STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES LEWEK, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1995-06-21
No. 94-2396
GLICKSTEIN, WARNER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
656 So. 2d 268 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1995) Positive Treatment
Cited by 13 cases

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Synopsis

The State of Florida appealed the trial court's dismissal of vehicular homicide charges against Lewek, who was charged with multiple counts arising from a fatal traffic accident. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that while a defendant cannot be convicted of both manslaughter and vehicular homicide for a single death, charging both crimes is permissible, and reversed the dismissal of the vehicular homicide counts.


Holding

Vehicular homicide charges cannot be dismissed as lesser included offenses of manslaughter charges. Although a defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes based on a single death, both charges may be brought and submitted to the jury. The severance of the DUS and marijuana charges was not an appealable order.


Headnotes

[1] Vehicular homicide is not a lesser included offense of manslaughter under Florida law.

[2] A defendant may be charged with both manslaughter and vehicular homicide for a single death, even though conviction for both is prohibited.

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Key Quotes

“DWI (subsequently DUI) manslaughter and vehicular homicide were two separate crimes and that neither was a lesser included offense of the other, but a single death could not support conviction of both DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide.”

Establishes the 'one death/one conviction' rule cited from State v. Chapman

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Facts & Procedural History

Lewek was charged with two counts of manslaughter, two counts of vehicular homicide, one count of driving with suspended license (DUS), and one count …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellee Lewek was charged with two counts of manslaughter, two counts of vehicular homicide, and one count each of DUS [driving while license suspended] and possession of less than 20 grams of marijuana. All charges arose out of his running a red light and thus killing a woman and her child in February 1994.

Lewek moved to dismiss either the manslaughter or the vehicular homicide charges and to sever the DUS and marijuana possession charges. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the vehicular homicide charges, finding that under the circumstances vehicular homicide was a lesser included offense of manslaughter. The court also severed the DUS and marijuana charges because they were unrelated to the manslaughter. We reverse the dismissal of the vehicular homicide charges. The trial court’s order cited State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1993), which said that DWI (subsequently DUI) manslaughter and vehicular homicide were two separate crimes and that neither was a lesser included offense of the other, but a single death could not support conviction of both DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide. Thus the supreme court approved the vacation of a conviction for vehicular homicide where the defendant had also been convicted of DUI manslaughter. Despite this clear rule saying that a defendant cannot be convicted of both manslaughter and vehicular homicide for a single death, there is no such rule saying that he cannot be charged with both crimes. In Collins v. State, 605 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), charges of DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide were both submitted to the jury, which found the defendant guilty of DUI manslaughter and of vehicular homi cide’s necessarily lesser included offense of reckless driving. The Fifth District applied the “one death/one conviction” rule without passing on the propriety of the state’s having charged both offenses.

We reverse and remand for reinstatement of the vehicular homicide charges. We dismiss the state’s appeal of the severance of Lewek’s DUS and marijuana charges. An order severing charges is not one of the appealable orders enumerated in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1). Nor is it an appropriate subject for a petition for writ of certiorari.

REVERSED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

GLICKSTEIN, WARNER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • LEE v. State, 223 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)
    …ns about charging alleged criminal activity,” Id. at 134-35, Sholl, 18 So. 3d at 1162. The Sholl court concluded that the double jeopardy argument was “premature and an improper basis for dismissal,” Id. (footnote omitted). See also State v. Lewek, 656 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“Despite this clear rule saying that a defendant cannot be convicted of both manslaughter and vehicular homicide for a single death, there is no such rule saying that he cannot be charged with both crimes,”) (emphasis in origina…
  • Claps v. State, 971 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …no law prevents charging a defendant with multiple counts. In support of that conclusion, the court cited a successful State appeal of just the kind of dismissal of charges that Claps now argues his counsel should have requested. See State v. Lewek, 656 So. 2d 268, 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding that “[djespite this clear rule saying that a defendant cannot be convicted of both manslaughter and vehicular homicide for a single death, there is no such rule saying that he cannot be charged with both crimes”).…
  • Werhan v. State, 673 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …e arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, the State may elect to charge the defendant under the manslaughter statute,” State v. Young, 371 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla.1979), or the vehicular homicide statute. See State v. [*555] Lewek, 656 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (defendant may be charged with, but not convicted of, both vehicular homicide and manslaughter). “[T]he legislature created the offense of vehicular homicide ‘to cover the hiatus between [ ...] manslaughter and the traffic offens…

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