WILLIAMS COLLEGE, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
ROBERT A. BOURNE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND SIDNEY C. WARD, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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Williams College appeals a trial court's award of attorney's fees in an estate case, challenging whether a 1993 statute retroactively increased the reasonable fee amount. The court holds that retroactive application of the statute violates constitutional due process protections, as substantive rights and obligations cannot be adversely affected by subsequent legislation.
The court holds that the 1993 statute cannot be applied retroactively because doing so would violate constitutional due process by adversely affecting substantive rights and obligations that vested when the attorney services were rendered. The award of attorney's fees must be reversed and limited to $63,624.00, the amount required under the prior law.
[1] A statutory amendment affecting the substantive right to attorney fees and the concomitant burden of paying them is substantive.
[2] Substantive rights, once vested, cannot be adversely affected by the enactment of subsequent legislation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is a facet of constitutional due process that, after they vest, substantive rights cannot be adversely affected by the enactment of legislation.”
Establishes the fundamental constitutional principle that protects vested rights from retroactive statutory changes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn estate was filed in 1988 and attorney services were rendered prior to the 1993 enactment of section 733.6171. The trial court determined that under…
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HARRIS, Chief Judge.
The issue in this case is whether section 733.6171, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1993, controls the award of attorney’s fees in this estate which was filed in 1988. All of the services involved in this appeal were rendered prior to the enactment of section 738.6171.
The trial court, applying section 733.6171, determined that a reasonable fee would be $116,676.10. The court further found, however, that under the prior applicable statute, as interpreted by In re Estate of Platt, 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla.1991), the reasonable fee would have been $63,624.00. It is apparent, therefore, that a determination of whether the 1993 enactment is retroactive will substantially affect the rights of the residuary beneficiary.
We conclude that we are bound on this issue by our previous holding in L. Ross, Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Const. Co., 466 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), approved, 481 So. 2d 484 (Fla.1986). Although Ross involved a different statutory attorney’s fee provision, the logic also applies to this case.
Judge Cowart, writing for the court, stated:
It is a facet of constitutional due process that, after they vest, substantive rights cannot be adversely affected by the enactment of legislation. Likewise, but conversely, it is fundamentally unfair and unjust for the legislature to impose, ex post facto, a new or increased obligation, burden, or penalty as to a set of facts after those facts have occurred. For the same reason, regardless of the intent of the legislature, the legislature cannot constitutionally increase an existing obligation, burden or penalty as to a set of facts after those facts have occurred.
L. Ross, 466 So. 2d at 1098.
In approving our Ross opinion, the supreme court held:
The right to attorney fees is a substantive one, as is the burden on the party responsible for paying the fee. A statutory amendment affecting the substantive right and concomitant burden is likewise substantive.
L. Ross, 481 So. 2d at 485.
In the case before us, once the services by the attorney for the estate were rendered, the estate became obligated to pay a reasonable attorney fee in the amount of $63,624.00 based on then applicable law. Under Ross, this obligation may not be increased by a subsequent legislative enactment. The award of attorney’s fees entered herein is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to award $63,624.00 as attorney fees in the probate estate.1
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . We find the cross-appeal to be without merit.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- In re Est. OF Lester Platt, 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991)
- L. Ross, Inc. v. R. W. Roberts Constr. Co., Inc., 481 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1986)
- L. Ross, Inc. v. R.W. Roberts Constr. Co., Inc., 466 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)