children. Just nine days later, on October 28,1994, the husband served on the wife a notice of hearing on a motion to modify the interim order. Hearing was set for November 7, 1994, but another notice of hearing was served on the wife on November 1, 1994 for a hearing set for November 2, 1994 on a number of pending motions (though not for any motion for modification).
At the November 2, 1994 hearing, the court announced that the $1,500.00 a week support was suspended until the wife was prepared to go forward with an evidentiary hearing on the issue of temporary support.
While a trial court may modify a temporary support award before entry of final judgment, Allison v. Allison, 605 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), rev. denied, 618 So. 2d 208 (Fla.1993), Moliver v. Moliver, 200 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), elementary notions of procedural due process which include notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard apply to support modification proceedings. See, e.g., State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Colonel, 627 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), caused dismissed, 642 So. 2d 746 (Fla.1994); Hammond v. Hammond, 492 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Cf. Pefaur v. Pefaur, 626 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
Thus, a spouse who seeks to modify an existing temporary support award must, at least in the absence of emergency circumstances, afford the other spouse adequate advance notice of the relief sought. This includes service of an appropriate pleading seeking modification, see Hammond v. Hammond, and adequate advance notice of the scheduled hearing on said motion. See Colonel (error to effect modification of child support obligation where subject exceeded announced scope of hearing). The trial court here effected a modification of the husband’s previously agreed to temporary support obligation at a hearing which was noticed only one day earlier and the notice for which did not encompass consideration of a motion to modify. It further appears that no written pleading seeking modification was served on the wife. The order suspending the husband’s weekly support obligation is reversed and the cause remanded for reinstatement of the temporary support obligation adjudicated in the October 19, 1994 amended interim order. REVERSED.
DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . See Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii).
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Dent v. Dent, 851 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…berally permitting modifications of interlocutory orders. First, a legitimate due process concern would be raised if a party was unaware that the court would be reconsidering the temporary awards in a subsequent hearing. See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, 654 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Thus, although a court is free to reconsider its interlocutory orders and .the parties do not have a vested interest in the content of the order, the parties must have notice if those issues are to be revisited and an opportunit…
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Fratangelo v. Olsen, 271 So. 3d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)…has the inherent authority to revisit an earlier ruling either it has made or a predecessor judge has made, it must provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to the party or parties to prepare for and to defend its position. See Wright v. Wright, 654 So. 2d 674, 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) ("While a trial court may modify [an interlocutory order], elementary notions of procedural due process which include notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard apply ...."). The successor judge's mid-trial revisiting…
Authorities Cited
- Hardy v. State, 492 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Hammond v. Hammond, 492 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Allison v. Allison, 605 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Moliver v. Moliver, 200 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Pefaur v. Pilar Pefaur, 626 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- State v. Colonel, 627 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)