MICHAEL REID, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1995-05-12
No. 94-1223
MINER, J., concurs., BENTON, J., concurs in result.
656 So. 2d 191 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1995) Caution
Cited by 16 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Michael Reid appeals his convictions for attempted manslaughter and armed burglary and his departure sentence. The court reversed his attempted manslaughter conviction because the jury instruction impermissibly allowed conviction of the nonexistent crime of attempted manslaughter by culpable negligence, affirmed his armed burglary conviction, and reversed his sentence for resentencing.


Holding

The court held that instructing on attempted manslaughter by culpable negligence constitutes fundamental error requiring reversal and a new trial, even absent objection at trial, because it permits conviction of a nonexistent crime. The conviction for armed burglary was affirmed, but the sentence was reversed and remanded for resentencing because the reversal of the attempted manslaughter conviction affects the sentencing guidelines score.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant may be convicted of attempted manslaughter only if there is proof of the requisite intent to commit an unlawful act; there is no crime of attempted manslaught…

[2] Giving a jury instruction that permits a conviction for the nonexistent crime of attempted manslaughter by culpable negligence constitutes fundamental error.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“A defendant may be convicted of attempted manslaughter if there is proof that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit an unlawful act; however, there is no crime of attempted manslaughter by culpable negligence.”

Establishes the core legal principle that intent is required for attempted manslaughter and culpable negligence-based attempted manslaughter does not exist as a crime

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Michael Reid was convicted of attempted manslaughter and armed burglary. At trial, the court instructed the jury that attempted manslaughter could be …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
ERVIN, Judge.

ERVIN, Judge.

Michael Reid appeals his convictions for attempted manslaughter and armed burglary and his departure sentence. He claims the trial court committed fundamental error by giving a jury instruction that permitted him to be convicted of the nonexistent crime of attempted manslaughter by culpable negligence; that the jury verdicts are inconsistent; and that the trial court erred in permitting his prior juvenile adjudication to be used as a basis for exceeding the sentencing guidelines. We reverse Reid’s conviction for attempted manslaughter and remand for new trial, and affirm his conviction for armed burglary, but reverse his sentence and remand for resentencing.

A defendant may be convicted of attempted manslaughter if there is proof that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit an unlawful act; however, there is no crime of attempted manslaughter by culpable negligence. Taylor v. State, 444 So. 2d 931, 934 (Fla.1983). The trial court below erred by giving the following instruction on attempted manslaughter:

Now another lesser included would be attempted manslaughter. Before you can find the defendant guilty of attempted manslaughter, the state must prove the following element beyond a reasonable doubt: That the attempted death was caused by the culpable negligence of Michael Reid[.]

The state argues that Reid did not object at trial, thus he did not preserve the issue for appeal, citing Murray v. State, 491 So. 2d 1120 (Fla.1986). On the contrary, we consider the charge constitutes fundamental error. Arline v. State, 550 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

The standard jury instruction on manslaughter at the time of trial1 provided that manslaughter can be proved by showing that the victim was killed by the intentional act of the defendant, intentional procurement by the defendant, or culpable negligence of the defendant. If the court instructs on attempted manslaughter, any reference to culpable negligence must be omitted. Taylor. In Murray, although the trial court erred in including culpable negligence in its charge, the court did instruct on act or procurement, and because there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict under one of such alternatives, the court affirmed Murray’s conviction.

In contrast, in Arline, the court gave the following instruction:

For the purpose of this case manslaughter is defined as the unlawful lulling of a human being by culpable negligence of the defendant.

Applying Taylor, this court held that giving an instruction on the nonexistent criminal offense of attempted manslaughter by culpable negligence constituted fundamental error requiring a new trial. Id. at 1181. In so deciding, the court cited Brown v. State, 550 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), wherein we concluded that it was fundamentally erroneous for the defendant to be convicted of the nonexistent offense of attempted solicitation. The error in the case at bar was fundamental — as it was in Brawn and Arline — because it did not simply involve an erroneous instruction that may have misled the jury, as in Murray, but, in fact, it permitted the defendant’s conviction of a nonexistent crime. The failure to object to an instruction which permits the jury to find the defendant guilty of a nonexistent crime does not constitute waiver of such fundamental defect. State v. Sykes, 434 So. 2d 325 (Fla.1983). The defendant therefore must be allowed a new trial for the homicide.

We affirm appellant’s conviction for armed robbery. Gonzalez v. State, 449 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 458 So. 2d 274 (Fla.1984). Because, however, our reversal of his conviction for attempted manslaughter will affect his score under the sentencing guidelines, we reverse his sentence for armed burglary and remand for resentencing. Accordingly, we do not reach his third issue involving the alleged sentencing error. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MINER, J., concurs.

BENTON, J., concurs in result.

. The jury instructions as amended May 5, 1994, after the trial in this case, now provide a specific instruction on “Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter," which includes "Notes to Judge" explicitly stating that there is no crime of attempted involuntary manslaughter by culpable negligence, referring to Taylor. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 58K-1.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Fredericks v. State, 675 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …, that the defendant was not en [*991] titled to be discharged, but rather, should be granted a new trial. Id. Similarly, the appellant in the case before us is not entitled to discharge, but instead, must be granted a new trial. See Reid v. State, 656 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). However, unlike the situation presented in Sykes, in which no double jeopardy was presented by a re-trial for grand theft, we find that appellant cannot be retried on the principal charge, aggravated assault of a law enforcement…
  • Mosely v. State, 682 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …ument concerning culpable negligence, the error is harmless. We disagree. We have previously held that it is fundamental error to instruct the jury that it may find a defendant guilty of attempted manslaughter by culpable negligence. Reid v. State, 656 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA) rev. denied 663 So. 2d 632 (Fla.1995); Arline v. State, 550 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). As we stated in Reid: The error in the case at bar was fundamental — as it was in Brown [v. State, 550 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ] and…
  • Horn v. State, 677 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …t is not for us “sitting in an appellate capacity ... to presume a finding of intent that the jury itself did not have to make.” Pratt, 668 So. 2d at 1009. There is no crime of attempted manslaughter by culpable negligence in Florida. Reid v. State, 656 So. 2d 191, 192 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 663 So. 2d 632 (Fla.1995) (“A defendant may be convicted of attempted manslaughter if there is proof that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit an unlawful act; however, there is no crime of attempted m…

Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw