BOBBY WAYNE STROUD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bobby Wayne Stroud challenges his conviction for criminal mischief, contending the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of a black prospective juror in violation of Batson standards. The appellate court agrees that the prosecutor failed to provide race-neutral reasons for the challenge and reverses the conviction for a new trial.
The trial court erred in permitting the peremptory challenge because the prosecutor failed to provide race-neutral reasons that satisfied the Batson burden. The prosecutor's stated reasons—disliking a brief answer that other jurors also gave and wanting to reach another juror—were inadequate, and the prosecutor failed to explain nonracial reasons for challenging the black juror rather than white jurors in the same effort.
[1] A peremptory challenge may not be exercised in a racially discriminatory manner.
[2] When a party objects to a peremptory challenge as racially discriminatory, the trial court must conduct an inquiry and require the challenging party to provide neutral re…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once a trial judge is satisfied that the complaining party's objection was proper, the other party must rebut by giving a "clear and reasonably specific" racially neutral explanation of "legitimate reasons" for the state's use of its peremptory challenges.”
States the required burden under Batson to justify a peremptory challenge when racial discrimination is alleged.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStroud was charged with criminal mischief involving more than $1,000 damage to a motor vehicle. During voir dire, prospective juror Ms. Council, a bla…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Bobby Wayne Stroud, challenges the trial court’s judgment and sentence. We find that the trial court erred in permitting the state’s peremptory challenge of a prospective juror and, accordingly, reverse and remand for a new trial.
The appellant was charged with criminal mischief of more than $1000 damage to a motor vehicle, in violation of section 806.13(l)(b)3, Florida Statutes (1991). During voir dire, the trial court asked the jury panel as a whole various general questions. The prosecutor also asked the prospective jurors individually what they thought about the criminal justice system. Ms. Council, a prospective black juror, responded to that question by stating, “I feel the system works.” Although other questions were asked directly of other members of the panel, no further questions were asked of Ms. Council. The prosecutor peremptorily challenged Ms. Council and the appellant, who was a white male, objected.
The trial court subsequently conducted an inquiry pursuant to State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1984), and instructed the prosecutor to give his neutral reasons for excusing Ms. Council. It appears that the prosecutor’s reasons for challenging Ms. Council were because he did not like the brief answer she gave to the question regarding what she thought of the criminal justice system and because he wished to get to another juror farther back on the panel.
The trial court found that the state had given neutral reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge as to Ms. Council.
The jury subsequently found the appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of criminal mischief, with damage greater than $200 but less than $1000, in violation of section 806.13(l)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1991). The trial court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to one year probation, which was to run consecutive to his prison sentence in a different case, and ordered him to make restitution. This timely appeal followed.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the state to exercise a peremptory challenge against Ms. Council. We agree.
A Neil inquiry is required when an objection is raised that a peremptory challenge is being used in a racially discriminatory maimer. State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319 (Fla.1993). Once a trial judge is satisfied that the complaining party’s objection was proper, the other party must rebut by giving a “clear and reasonably specific” racially neutral explanation of “legitimate reasons” for the state’s use of its peremptory challenges. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)).
In the instant case, the prosecutor explained that he challenged Ms. Council because he did not like the way she answered the question regarding what she thought of the criminal justice system.
However, the prosecutor did not ask Ms. Council to go into detail and explain her answer further. Although Ms. Council’s answer that she felt the criminal justice system worked was brief, other juror responses to the same question were also brief.
Furthermore, that was the only question asked of Ms. Council directly. The prosecutor also explained that he challenged Ms. Council because he wished to get to another juror farther back. In such a situation, however, it is incumbent on the prosecutor to give nonracial reasons for having challenged the black jurors rather than the white jurors in his effort to make room for the new persons he sought to have join the panel. Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla.1989). The prosecutor in the instant case failed to provide such a nonracial reason.
We, therefore, find that the prosecutor’s explanations for challenging Ms. Council did not satisfy the state’s required burden of showing that the challenge was not exercised solely on the basis of race. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
RYDER, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
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Overstreet v. State, 712 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…imonial evidence as did Ms. Thomas. Thus, since the State’s proffered reason for striking Ms. Thomas was equally applicable to Ms. Barrera, who was not stricken, it can hardly be deemed non-pretextual. See Daniel, 697 So. 2d at 960; Stroud v. State, 656 So. 2d 195, 196-97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Givens v. State, 619 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Richardson v. State, 575 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Floyd v. State, 511 So. 2d 762, 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). It occurs to us from the record that the Sta…
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Daniel v. State, 697 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…od, responded similarly to Ortiz regarding the privilege. Where Ortiz’s response was shared by another juror who was not challenged by the prosecutor, the trial court erred in failing to reject the state’s explanation as pretextual. Stroud v. State, 656 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(strike based on briefness of juror answer was insufficient where other juror responses on the same issue were also brief); Richardson v. State, 575 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)(strike based on challenged juror’s response which w…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986)
- State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984)
- State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)
- Men's Int'l Prof'l Tennis Council v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 487 U.S. 1219 (U.S. 1988)
- Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 487 U.S. 1219 (U.S. 1988)
- State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1993)
- Kibler v. State, 546 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1989)