CANDACE JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
KASHY LORENE FYE AND MILLARD NEWMAN, APPELLEES
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Johnson appealed a trial court's award of attorney's fees to defendants under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, following a no-liability verdict in an automobile accident lawsuit. The First District Court of Appeal held that because Johnson's cause of action accrued before the October 1, 1990 amendments to section 768.79, the prior version of the statute applied, which did not allow attorney's fees for no-liability judgments.
Defendants are not entitled to attorney's fees under section 768.79 because Johnson's cause of action accrued prior to the effective date of the 1990 amendments, and thus the prior version of the statute applies, which required a judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff before defendant could receive attorney's fees.
[1] A defendant is not entitled to attorney's fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, when the cause of action accrued prior to the effective date of the 1990 amendments…
[2] The version of section 768.79, Florida Statutes, in effect at the time a cause of action accrues governs attorney's fee awards under that statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[T]he version of section 768.79 in effect at the time the cause of action accrues is the version that should be applied in determining attorney-fee awards thereunder.”
Establishes the controlling principle that the statute in effect when the cause of action accrues governs attorney-fee awards, not the statute in effect at judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson brought a lawsuit for injuries sustained in an automobile accident on January 31, 1990. Defendants sent Johnson an offer of judgment on Januar…
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LAWRENCE, Judge.
Candace Johnson (Johnson), plaintiff below, appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the defendants pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991). The defendants incurred these fees in defending a lawsuit brought by Johnson for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident on January 31,1990. On January 5, 1994, the defendants sent Johnson an offer of judgment, which she rejected. A verdict of no liability was thereafter returned by a jury in favor of the defendants. Upon proper motion, the trial court awarded the defendants $43,317.50 in attorney’s fees under section 768.79 and $53,627.61 in costs under section 57.041, Florida Statutes (1991). We affirm in part, and reverse in part.
Prior to October 1, 1990, the effective date of the 1990 amendments, section 768.79 required a judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff before the defendant could receive attorney’s fees under the statute. Upon amendment, however, the statute allowed an attorney’s fee to be awarded to the defendant when a no liability judgment was entered for the defense. Buchanan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 629 So. 2d 991, 992 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). “[T]he version of section 768.79 in effect at the time the cause of action accrues is the version that should be applied in determining attorney-fee awards thereunder.” Id. at 992 (relying on Metropolitan Dade County v. Jones Boatyard, Inc., 611 So. 2d 512 (Fla.1993)). Because Johnson’s cause of action accrued prior to the effective date of the 1990 amendments and because a no liability judgment was entered in favor of the defendants, they are not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1989).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM that part of the order awarding costs pursuant to section 57.041 and REVERSE that part of the order awarding attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79.
BOOTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Marcus v. Miller, 663 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…nce their cause of action accrued prior to the October 1, 1990, effective date); Brodose v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, Fla., 622 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (1990 amendment does not apply where cause of action accrued in 1987); Johnson v. Fye, 654 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (because Johnson’s cause of action accrued prior to the effective date of the 1990 amendments and because a no liability judgment was entered in favor of the defendants, they are not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursua…
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MX Invs., Inc. v. Crawford, 683 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…nd attorney’s fees against the award. . This amendment appears to have been prompted, at least in part, by cases interpreting the old statute as precluding defendants from obtaining attorney fees on a judgment of "no liability.” See Johnson v. Fye, 654 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Brodose v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 622 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).…
Authorities Cited
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Jones Boatyard, Inc., 611 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1993)
- Buchanan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 629 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)