ROBERT C. SAFFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
KATHERINE SAFFORD, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1994-12-14
No. 94-01066
PATTERSON and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
656 So. 2d 485 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

In a dissolution of marriage case, the Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of temporary alimony to the wife but reversed the award of temporary attorney's fees and costs, holding that the trial court failed to make a reasonableness determination despite statutory amendments eliminating the need for expert testimony.


Holding

The court affirmed the temporary alimony award but reversed the temporary attorney's fees and costs award, holding that even though expert testimony is not required under the amended statute, the party seeking fees must still prove with evidence that the fees are reasonable and necessary.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must determine that temporary attorney's fees and costs awarded are reasonable, not only that one spouse has a need and the other has the ability to pay.

[2] The statutory amendment allowing attorney's fees applications to proceed without corroborating expert testimony does not relieve the party seeking fees of the burden to p…

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Key Quotes

“The trial court must "not only determine that one spouse has a need for suit money and the other has the ability to pay, but also that the temporary attorney's fees and costs awarded are reasonable."”

Establishes the required elements for awarding temporary attorney's fees in family law cases

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Facts & Procedural History

Robert C. Safford appealed a trial court order granting temporary alimony, attorney's fees, and costs in a dissolution of marriage action. The wife's …

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Opinion of the Court
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.

RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.

Robert C. Safford, the husband, raises two issues in his appeal from the trial court’s nonfinal order granting temporary alimony, attorney’s fees and costs in this dissolution of marriage action. We affirm the order with respect to temporary alimony, but we find merit to the husband’s argument that the trial court erroneously awarded temporary attorney’s fees and costs without determining that the amounts sought were reasonable.

Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (1993), allows a court to “order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding” under Chapter 61. The “appropriate inquiry and standard to be applied is the same whether the fees requested are temporary or final.” Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So. 2d 620, 622 (Fla.1988). The trial court must “not only determine that one spouse has a need for suit money and the other has the ability to pay, but also that the temporary attorney’s fees and costs awarded are reasonable.” Duncan v. Duncan, 642 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Here, no testimony was taken on the issue of temporary attorney’s fees. A one-page bill from the wife’s counsel totaling $125,000.00 was the only evidence offered on the issue. The bill did not contain information regarding anticipated work to be done or hourly billing rates.

The wife argued to the trial court and contends on appeal that the change in section 61.16, effective October 1, 1993, obviated the need for any testimony regarding the reasonableness of attorney’s fees sought under the statute. The change added the following to section 61.16: “An application for attorney’s fees, suit money, or costs, whether temporary or otherwise, shall not require corroborating expert testimony in order to support an award under this chapter.” We conclude, however, that this change did not alter the burden of the party seeking fees to prove with evidence their reasonableness and necessity of the fees sought.

We, therefore, affirm the award of temporary alimony, reverse the award of temporary attorney’s fees and costs and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PATTERSON and QUINCE, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • Addie v. Onyx Coale, 120 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
    …discretion. Phillips v. Ford, 68 So. 3d 257, 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).. The party seeking fees has the burden of proving the reasonableness and the necessity of the fee sought. Baker v. Baker, 35 So. 3d 76, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Safford v. Safford, 656 So. 2d 485, 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In cases where the divorce leaves the “poorer” spouse “with a substantial equitable distribution, courts have either reversed a total or partial award of attorney’s fees or affirmed a denial of attorney’s fees.” Von Baillou…
  • Kasm v. Kasm, 933 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …,000 without explanation. “The trial court must ‘not only determine that one spouse has a need for suit money and the other has the ability to pay, but also that the temporary attorney’s fees and costs awarded are reasonable.’ ” Safford v. Safford, 656 So. 2d 485, 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 642 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)). In the present case, the trial court did not explain how it determined that $10,000 was a reasonable fee, and we cannot determine how it reached that conclusion…
    1 / 2
  • Faircloth v. Bliss, 917 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
    …rs reasonably expended, the reasonable hourly rate or details of the services performed. We, therefore, reverse the fee award without remand. Affirmed in part and Reversed in part. STEVENSON, C.J., and POLEN, J., concur. . See Safford v. Safford, 656 So. 2d 485, 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (noting that the amendment to Florida Statutes section 61.16 effective 1993 obviating the need for corroborating expert testimony did not alter the burden of the party seeking fees to prove with evidence the reasonableness an…

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