DANIEL LEE DOYLE, PETITIONER,
v.
HARRY K. SINGLETARY, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Daniel Lee Doyle, a death row inmate, petitioned for habeas corpus relief raising four claims including vagueness of jury instructions on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied the petition, finding all claims procedurally barred or lacking merit.
All four claims were procedurally barred. The HAC instruction claim was barred because the specific objection at trial was not pursued on direct appeal. The ineffective assistance claim was barred as a successive habeas petition raising a different issue. The Caldwell claim had been raised and rejected in an earlier collateral proceeding and could not be relitigated. The harmless error claim was procedurally barred. Even if addressed on the merits, the court would have found the instruction harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that appellate counsel was not ineffective under Strickland.
[1] Claims that a jury instruction on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague are procedurally barred unless a specific objection is…
[2] A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on failure to raise an issue on direct appeal is procedurally barred if the defendant raised ineffective assi…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Claims that the HAC instruction was unconstitutionally vague are procedurally barred unless specific objection is made at trial on that ground and pursued on appeal.”
Establishes the procedural bar doctrine that Doyle failed to satisfy regarding the HAC instruction issue.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDoyle was convicted and sentenced to death for murder by strangulation. The victim died from strangulation occurring over approximately five minutes, …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Heinous, Atrocious, Or Cruel (Hac) Aggravator cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Daniel Lee Doyle, an inmate under sentence of death, petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction based on article V, § 3(b)(9) of the Florida Constitution. We deny the petition. The facts of this case and its procedural history are recited in Doyle’s direct appeal. See Doyle v. State, 460 So. 2d 353 (Fla.1984).
We are now considering Doyle’s second habeas corpus petition in this Court. See Doyle v. State, 526 So. 2d 909 (Fla.1988). Doyle raises four claims in this petition: (1) the jury received an unconstitutionally vague instruction on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravating factor; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the HAC issue on direct appeal; (3) the trial judge and prosecutor diminished the role of the jury in sentencing; and (4) this Court erred on direct appeal when it failed to engage in a constitutionally proper harmless error analysis after striking an aggravator. Doyle’s first claim about the vagueness of the HAC instruction is procedurally barred. Doyle’s jury received the instruction that the United States Supreme Court later found inadequate in Espinosa v. Florida, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992).
Claims that the HAC instruction was unconstitutionally vague are procedurally barred unless specific objection is made at trial on that ground and pursued on appeal. James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668, 669 (Fla.1993). Doyle’s trial counsel preserved the issue at trial by objecting and proposing new instructions, but his appellate counsel failed to pursue the issue on direct appeal. See Doyle, 460 So. 2d 353. Thus, Doyle’s claim is procedurally barred.
We reject Doyle’s characterization of Espi-nosa as a fundamental change in law that would overcome the procedural bar. Chandler v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 1994); Jackson v. Dugger, 633 So. 2d 1051, 1055 (Fla.1993).
In addition, were we to address the issue on the merits, we would find that reading the defective instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986). The record reflects:
In particular, the finding that the murder was heinous, atrocious and cruel was based on evidence that the victim died of strangulation which occurred over a period of up to five minutes and that prior to losing consciousness the victim was aware of the nature of the attack and had time to anticipate her death. Murder by strangulation has consistently been found to be heinous, atrocious and cruel because of the nature of the suffering imposed and the victim’s awareness of impending death.
Doyle, 460 So. 2d at 357 (citations omitted).
We also find that Doyle’s second claim, in which he argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the HAC instruction issue, is procedurally barred. Doyle argued ineffective assistance of counsel in his first habeas petition, which this Court rejected. He is procedurally barred from raising such claims in this petition, even though the current claim would be based on a different issue. Lambrix v. Singletary, 641 So. 2d 847, 848-49 (Fla.1994).
However, were we to find no bar, we would hold that appellate counsel was not ineffective under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), because this Court would have rejected Doyle’s Espinosa claim on direct appeal.
Doyle’s third claim, which is based on an alleged violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi,
was raised and rejected in an earlier collateral proceeding. See Doyle, 526 So. 2d at 911. Doyle cannot now relitigate this issue. Scott v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Fla.1993); Francis v. Barton, 581 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1245, 111 S.Ct. 2879, 115 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1991).
Finally, Doyle’s claim about this Court’s harmless error analysis on direct appeal is procedurally barred. Francis; Lambrix.
Accordingly, we deny Doyle’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. . 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Floyd v. State, 808 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2002)…ruction on the definition of HAC. Trial counsel made no additional objection to the instruction and appellate counsel did not challenge any aspect of the instruction on appeal. Thus, Floyd’s challenge is procedurally barred. See Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1995). Even if the challenge were not procedurally barred, Floyd’s argument would be without merit. The enhanced instruction submitted by trial counsel and given by the trial court contained the language deemed so critical to the validit…
-
Jennings v. State, 782 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 2001)…en found. With respect to the HAC instruction, this Court has found that a constitutionally vague HAC instruction may be found harmless where the facts of the murder support finding the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. See Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1995) (explaining that error concerning constitutionally vague HAC instruction was sub [*863] ject to harmless error analysis under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.1986)); Johnston v. Singletary, 640 So. 2d 1102, 1104-05 (Fla.1994…
-
Taylor v. State, 3 So. 3d 986 (Fla. 2009)…which could have been, should have been, or were raised on appeal or in a rule 3.850 motion, or on matters that were not objected to at trial.” Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla.1989). We rejected a similar argument in Doyle v. Singletary, 655 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla.1995) (holding that Doyle’s claim was proeedurally barred because Doyle had failed to pursue the issue on appeal). As in Doyle, Taylor did not raise this claim on direct appeal and we now reject this habe-as claim for the same reason.2 C…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (14 total)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- State v. DiGUILIO, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986)
- Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (U.S. 1992)
- Davidson Joel James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1993)
- Doyle v. State, 460 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1984)
- Chandler v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1994)
- Doyle v. State, 526 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1988)
- Francis v. Barton, 581 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1991)
- Etheria Verdell Jackson v. Dugger, 633 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993)
- Cary Michael Lambrix v. Singletary, 641 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1994)