CHESTER MATTEAR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Chester Mattear was convicted of sexual battery on a child after the trial court excluded two key defense witnesses for failure to disclose them during discovery. The Fourth DCA reversed, holding that exclusion of exculpatory evidence violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to defend himself, and that a mistrial rather than witness exclusion is the proper remedy for such discovery violations.
Yes. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that when exculpatory evidence is sought to be introduced in violation of discovery rules and adequate remedies are insufficient, a mistrial is the proper sanction rather than witness exclusion, as exclusion would deny the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to defend himself.
[1] Excluding exculpatory defense witness testimony for a discovery violation may deny a defendant's fundamental right to defend himself, violating the Sixth Amendment.
[2] When exculpatory evidence is sought to be introduced in violation of discovery rules, and remedies that would allow the trial to proceed are insufficient, a mistrial is a…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court's decision to exclude testimony for a discovery violation should balance 'the propositions that the reciprocal rules of discovery should be followed so long as the defendant is not denied his fundamental right to defend himself.'”
Establishes the balancing test courts must apply when discovery violations threaten to exclude evidence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA medical examination indicated that a penis had been forced into the victim's vagina. The victim testified she had never had sexual relations with T.…
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HERSEY, Judge.
We deny rehearing, but -withdraw the opinion filed May 3, 1995, and substitute in lieu thereof the following.
Appellant timely appeals a judgment of conviction for sexual battery upon a child, claiming that the trial court erred in excluding two key defense witnesses because they were not disclosed during discovery. We agree.
At trial an expert testified that a medical examination indicated that a penis had been forced into the victim’s vagina. The victim testified that she never had sex with an individual named T. McBride or anyone else. Defense counsel attempted to call McBride as well as one of victim’s friends to testify that the victim and McBride had engaged in sexual relations. The state objected because neither witness was listed on defense’s witness list. The trial judge found that because opening statements and direct examination had been completed and because the evidence was of massive import in that essentially someone else was confessing to the crime, the state would be prejudiced by the introduction of the testimony without prior notice.
In Woody v. State, 423 So. 2d 971, 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), this court noted that a trial court’s decision to exclude testimony for a discovery violation should balance “the propositions that the reciprocal rules of discovery should be followed so long as the defendant is not denied his fundamental right to defend himself.” Since the testimony sought to be introduced by the witnesses in the instant case was exculpatory in nature, exclusion of the testimony would deny appellant his fundamental right to defend himself in violation of the Sixth Amendment. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for a new trial.
We are not suggesting by this opinion that the trial court, after determining under Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971), that the state would suffer substantial prejudice, should have allowed the witnesses to testify in the trial presently underway. When exculpatory evidence is sought to be introduced in violation of the discovery rules, and remedies which would allow the trial to proceed are insufficient, the proper course of action is to declare a mistrial. A mistrial is an appropriate discovery sanction under rule 3.220(n)(l), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Further, we disagree with appellee’s assertion that the failure to allow the testimony of McBride was harmless error because in his proffered testimony he invoked his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Whether this court may consider proffered testimony in deciding whether the error was harmless is currently the subject of a question certified to the Florida Supreme Court in O’Rourke v. State, 645 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). However, even if proffered testimony can be considered, we find that the error was not harmless because defense counsel could, at trial, introduce the deposition of McBride, in which he admits to having sexual relations with the victim, on the grounds that McBride was unavailable under section 90.804, Florida Statutes (1993).
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
DELL, C.J., and FARMER, J., concur.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Comer v. State, 730 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…rdict. Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990). Given the record before us, we are unable to conclude that the State satisfied its DiGuilio burden to show that the failure to conduct an adequate inquiry was harmless error. Mattear v. State, 657 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (in prosecution for sexual battery upon child, trial court’s erroneous exclusion of testimony that someone other than defendant had sex with child, [*776] as sanction for non-disclosure of witness, was not harmless); Baker, 522 S…
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Casseus v. State, 902 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…quate inquiry to determine whether other reasonable alternatives can be employed to overcome or mitigate any possible prejudice.” Id. (quoting Wilkerson v. State, 461 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)). This case is similar to Mattear v. State, 657 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In' that case, the trial court refused to permit defense counsel to call two key defense witnesses who would directly contradict the victim’s testimony. The state objected to their testimony because neither had been listed as wi…
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Alexander v. State, 931 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…o. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). A defendant’s fundamental right to defend himself or herself under the Sixth Amendment is denied when exculpatory evidence is excluded. Wessling v. State, 877 So. 2d 877, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Mattear v. State, 657 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Under Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 775 (Fla.1971), a hearing should be held to determine the extent and nature of any prejudice resulting from a party’s alleged discovery violation. A Richardson hearing requires the…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971)
- O'Rourke v. State, 645 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Reholga Mack Woody v. State, 423 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)