MEKAMY OAKS, INC., NORMAN C. HATFILL AND TED MEDLIN, APPELLANTS,
v.
LEON JOSEPH SNYDER, APPELLEE
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An employee injured by a defective riding mower sued his employer and supervisors, claiming they removed a safety switch. The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, holding that the defendants were entitled to worker's compensation immunity because the employee failed to establish intentional tort or culpable negligence.
The appellate court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment and worker's compensation immunity because there was no evidence of intentional tort or culpable negligence. Although the defendants' conduct may have been negligent or grossly negligent, it was not conduct designed to or substantially certain to result in injury or death.
[1] An employer's worker's compensation immunity can be overcome only by evidence of an intentional tort, not mere negligence or gross negligence.
[2] Conduct is considered an intentional tort for the purpose of overcoming worker's compensation immunity if it was designed to result in injury or death, or was substantial…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there is no evidence it committed an intentional tort — which is the conduct requisite to removing an employer's worker's compensation immunity”
Establishes the legal standard for overcoming worker's compensation immunity
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeon Snyder operated a riding lawn mower for his employer, Mekamy Oaks, Inc. After the mower began losing power, supervisor Ted Medlin was told by a r…
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PETERSON, Chief Judge.
The appellants challenge the trial court’s denial of their motions for summary judgment in which they claimed they were immune to suit under worker’s compensation law. Appellee, Leon Snyder, filed suit for personal injuries against his employer, Meka-my Oaks, Inc., his supervisor, Ted Medlin, and Norman C. Hatfili, Mekamy Oaks’ corporate director, after the riding lawn mower he was operating flipped over and ejected him. We have jurisdiction1 and reverse. The facts are in dispute, but those most favorable to Snyder are the following. Snyder maintained the grounds of Mekamy Oaks and regularly used a riding mower in doing so. After the mower began losing power while Snyder was operating it, Medlin, Snyder’s supervisor, was told by a repairman that the mower would have to be sent to the factoiy to be repaired. Medlin told Snyder that the problem was caused by a malfunctioning safety switch that was designed to kill the engine when the rider dismounted. Medlin then informed Snyder that he was going to resolve the problem by removing the safely switch and by “doling] away with the whole thing.” Snyder remarked that someone could get hurt. He later saw Med-lin working on the mower, and Snyder operated the mower without incident for a few days. Unfortunately, he later operated the mower on a sloped surface when the front end of the mower suddenly went down, and the back reared up; Snyder was thrown and the mower blade cut his foot.
The court erred in denying summary judgment in favor of Mekamy Oaks because there is no evidence it committed an intentional tort — which is the conduct requisite to removing an employer’s worker’s compensation immunity. Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla.1986); Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Products, 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla.1986). Although Mekamy Oaks’ conduct, through the acts of Medlin or Hatfill, may have been negligent or even grossly negligent, there is no evidence to show that it engaged in conduct either designed to or substantially certain to result in injury or death, or that Mekamy Oaks committed an intentional tort. Fisher; Lawton; Emergency One, Inc. v. Keffer, 652 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Kline v. Rubio, 652 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 660 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1995) (table).
Similarly, the court erred in denying summary judgment in favor of Medlin and Hatfill because there is no evidence that the conduct of either Medlin or Hatfill2 constituted the crime of culpable negligence or that their conduct would warrant punitive damages. § 440.11(1), Fla.Stat. (1989); Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1993); compare Como Oil Co. v. O’Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.1985); White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla.1985).
Accordingly, we reverse the order denying summary judgment and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Mekamy Oaks, Medlin, and Hatfill.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . District courts have jurisdiction to review a non-final order which determines that a party is not entitled to worker's compensation immunity as a matter of law. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi), Fla.R.App.P.; Mandico v. Taos Constr. Inc., 605 So. 2d 850 (Fla.1992); Kennedy v. Moree, 650 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Ross v. Baker, 632 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. David, 632 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. dismissed, 639 So. 2d 976 (Fla.1994); see also Ramos v. Univision Holdings, Inc., 655 So. 2d 89, 91 n. 2 (Fla.1995).
. With respect to Hatfill, no evidence was presented refuting his assertion that he was unaware the mower had a safety switch and that it was allegedly removed or disabled.
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Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000)…ned "virtual certainty" standard. See, e.g., Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc. v. Phiel, 681 So. 2d 786, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (applying “substantial certainty” standard to [*688] determine whether employer acted intentionally); Mekamy Oaks, Inc. v. Snyder, 659 So. 2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (same). As noted earlier, we upheld legislation in Eller that created an exception to a managerial coemployee's immunity when the coemployee acted with culpable negligence. That culpable negligence exception is not unlike t…
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Gustafson's Dairy, Inc. v. Phiel, 681 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…ngaged in conduct which was substantially certain to result in injury or death. See, Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Const. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla.1986); Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Products, Inc., 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla.1986); Mekamy Oaks, Inc. v. Snyder, 659 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Emergency One, supra; Kline v. Rubio, 652 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 660 So. 2d 714 (Fla.1995). REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Gustafson’s Dairy. BOOTH, J., concurs. WO…
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Woodson v. Ivey, 917 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…mes egregious acts by employers and managers, as long as those acts fall short of intentional torts, culpable negligence or serious criminal misconduct. See Byers v. Ritz, 890 So. 2d 343, 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); see also Mekamy Oaks, Inc. v. Snyder, 659 So. 2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (holding that employer retained worker’s compensation immunity where supervisor removed safety switch from lawnmower, causing plaintiff to be thrown from mower and cut his foot); Emergency One, Inc. v. Keffer, 652 So. 2d 12…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- White Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1984)
- Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc., 605 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1992)
- Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1986)
- Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1993)
- Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986)
- Como OIL Co., Inc. v. Celestine O'Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1985)
- Emergency ONE, Inc. v. Keffer, 652 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. David, 632 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Ross v. Baker, 632 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Ramos v. Univision Holdings, Inc., 655 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1995)