RICHARD C. MCCLANEY, APPELLANT,
v.
DICTAPHONE/PITNEY BOWES AND TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1994-12-29
No. 94-533
MICKLE and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
659 So. 2d 325 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1994) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

An employee injured in a workplace accident was later diagnosed with advanced cancer. The workers' compensation judge attributed all of the employee's inability to work to the cancer rather than analyzing what portion of disability resulted from the compensable industrial injury. The court reversed, holding that even where a noncompensable condition independently causes disability, the judge must analyze what portion of current disability is attributable to the compensable accident.


Holding

Yes. The judge must analyze what portion of the employee's disability at the time of final hearing was caused by the compensable accident. A subsequent noncompensable injury does not negate the effects of the first compensable accident, and even if disability results from both causes, the employee may be entitled to compensation for the portion attributable to the compensable accident.


Headnotes

[1] A subsequent noncompensable injury does not negate the effects of a prior compensable accident.

[2] A Judge of Compensation Claims must analyze the extent to which a compensable accident caused a claimant's present disability, even when a noncompensable event is an inde…

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Key Quotes

“[I]t was incumbent upon the JCC to analyze the case from the point of view as to what portion of claimant's present disability is caused by the compensable accident, even where the noncompensable accident may be an independent and sufficient producing cause of claimant's disability.”

Establishes the primary legal standard requiring judges to apportion disability between compensable and noncompensable causes

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Facts & Procedural History

McClaney suffered an industrial accident on February 13, 1992, while employed by Dictaphone/Pitney Bowes. On January 2, 1993, he was diagnosed with ad…

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Opinion of the Court
SHIVERS, Senior Judge.

SHIVERS, Senior Judge.

The employee suffered an industrial accident on February 13, 1992, while employed with Dictaphone/Pitney Bowes. On January 2, 1993, the employee was diagnosed with advanced cancer of the rectum.

According to the final order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC), it appears the employee reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) from the industrial accident on March 8, 1993 with 12% permanent partial impairment (PPI); but that on January 9, 1993, the employee was not capable of sustaining even part-time employment on an uninterrupted basis based on claimant’s diagnosis of cancer alone. The judge concluded that all of the employee’s inability to work was attributable to the cancer rather than a combination of the industrial injury and the cancer. We reverse and remand.

In Siegel v. AT & T Communications, 611 So. 2d 1345, 1350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), we held that: “[I]t was incumbent upon the JCC to analyze the case from the point of view as to what portion of claimant’s present disability is caused by the compensable accident, even where the noncompensable accident may be an independent and sufficient producing cause of claimant’s disability.”

And in Curtis v. Bordo Citrus Products, 566 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), this court held as follows: “While disability resulting solely from a second, noncompensable cause is not compensable, if on the date of the noncompensable event the claimant is still suffering from the effects of the first, compensable accident, it does not follow that he is entitled to no compensation.” 566 So. 2d at 329, citing Koulias v. Tarpon Marine Ways, 538 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

If claimant attained MMI and a 12% PPI from his industrial accident on March 8, 1993, it seems he would be excused from a work search due to the status of his cancer on that date.

We reverse and remand for an analysis as to what portion of the employee’s disability at the time of the final hearing was caused by the compensable accident. The subsequent noncompensable injury did not negate the effects of the first compensable accident.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

MICKLE and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Cathaleen Myers v. Sherwin-Williams Paint, 838 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
    …events his working, if a prior industrial accident would otherwise have entitled the employee to workers’ compensation benefits. See Koulias [v. Tarpon Marine Ways, 538 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ]. See also McCla-ney v. Dictaphone/Pitney Bowes, 659 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Id. at 1270. Similarly, as to permanent indemnity benefits, the judge of compensation claims must decide on remand whether appellant’s disability attributable to the industrial accidents would have rendered her totally, permane…
  • Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. la Torre, 702 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
    …elated to work befalls an industrially injured employee and prevents his working, if a prior industrial accident would otherwise have entitled the employee to workers’ compensation benefits. See Koulias. See also McClaney v. Dictaphone/Pitney Bowes, 659 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). While Mr. La Torre’s retinitis pigmentosa had manifested itself before his industrial accident, the condition was progressive and only became disabling after the accident. Where a noncompensable second cause “has intervened to c…

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