STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
PATRICK DURDEN, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1995-05-31
No. 94-1870
BOOTH, JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.
655 So. 2d 215 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1995) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appealed a trial court's order suppressing blood test results from a DUI accident case. The appellate court reversed, holding that the officer had sufficient probable cause under Florida law to request the blood test based on objective facts including a vehicle crossing the center line, open alcohol containers, and serious bodily injuries.


Holding

The court held that the officer had probable cause to request the blood test. The uncontradicted evidence of the vehicle crossing the center line, open liquor container, beer cans, and serious bodily injuries to the other driver provided sufficient objective facts to establish probable cause under section 316.1933(1).


Headnotes

[1] Probable cause to order a blood test exists if an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the…

[2] Probable cause for a blood test must be based on objective facts and circumstances, not on an officer's personal opinions or suspicions.

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Key Quotes

“Probable cause to order a blood test exists under section 316.1933(1) if an officer, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect driver was under the influence of alcoholic beverages at the time of the accident and caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being.”

Establishes the legal standard for probable cause to request blood testing in DUI accident cases

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Facts & Procedural History

Patrick Durden was involved in an automobile accident. Durden's Jeep was approximately six feet across the center line at impact. An open container of…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on appeal from the trial court’s order granting appellee Durden’s motion to suppress results of a blood test requested by a law enforcement officer at the scene of Durden’s automobile accident, based upon the trial court’s finding that the law enforcement officer “was not possessed with sufficient facts at the time the blood alcohol test was performed from which to formulate the requisite probable cause to request the blood test in the first instance” under section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1993).1

Probable cause to order a blood test exists under section 316.1933(1) if an officer, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect driver was under the influence of alcoholic beverages at the time of the accident and caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being. Probable cause must be based on objective facts and circumstances, not on the officer’s personal opinions or suspicions. Jackson v. Florida, 456 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Uncontradicted record evidence in the present case establishes (and Durden conceded at oral argument) that (1) Durden’s Jeep was approximately six feet across the center line at the time of impact; (2) there was an open container of liquor in the Jeep; and (3) there was an ice chest and beer cans lying around the Jeep. Despite conflicting evidence regarding other matters (including whether there was the smell of alcohol on Durden’s breath), we find as a matter of law that this uncontradicted evidence, along with the serious bodily injuries suffered by the driver of the other car involved in the accident, provided probable cause for the police officer to request a blood test under section 316.1933(1). See Robertson v. State, 604 So. 2d 783 (Fla.1992).

REVERSED.

BOOTH, JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur. . Durden concedes that the trial court's alternative basis for granting his suppression motion must be reversed pursuant to this court's recent opinion in State v. Rasmussen, 644 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Johnson, 695 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …est evidence in this case. Accordingly we reverse and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . § 316.193, Fla.Stat. (1993). . State v. Perez, 587 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). . State v. Durden, 655 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). . State v. Jensen, 765 P. 2d 1028 (Colo.1988). . See Henninger v. State, 667 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). . § 316.066(4), Fla.Stat. (1993). . See State v. Marshall, 695 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), rev. granted, 689 So.…
  • State v. Brown, 725 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
    …ursuant to section 316.1933(1). The odor of alcohol on a driver’s breath is a critical (if not the only)3 factor in many eases involving admissibility of a blood test under the statute. See State v. Perez, 531 So. 2d 961 (Fla.1988); State v. Durden, 655 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Cesaretti; Keeton; Jackson. Another factor present in this case was the observation that Brown had blood shot eyes.4 Indeed the absence of the odor of alcohol is critical in suppression cases. White v. State, 492 So. 2d 1163 (Fl…
  • …us enough for Guzman to have been taken to the hospital. (Id., p. 112.) Thus, it was not unreasonable for appellate counsel to conclude that Officer Womack’s knowledge was sufficient to allow him to rely on the statute. See, e.g., State v. Durden, 655 So. 2d 215, 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“Probable cause to order a blood test exists under section 316.1933(1) if an officer, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable cauti…

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