K. JAMES FINCH, APPELLANT,
v.
BARBARA FINCH, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court's final judgment because the judgment failed to explain how it applied the statutory factors required for equitable distribution of marital assets and liabilities. The court also required additional findings regarding non-marital assets and income to justify the attorney's fees award.
The trial court's judgment must be reversed and remanded because it failed to apply the statutory factors for equitable distribution as expressly required by section 61.075(3), and because the court made no findings regarding the parties' non-marital assets and income to justify the attorney's fee award. The trial judge may revisit the entire judgment on remand.
[1] A judgment of dissolution must explain and justify the equitable distribution of marital assets and liabilities by referencing the factors listed in section 61.075(1), as…
[2] A trial court's equitable distribution judgment is not meaningful for appellate review if it merely references category considerations without specifically applying them…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it does not explain nor justify the equitable distribution with reference to the factors listed in section 61.075(1), as is expressly required by section 61.075(3). The judgment merely references three category considerations, without specifically applying them to this case. That is not meaningful for purposes of appellate review.”
Establishes that the trial court's failure to apply statutory factors to the case facts violated the express requirement for equitable distribution judgments and prevented meaningful appellate review.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced in what appears to have been a short-term marriage. The former husband had gifted substantial pre-marital assets to the form…
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W. SHARP, Judge.
The former husband appeals from a final judgment of dissolution. He argues numerous grounds for reversal, challenging the trial court’s equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets and liabilities, and the award to the former wife of $3,885.00 for attorney’s fees (which represented approximately 60% of the amount she requested and which the court found to be a reasonable fee) and $738.99 for costs. We remand for further consideration and findings.
It appears in this case that the trial judge equally divided the parties’ marital assets, and liabilities, and the judgment set forth the identity and value of the marital assets and liabilities. However, it does not explain nor justify the equitable distribution with reference to the factors listed in section 61.075(1), as is expressly required by section 61.075(3). The judgment merely references three category considerations, without specifically applying them to this case. That is not meaningful for purposes of appellate review. See McMonagle v. McMonagle, 617 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
We do not take any position on whether the equitable distribution devised by the court is or is not “fair.” However, we have some concern that the record in this case indicates this was not a long-term marriage. The former husband gifted the former wife with substantial pre-marital assets (primarily the marital residence). And, he mortgaged pre-marital assets in order to acquire the marital residence. This “marital debt” was left apparently to be paid solely by the former husband and it is secured by his premarital properties. The equities for this result are not clear. The attorney’s fee and cost awards appear to be within the trial court’ discretion, given indications in the record that the former husband’s income from his current employment and non-marital assets greatly exceeded the former wife’s. The former wife has no non-marital property. However, these circumstances are disputed by evidence presented to the trial judge, and the trial court made no finding regarding the parties’ non-marital assets and income, which could justify the attorney’s fee award. Thus on remand, the trial court should make additional findings concerning non-marital assets and income belonging to the former husband.
Accordingly, we remand this cause to the trial judge for additional findings and considerations. The trial judge may revisit the appealed judgment as a whole, in his discretion, so as to do full equity in this case. See Hamlet v. Hamlet, 583 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1991).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
EVANDER, K.I., Associate Judge, concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially with opinion.
DAUKSCH, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree the judgment must be reversed and remanded, I do not equivocate regarding what should next occur. In order to render full justice I suggest, due to the passage of time, only a new, complete hearing regarding the economic issues, including fees, will suffice.
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Vidal Herrera v. Elbanile Herrera, 673 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…court cannot prejudge the validity of any reasons or findings to depart from an equal distribution of marital assets, or whether the record supports any such findings. REVERSED and REMANDED. HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . See Finch v. Finch, 659 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Kimm v. Kimm, 650 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Plyler v. Plyler, 622 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); § 61.075(3), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994). . Schütz v. Schütz, 581 So. 2d 129…
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Adams v. Adams, 677 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…urham v. McNair, 659 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part. DAUKSCH, J., concurs in conclusion only. HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion. . See § 61.075(3), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994); Finch v. Finch, 659 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Kimm v. Kimm, 650 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Plyler v. Plyler, 622 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). . Lagstrom v. Lagstrom, 662 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Ingle v. I…
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Kelley v. Sang Hui Kelley, 678 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…he amount of the retroactive award consistent herein. We also reverse the equitable distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities because the trial court failed to make findings required by section 61.075(3), Florida Statutes. Finch v. Finch, 659 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Green v. Green, 650 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Pridgeon v. Pridgeon, 632 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Collinsworth v. Collinsworth, 624 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hamlet v. Hamlet, 583 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1991)
- McMONAGLE v. McMONAGLE, 617 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)