MICHAEL D. BELL, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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Michael Bell sought a writ of mandamus challenging the Florida Parole Commission's denial of control release eligibility based on an arrest report indicating battery on a law enforcement officer, despite his actual conviction being only for simple battery. The court affirmed the trial court's denial but certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether an arresting officer's affidavit can disqualify an inmate from control release eligibility when the judgment of conviction itself is not disqualifying.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the mandamus petition but certified a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether an arresting officer's affidavit can disqualify an inmate when the actual judgment of conviction does not carry the statutory disqualification.
[1] A statute precluding control release eligibility for inmates convicted of battery against an officer requires proof of nothing other than a specified conviction.
[2] An arrest report is insufficient to prove a conviction for the purpose of disqualifying an inmate from control release eligibility under a statute requiring proof of a sp…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Grant court never held that a conviction could be proven except by a copy of the judgment.”
Establishes that conviction status for statutory disqualification purposes must be proven by the judgment itself, not by extrinsic documents like arrest reports.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBell was originally charged with battery on a law enforcement officer but entered a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser included offense of simple b…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Michael Bell's petition for writ of mandamus, on the authority of Gramegna v. Florida Parole Commission, 638 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), review granted, No. 83,955, 649 So. 2d 233 (Fla. Nov. 15, 1994).
Originally charged with battery on a law enforcement officer, Bell entered a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser included offense of simple battery as part of a plea agreement. He complains that the Parole Commission has denied him control release eligibility under section 947.146(3)(h), Florida Statutes (1993), which precludes such eligibility for inmates “convicted ... of committing or attempting to commit ... battery ... against an officer.” § 947.146(3)(h), Fla.Stat. (1993) (emphasis supplied).
The Parole Commission asserts a right to rely on the arrest report, which indicates that a battery occurred in the course of an altercation with a Florida Highway Patrol Officer. The Commission has treated Bell as if he had been convicted of a battery on a law enforcement officer on the supposed authority of Dugger v. Grant, 610 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1992), which, however, is distinguishable.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the Secretary of the Department of Corrections could rely on information in an inmate’s presentence investigation report, to determine eligibility for provisional credits, when factual matters apart from the nature of a conviction were at issue. Dugger v. Grant, 610 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1992).... In contrast, section 947.146(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1991), requires proof of nothing other than a specified conviction in order to disqualify the convict from control release.
Gramegna, 638 So. 2d at 206-07. Similarly, section 947.146(4)(h), Florida Statutes (1993), “requires proof of nothing other than a specified conviction in order to disqualify the convict from control release,” and . “the Grant court never held that a conviction could be proven except by a copy of the judgment.” Gramegna, 638 So. 2d at 207 (emphasis in original).
As in Gramegna, therefore, and as in Wilson v. Florida Parole Commission, 638 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), we certify a question of great public importance to our supreme court:
WHETHER AN ARRESTING OFFICER’S AFFIDAVIT MAY BE USED TO DISQUALIFY AN INMATE FROM CONTROL RELEASE ELIGIBILITY, UNDER SECTION 947.146(3)(h), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993), WHERE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS NOT ITSELF DISQUALIFYING?
MINER, WOLF, and BENTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Dugger v. Wiley Jerome Grant, 610 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1992)
- Jones v. State, 638 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)