RICHARD EDWARD SHODA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Richard Shoda appeals the trial court's probation and community control sentences imposed upon revocation of his original probation. The court reversed the three-year probation sentence because the trial court failed to credit time previously served on probation, making the sentence exceed the statutory maximum, but affirmed the community control sentence and certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding credit for time served on community control.
The trial court was required to give Shoda credit for time previously served on probation toward the new three-year probationary term, as its failure to do so resulted in a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum. However, the trial court was not required to give credit for time previously served on probation toward the two-year community control sentence. The court certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether credit must be given for time served on probation when a new community control sentence is imposed upon revocation.
[1] A trial court must credit time previously served on probation towards a new probationary term imposed upon revocation, or the new sentence may exceed the statutory maximu…
[2] A trial court is not required to credit time previously served on probation towards a new community control sentence imposed upon revocation.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court was required to give Shoda credit toward his new three-year probationary term for the time that he previously served on probation”
Establishes the holding that credit for time served on probation must be given when a new probationary sentence is imposed upon revocation.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShoda was placed on five years probation on June 21, 1990, after pleading no contest to armed trespass, a third degree felony. On October 20, 1993, a …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Credit For Time Served On Probation cases and more on FLexlaw
VAN NORTWICK, Judge.
Appellant, Richard Edward Shoda, appeals separate community control and probation orders entered upon his revocation of probation for a third degree felony offense. We reverse the order imposing three years probation because the trial court failed to give Shoda credit for time previously served on probation. As a result, the imposition of Shoda’s successive three-year probationary term constitutes a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum. We affirm the trial court’s order imposing two years community control because the trial court was not required to give credit against that sentence for time previously served on probation.
On June 21, 1990, in Case No. 90-52, Sho-da was placed on five years probation after pleading no contest to armed trespass, a third degree felony. On October 20, 1993, an affidavit of violation of probation was filed alleging that Shoda had committed new offenses. At approximately the same time, he was charged with DUI with serious bodily injury and felony possession of marijuana (Case No. 93-1284). Shoda admitted the probation violation and pled no contest to the new charges. Thereafter, Shoda’s probation was revoked and, on both the probation violation and the new charges, he was placed on two years community control followed by three years probation. Separate community control and probation orders were entered in each ease. In this appeal, Shoda challenges the orders imposed for the probation violation in Case No. 90-52.
The state concedes that, as to Shoda’s probation sentence, the trial court was required to give Shoda credit toward his new three-year probationary term for the time that he previously served on probation. State v. Summers, 642 So. 2d 742 (Fla.1994). However, the state argues, and we agree based on this court’s prior decisions applying Summers, supra, and State v. Roundtree, 644 So. 2d 1358 (Fla.1994), that the trial court was permitted to give Shoda a new community control sentence without the necessity of crediting against that sentence time previously served on probation. Eanes v. State, 648 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Gardner v. State, 656 So. 2d 933, 938-40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
In addition, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance:
UPON REVOCATION OF PROBATION AND THE IMPOSITION OF A NEW COMMUNITY CONTROL SENTENCE, MUST THE TRIAL COURT GIVE CREDIT FOR TIME PREVIOUSLY SERVED ON PROBATION TOWARDS THE NEWLY IMPOSED COMMUNITY CONTROL SENTENCE?
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.
MICKLE and BENTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Nydia Karell v. Miami Airport Hilton/Miami Hilton Corp., 668 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…dments relating to independent medical examinations are substantive in nature, and thus applicable only to accidents occurring subsequent to January 1, 1994. Southern Bakeries v. Cooper, 659 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Public Gas Co. v. Monette, 658 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). . Under the new IME statute, the E/C's right to schedule an IME before a petition for benefits is filed is not dependent upon the employee being represented by an attorney. Further, under section 440.13(5)(f) attorney’s fees in…
-
Shoda v. State, 666 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1996)…PER CURIAM. We have for review Skoda v. State, 658 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), wherein the First District Court of Appeal certified the following question to be of great public importance: UPON REVOCATION OF PROBATION AND THE IMPOSITION OF NEW COMMUNITY CONTROL SENTENCE, MUST THE TRIAL COURT GIVE CREDIT F…
-
Rosanna Snider v. Mumford, Inc., 65 So. 3d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…n his investigatory authority pursuant to section 440.29(1), Florida Statutes (1981). At that time, a claimant was not required to pay for an examination ordered by the deputy commissioner at the claimant’s suggestion. See Public Gas Co. v. Monette, 658 So. 2d 673, 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (approving JCC’s appointment of an IME, pursuant to section 440.29(1), Florida Statutes (1991), with physician chosen by claimant); see also Berry Corp. v. Smith, 576 So. 2d 1366, 1367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding JCC may or…
Authorities Cited
- Carder v. State, 642 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1994)
- State v. Roundtree, 644 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 1994)
- Gardner v. State, 656 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Eanes v. State, 648 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Justo L. Miranda v. State, 648 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)