KATHRYN A. ROBINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN W. ROBINSON, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1995-07-19
No. 94-3833
WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
657 So. 2d 958 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1995) Caution
Cited by 24 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in failing to enter an income deduction order, in failing to make child support retroactive, and in deviating from child support guidelines without sufficient legal reason.


Headnotes

[1] An income deduction order must be entered upon an order establishing or modifying child support or alimony, and may only be delayed upon a finding of good cause for such…

[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to make increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification when the need for support and the…

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant appealed a final order modifying a judgment of dissolution of marriage, arguing the trial court erred in several aspects of child support an…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
WOLF, Judge.

WOLF, Judge.

Kathryn Robinson appeals from a final order modifying a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Appellant argues that (1) the trial court erred in failing to enter an income deduction order for the payment of child support and alimony, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the increased child support retroactive to the date of the petition for modification, and (3) the trial court erred in failing to award child support in accordance with the child support guidelines. We reverse as to all three issues.

An income deduction order must be entered when there has been an order establishing or modifying child support or alimony, and this order is effective immediately unless the trial court finds good cause to delay entry of the order until there is a delinquency in an amount equal to one month’s support. Gurene v. Gurene, 575 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We, therefore, reverse and remand for the trial court to enter an income deduction order and to redetermine if good cause exists to delay the effectiveness of the order in accordance with section 61.1301(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1993). We also determine that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to make the order granting increased child support retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition for modification because the undisputed evidence demonstrates the need for support, and the husband’s ability to pay existed at the time of the filing of the petition. Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

We find also that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deviate from the child support guidelines because the reasons given for the deviation were legally insufficient. The first reason given by the trial court for deviating from the guidelines was that the husband had a baby to support with his new wife. Section 61.30(12), Florida Statutes (1993), states,

The existence of such subsequent children should not as a general rule be considered by the court as a basis for disregarding the amount provided in the guidelines....

We are unable to find any ease which interprets this language which was added to the section on child support guidelines by chapter 93-208, Laws of Florida.1 We feel, however, that we must give some meaning to the phrase “subsequent children should not as a general rule be considered,” when deviating from the guidelines. It would appear that there was a legislative recognition that parties should be aware of their support obligation to existing children, and should take that into account prior to assuming further obligation.2 We, therefore, hold that absent some special circumstance, the presence of a subsequent child will not justify a deviation from support guidelines.3 In the instant case, the judge did not refer to any special circumstance which would justify the deviation.

The trial court also assigned as reasons for departing from the guidelines the temporary nature of the former husband’s net monthly income in California, and the high cost of living in California. While the high cost of living in California may have been a valid consideration, the trial court incorrectly allowed a deduction for off-base living expenses and also incorrectly failed to consider a salary increase received by the husband when he received a promotion. The only temporary pay the husband was receiving in California was the VHA pay which is given to military members to offset the higher cost of living in certain areas. This amount may be adjusted when the husband moves, if he moves to an area with a lower cost of living. Thus, such a decrease should be offset by the lower cost of living. The other money the trial court referred to was the husband’s housing allowance, which he will continue to receive at his new assignment if he lives off base. If the husband lives on base in New Orleans, his pay will be reduced, but he will have no rent or utilities which could mean he actually has more income at that time. He will also continue to receive his present salary which was increased when he was promoted to commander. If he lives off base, his net income will be comparable to what he is currently receiving in California.

Because the trial court failed to use proper figures in the computation of child support according to the guidelines, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur. . In Hutslar v. Lappin, 652 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), this court dealt with the issue of children who were bom prior to the child who was subject of the support litigation, an issue not covered by this subsection.

. We are not unmindful that the subsequent child should not be punished for the irresponsibility of the parent, and the issue of the total unavailability of income to support the subsequent child is a factor that the trial judge may consider in applying the support guidelines.

.For instance, a disability or other circumstance which would require greater than normal financial support for the subsequent child.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • Lucinda Jean Hinton v. Smith, 725 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
    …ning to income deduction. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to provide for immediate income deduction, with payment through the central depository, unless all of the requirements for entering a delayed order are met. See Robinson v. Robinson, 657 So. 2d 958, 959 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). ATTORNEY’S FEES At the outset of the modification hearing, both parties and the trial court agreed to address the issue of attorney’s fees at a later hearing. Nevertheless, in its order modifying child support, the trial…
  • Hice v. Pace, 675 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …ich have been reversed based on downward departures for subsequent children without written reasons or evidence of special circumstances or impairment of the parent’s ability to meet the amount required under the guidelines. In Robinson v. Robinson, 657 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), this court found that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deviate from the child support guidelines based on the fact that the husband had a baby to support with his new wife. The court noted that section 61.30(…
  • Kimberlee Miller-Bent v. Miller-Bent, 680 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …xisting award. § 61.30(12), Fla.Stat. (emphasis added). There is no legal basis for the consideration of subsequent-bom children to justify a decrease in child support. The statute clearly forbids doing so. The appellee cites Robinson v. Robinson, 657 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), to support his argument that the court’s reasons for downward departure are sufficient. However, in Robinson, this court dealt with an upward modification in which the former husband was challenging an increase in child support…

Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw