CHRISTENSON & ASSOCIATES, MORTGAGE COMPANY; NEILS P. CHRISTENSON; AND DAVID A. CHRISTENSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
CHRISTINA PALUMBO-TUCKER, APPELLEE
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In affirming a judgment for punitive damages, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal addresses whether prejudgment interest should be included in calculating the presumptive cap on punitive damages under Florida Statute § 768.73(1)(a). The court holds that prejudgment interest, as an element of compensatory damages, must be included in the punitive damages calculation.
Prejudgment interest must be included in the calculation of compensatory damages for purposes of determining the statutory cap on punitive damages. The court held that judges cannot selectively exclude prejudgment interest from the compensatory damages package used to calculate the punitive damages formula.
[1] Prejudgment interest is considered an element of compensatory damages in Florida.
[2] The statutory cap on punitive damages, which limits awards to three times the amount of compensatory damages, includes prejudgment interest as part of the compensatory da…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“since at least before the turn of the century, Florida has adopted the position that prejudgment interest is merely another element of pecuniary damages.”
Establishes the foundational principle that prejudgment interest is part of compensatory damages, not a separate category
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involves a dispute over punitive damages between Christenson & Associates (a mortgage company) and Christina Palumbo-Tucker. The trial court …
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FARMER, Judge.
In affirming the judgment below in all respects, we write only to address Judge Stone’s reluctance to include prejudgment interest in calculating the presumptive range of punitive damages under section 768.73(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1993).
Section 768.73(l)(a) provides that an award of punitive damages presumptively “may not exceed three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to each person * * In Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla.1985), the supreme court reaffirmed the principle that “since at least before the turn of the century, Florida has adopted the position that prejudgment interest is merely another element of pecuniary damages.” 474 So. 2d at 214. If prejudgment interest is just another element in the “amount of compensatory damages awarded to” plaintiff, one might reason that it is necessarily hide-bound with the whole, The question is whether we can, to mix metaphors, split the atom and exclude one of the elements of the compensatory damages package from the calculus for punitive damages.
Certainly, there is nothing in section 768.73 authorizing judges to separate the various elements composing the bundle of compensatory damages and discard from the punitive damages formula those elements that the judge personally deems unwise. Indeed, the statute does not even mention the subject of prejudgment interest. Nor have defendants suggested a rationale for excluding it from the calculations. Even if we thought it salutary to do so, we are unable to read such an exclusion into the formula by statutory construction. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla.1984).
AFFIRMED.
GUNTHER, J., concurs.
STONE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
STONE, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur in affirming but for the amount of punitive damages. As to it, I would remand with instructions to omit prejudgment interest in calculating the limits of the punitive damage award under section 768.73(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). The analysis in the majority opinion is certainly logical. Nevertheless, I cannot accept that it is intended that the amount of potential punitive damages will increase or decrease simply by the length of time Plaintiff takes in getting from injury to judgment.
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Cited By
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Vining v. Martyn, 660 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…[*1083] FARMER, Judge, concurring specially. I write separately only to make clear that our decision today is not inconsistent with Christenson & Associates, Mtg. Co. v. Palumbo-Tucker, 656 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In that ease we held that prejudgment interest was part of the total compensatory damages package for purposes of calculating the presumptive range of allowable punitive damages under section 768.73(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993…
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Sirer v. Aksoy (S.D. Fla. 2023)…ates damages on a plaintiff’s out-of-pocket, pecuniary losses, plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of that loss”) (emphasis added); see also Christenson & Assocs. v. Palumbo- Tucker, 656 So. 2d 266, 267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (explaining that prejudgment interest is calculated from the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff). Moreover, prejudgment interest is not available on non-economic damages, such as the damages to reputat…
Authorities Cited
- Eugene Holly, M.D. v. Albert W. Auld, M.D., 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984)
- Argonaut Ins. Co. v. MAY Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985)