DAVID D. BARTON, APPELLANT,
v.
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, ETC., APPELLEE
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An indigent prisoner's petition to change his name was denied by the trial court following a telephonic hearing, but the court provided no findings of fact and no transcript existed. The appellate court affirmed the denial on the alternative ground that the petition was not properly verified under Florida law, but without prejudice to refiling in proper form.
A trial court must set forth the factual basis for denying a facially sufficient petition for change of name in its order. Additionally, the petition in this case was invalid because it was not properly verified—a verification qualified by 'to the best of [the affiant's] knowledge' is insufficient under Florida law.
[1] A trial court's denial of a facially sufficient petition for change of name, based on an unreported evidentiary hearing without factual findings, is improper.
[2] When a trial court denies a facially sufficient petition for change of name, the factual basis for the denial should be set forth in the order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If a prisoner's facially sufficient petition for change of name cannot be denied without evidence to support the denial, it follows that a denial based on an unreported evidentiary hearing, in the absence of factual findings, would also be improper.”
Establishes the core legal principle that denials of name-change petitions must be supported by factual findings, especially when based on an evidentiary hearing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavid Barton, an indigent prisoner, filed a petition to change his name. The trial court held a telephonic hearing but did not transcribe it and denie…
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KLEIN, Judge.
Appellant, an indigent prisoner, filed a petition to change his name, which the trial court denied, following a telephone hearing, on the ground that the reason for the change was “for an ulterior purpose.” The trial court gave no further explanation as to why it denied the petition, and the telephonic hearing was not transcribed. There is, accordingly, no way for us to determine whether appellant’s petition was properly denied.
Although there are a number of cases holding that a trial court cannot, without having received evidence, summarily deny a facially sufficient petition for change of name, Casey v. State, 604 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), and cases cited therein, we are not aware of any cases involving this specific situation, in which there was a hearing, but no transcript or findings of fact.
If a prisoner’s facially sufficient petition for change of name cannot be denied without evidence to support the denial, it follows that a denial based on an unreported evidentiary hearing, in the absence of factual findings, would also be improper. We therefore conclude that when a trial court does deny a facially sufficient petition for change of name under the circumstances of this case, the factual basis for the denial should be set forth in the order. We are well aware that trial judges already have enough to do, and that some of them have to deal with an excessive number of meritless claims by a few prisoners; however, we believe that requiring findings of fact is better than the only alternative we can think of, having the public bear the cost of reporting the hearing.
Our change of name statute, section 68.07, Florida Statutes, requires that a petition for change of name be verified. The petition in the present case is not properly verified. Section 92.525, Florida Statutes (1993), provides that documents may be verified by either (1) giving an oath before an authorized officer; or (2) by signing a written declaration which attests that under penalties of perjury, the facts stated in it are true. A verification which states that the information contained therein is true “to the best of [the affiant’s] knowledge” is insufficient because it is qualified, not positive. See Hahn v. Frederick, 66 So. 2d 823 (Fla.1953); Hall v. Byington, 421 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition, but do so without prejudice to petitioner’s filing a petition in proper form.
Affirmed.
GLICKSTEIN and WARNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Ballinger v. BAY Gulf Credit Union, 51 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…ef is insufficient to entitle the verifying party to relief because the verification is qualified in nature. See Muss v. Lennar Fla. Partners I, L.P., 673 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Barton v. Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, 659 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Thompson v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of Leesburg, Fla., 433 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). In this case, the verification reflects it was not based on Lenth’s personal knowledge. Bay Gulf asks this court to construe the v…
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In re the Name Change of Evan James Zimmer, 207 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…fraudulent purpose.” Hoyos v. Singletary, 639 So. 2d 631, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Where a trial court denies a facially sufficient petition, the factual basis for doing so must be set forth in its order. Barton v. Cir. Ct. of Nineteenth Jud. Cir., 659 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). For example, in Barton, the trial court stated it was denying a petition for a change of name because “the reason for the change was ‘for an ulterior purpose.’” Id. This court noted that the court’s order was insufficient.…
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Medina v. State, 310 So. 3d 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)…o. 2d 631, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Thus, when a facially sufficient petition is denied, the trial court must set forth a proper factual basis for doing so in its order. In re Zimmer, 207 So. 3d at 1007; Barton v. Cir. Ct. of Nineteenth Jud. Cir., 659 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Applying these standards, the trial court erred in denying the facially sufficient petition without providing a proper factual basis for determining whether the name change was sought for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hahn v. Frederick, 66 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1953)
- Hall v. Eleanore Florence Byington & Rinker Materials Corp., 421 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Casey v. State, 604 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)