ANTHONY LANCASTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Anthony Lancaster appealed his thirty-year sentence imposed upon probation revocation, challenging both its legality under sentencing guidelines and the trial court's failure to award proper gain-time credit. The court reversed the sentence as exceeding the applicable recommended guidelines range and remanded for resentencing, while affirming the trial court's proper delegation to the Department of Corrections regarding gain-time credits.
The thirty-year sentence is illegal as it exceeds the appropriate recommended guidelines range for offenses committed before July 1, 1988, and is therefore reversed and remanded for resentencing within the 22-27 year recommended range. The trial court properly delegated to the Department of Corrections the determination of specific gain-time amounts and properly provided for credit of unforfeited gain time; further, if defendant completed his original sentence prior to 1993, he is entitled to credit for administrative gain time and provisional credits under Orosz v. Singletary.
[1] Sentencing a defendant outside the permitted guidelines range for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1988, violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post fact…
[2] A trial court properly delegates to the Department of Corrections the task of computing and applying credit for time served and unforfeited gain time awarded during prior…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Application of the permitted ranges to offenses committed prior to July 1, 1988 violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.”
Establishes the primary basis for reversing the thirty-year sentence as exceeding the appropriate recommended guidelines range.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLancaster was sentenced to thirty years in prison following revocation of his probation. His original offense was committed on May 3, 1987. The trial …
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PARIENTE, Judge.
Defendant, Anthony Lancaster, appeals the trial court’s sentencing order following revocation of his probation. He challenges both the legality of his thirty-year sentence, claiming that it exceeds the appropriate guidelines sentencing range, and the failure of the trial court to award him proper credit for gain time on his previous sentence.
The state concedes and we agree that the trial court impermissibly sentenced defendant outside the guidelines ranges in effect on the date of the original crime, May 3, 1987. Prior to July 1, 1988, sentencing guidelines specified recommended ranges but not permitted ranges. Application of the permitted ranges to offenses committed prior to July 1, 1988 violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. See Washington v. State, 564 So. 2d 168, 169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Roberson v. State, 555 So. 2d 976, 979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). On this basis, defendant’s thirty-year sentence, which falls within the current permitted guidelines range but exceeds the appropriate recommended guidelines range, is illegal.
Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing within the recommended range of 22-27 years.
Defendant further complains that the trial court erred in failing to award him credit for all time previously served on his original sentence in addition to gain time previously accrued on his original sentence. In its order sentencing defendant to thirty years in prison, the trial court provided for both jail credit and gain time by indicating that:
Defendant is allowed credit for 334 days county jail credit served between date of arrest as a violator and date of resentencing. The Department of Corrections shall apply original jail credit awarded and shall compute and apply credit for time served and unforfeited gain-time awarded during prior service of case number [87-351].
This sentencing order expressly provides for the award of unforfeited gain time and properly delegates to the Department of Corrections the task of determining the amount of gain time to be credited. See Bacon v. State, 647 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Jenkins v. State, 642 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Green v. State, 636 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).1
Concerning defendant’s claim that he is entitled to credit for his entire seventeen-year jail term of his original sentence, prior to the supreme court’s recent decision in Orosz v. Singletary, 655 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1995), the supreme court had indicated that gain time to be credited was limited to earned gain time and did not include administrative gain time and provisional credits. See Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941, 943 n. 2 (Fla.1993).
After the sentencing order and the briefing in this case, the supreme court decided Orosz, which provides that a defendant who committed an offense prior to October 1, 1989 and completed his sentence prior to the enactment of section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993), has a vested right to previously awarded administrative gain time and provisional credits. 655 So. 2d at 1113. To retroactively cancel administrative gain time and provisional credits would unconstitutionally violate a defendant’s constitutional rights against ex post facto laws and bills of attain der. Id.
Thus, if upon remand it is determined that defendant completed his original sentence prior to 1993, when the legislature enacted section 944.278 and retroactively cancelled all awards of administrative gain time and provisional credits, defendant should properly be credited not only with earned gain time but with administrative gain time and provisional credits.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . If the records of defendant's prior jail time and gain time are made available to the trial court at sentencing, it would be preferable for the trial court to incorporate the specific amount of days credited in the sentencing order. However, to the extent that the cases relied on by defendant, Branton v. State, 646 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), and Thomas v. State, 612 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), could be interpreted to hold that the trial court may not delegate to the Department of Corrections the task of determining the specific amount of time to be credited for a prior sentence, we disagree.
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Citator
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State v. Lancaster, 731 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1998)…ited States Supreme Court decision in Lynce mandates a holding that ex post facto principles do apply to overcrowding credits. In this opinion we approve in part and quash in part the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Lancaster v. State, 656 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We further instruct the State to apply the principles expressed in this decision to all similarly situated inmates. We note that this case is distinguishable from Meola v. Department of Corrections, 732 So. 2d 1029 (Fla.1998), a…1 / 2
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State v. Lancaster, 687 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1997)…OVERTON, Justice. We have for review Lancaster v. State, 656 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), based on express and direct conflict with our opinion in Orosz v. Singletary, 655 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.1995), superseded by No. 83,487, — So. 2d — [1997 WL 23203] (Fla. Jan. 23, 1997)(on rehearing). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3…
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Welsh v. Singletary, 686 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…summarily dismissed the petition, without offering the petitioner the opportunity to submit evidence that he had filed an administrative grievance. Because the petition stated a facially sufficient claim for reinstatement under Lancaster v. State, 656 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), rev. granted, 666 So. 2d 901 (Fla.1996), the summary dismissal is reversed. On remand, the trial court should determine first whether appellant has exhausted his administrative remedies, and then consider whether he has demonstr…
Authorities Cited
- Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1993)
- Washington v. State, 564 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Green v. State, 636 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Thomas v. State, 612 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Bacon v. State, 647 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Roberson v. State, 555 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- R.M. Orosz v. Singletary, 655 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1995)
- Branton v. State, 646 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Jenkins v. State, 642 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)