ISRAEL RADA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida appellate court reversed a restitution order entered more than 60 days after sentencing. The court held that because the written judgment and sentence did not order restitution and the trial court failed to timely retain jurisdiction, the court lacked authority to enter a subsequent restitution order beyond the 60-day jurisdictional deadline.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the restitution order. Restitution orders must be imposed at the time of sentencing or within 60 days thereafter, and the court may only determine the amount beyond 60 days if a restitution order has been timely entered.
[1] An order of restitution must be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter.
[2] A court may determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period if an order of restitution has been entered in a timely manner.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an order of restitution must be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter and court can determine amount beyond the sixty day period, if an order of restitution has been entered in a timely manner”
Establishes the core jurisdictional requirement for restitution orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRada was convicted of two offenses and sentenced on May 21, 1992. The written judgment and sentence document did not order restitution and contained a…
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FULMER, Judge.
The defendant attacks an order of restitution on several grounds, one of which has merit.
After being convicted of two offenses, the defendant was sentenced on May 21, 1992. The written judgment and sentence neither ordered restitution nor retained jurisdiction to determine restitution at a separate hearing. Nevertheless, more than sixty days later, a separate restitution hearing was held and the order of restitution was entered. The state argues that it appears from the entire record that the restitution was orally ordered at the initial sentencing hearing. However, no citation to the record is given. The state further argues that since the defendant did not provide a transcript of the sentencing hearing, the record is insufficient and the appeal must fail. We do not agree. The defendant provided the judgment and sentence, which are the relevant documents. If the state wishes to assert that the judgment and sentence do not conform to the oral pronouncements of the trial judge, it is incumbent upon the state to supplement the record with those portions necessary to support that argument.
The judgment and sentence form contains a standard entry which reads “restitution in accordance with attached order.” This entry was not checked by the court. Other entries in the same section of the form were checked. Since the judgment, on its face, reflects that no restitution was ordered at sentencing, and the restitution hearing was not held within sixty days thereafter, the court was without jurisdiction to enter the challenged order. See State v. Sanderson, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1993) (an order of restitution must be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter and court can determine amount beyond the sixty day period, if an order of restitution has been entered in a timely manner).
Reversed.
PATTERSON, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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C.A. v. State, 685 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…oreover, since the written order did not conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement reserving restitution, the oral pronouncement prevails over the written form. See, e.g., Trueblood v. State, 635 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Rada v. State, 656 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 660 So. 2d 715 (Fla.1995). Affirmed.…
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L'Heureux v. State, 968 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…y days of sentencing when the “trial court did not impose restitution [at sentencing], nor did any discussion of restitution occur at the [sentencing] hearing” and the original written judgment and sentence did not order restitution); Rada v. State, 656 So. 2d 165, 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (reversing an order of restitution because the judgment and sentence reflected that restitution was not ordered at sentencing and the subsequent restitution hearing was not held within sixty days). However, after restitution…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Gaines, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1993)