RAYMOND BRADHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Raymond Bradham was convicted of kidnapping with aggravated battery, sexual battery, and aggravated battery arising from a 1993 violent crime. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed his separate aggravated battery conviction on double jeopardy grounds, holding that punishing him both through a direct aggravated battery conviction and through the aggravated battery enhancement to his kidnapping charge constituted punishment for the same offense.
Bradham's separate conviction for aggravated battery violates double jeopardy because both the direct aggravated battery conviction and the aggravated battery enhancement to kidnapping require proof of aggravated battery, resulting in double punishment for the same offense. The court rejected Bradham's alternative claim that aggravated battery is subsumed by sexual battery, as these offenses have disparate statutory elements.
[1] A conviction for aggravated battery during the commission of a felony, which reclassifies the underlying felony, and a separate conviction for aggravated battery violate…
[2] For double jeopardy purposes, offenses are considered separate if each criminal offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, irrespective of the accusato…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To determine for double jeopardy purposes whether offenses are separate criminal offenses, the court must look only at the statutory elements of the offenses.”
Establishes the applicable legal standard for double jeopardy analysis in Florida
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 28, 1993, Bradham knocked a victim off her bicycle, carried her into nearby woods, and beat and raped her. He was charged with and convic…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Felony Reclassification cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
On September 28, 1993, appellant knocked his victim from her bicycle and carried her into nearby woods where he beat and raped her. He was charged with and convicted of kidnapping during which an aggravated battery was committed, contrary to sections 787.01(2) and 775.087(l)(a), Florida Statutes, sexual battery, and aggravated battery. On appeal, appellant raises two double jeopardy claims. Because one of these claims is valid, we reverse appellant’s separate conviction for aggravated battery.
Section 775.087(l)(a), Florida Statutes, provides for re-classification of a felony from a first degree felony to a life felony, if “during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggravated battery.” Appellant was convicted of kidnapping and of committing an aggravated battery during the commission of this felony in violation of section 775.087(1), and his kidnapping offense was re-classified as a life felony. Appellant also was convicted of aggravated battery under section 784.045(l)(a)l.
To determine for double jeopardy purposes whether offenses are separate criminal offenses, the court must look only at the statutory elements of the offenses. See State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla.1989) (“[T]he statutory element test shall be used for determining whether offenses are the same or separate.”). The legislature has declared that “offenses are separate if each criminal offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.” § 775.021(4)(a), Fla.Stat. See Brown v. State, 617 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), affd, State v. Brown, 633 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1994). In the instant case, section 775.087(1) requires proof of a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is not an essential element and an aggravated battery to re-classify the felony. Violation of section 784.045(l)(a)l obviously requires proof of an aggravated battery. Because each crime does not require proof of an element that the other does not, appellant’s conviction under both statutes violates the principle of double jeopardy. Appellant is being punished for the same offense of aggravated battery through conviction of one count of aggravated battery and re-classification of the kidnapping offense to a life felony.
Appellant’s second double jeopardy claim, that aggravated battery is a lesser offense subsumed by the crime of sexual battery, fails. First, sexual battery requires a sexual attack, but aggravated battery does not. Hipp v. State, 509 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Second, aggravated battery requires proof of the actual infliction of great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement, which is not an element of sexual battery. These disparate elements evidence that these are separate offenses. Id.
The separate conviction for aggravated battery is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing and correction of the judgment. The judgment, sentence, and sentencing scoresheet should clearly reflect that appellant was not only convicted of kidnapping to facilitate a felony under section 787.01, Florida Statutes, but also of aggravated battery in violation of section 775.087, which re-classified the kidnapping as a life felony.
ERVIN and MINER, JJ., concur. BENTON, J., concurs in result.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Finkley v. State, 16 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…See Ramirez v. State, 928 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (double jeopardy clause prevented defendant from being convicted of aggravated battery since defendant’s kidnapping conviction was enhanced based on aggravated battery); Bradham v. State, 657 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (reversing conviction for aggravated battery because defendant already was being punished through re-classification of kidnapping offense to life felony due to aggravated battery). To the extent reversing the aggravated batte…
-
Beltran v. State, 700 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…fenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. We think it is fairly obvious from the statutes that each of the offenses of which appellant was convicted contains an element that the others do not. See Bradham v. State, 657 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (aggravated battery and sexual battery have disparate elements). [*135] The question raised by appellant is whether the various offenses are merely .“degrees of the same offense as provided by statute” so as to come within the ex…
-
Lavonte Diedrell Maxwell v. State, 803 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: (a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony, (emphasis added) Maxwell argues the enhancement of the kidnaping charge was improper, citing Bradham v. State, 657 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In Bradham, the defendant was convicted of kidnaping and committing an aggravated battery during the commission of one criminal offense. His kidnaping was reclassified under section 775.087(1) as a life felony and he was als…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1989)
- State v. Brown, 633 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1994)
- Hipp v. State, 509 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Brown v. State, 617 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)