ARTHUR HORTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Arthur Horton was charged with drug possession after police discovered cocaine, marijuana, and paraphernalia following a traffic stop. The court reversed his conviction, holding that the initial police detention was unconstitutional and the evidence was fruit of an illegal seizure.
The court held that Deputy Kraft's attempt to enter the car and order to unlock the door constituted an official show of authority that began an illegal detention. The facts that the car was parked in front of a burned house and that Horton dropped something do not provide reasonable suspicion necessary to detain a person. Therefore, the drugs and paraphernalia were fruit of an unconstitutional seizure and must be suppressed.
[1] A police officer may approach a citizen without a founded suspicion of criminal activity, as this constitutes a consensual encounter where the citizen is free to leave.
[2] Constitutional protections are implicated when a police officer exhibits an official show of authority from which a reasonable person would conclude they are not free to…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Deputy Kraft's attempt to enter the ear and his order to open the locked door constituted an official show of authority. No reasonable person would believe he was free to leave or to disregard the deputy's order.”
Establishes that the detention was unconstitutional because the officer's actions conveyed official authority that a reasonable person could not ignore.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeputy Kraft observed a legally parked car with three occupants in front of a burned-out house at 9:00 a.m. As the deputy approached the vehicle, he s…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Investigative Detention cases and more on FLexlaw
RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
Arthur Horton pleaded no contest to the charges of possession of cocaine, possession of paraphernalia and possession of less than twenty grams of marijuana. He reserved his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his dispositive motion to suppress evidence. Horton argues that the police illegally detained him and that the confiscation of drugs and paraphernalia was the fruit of this unconstitutional seizure. We agree, reverse and remand to the trial court with directions to discharge him.
The facts surrounding Horton’s encounter with the police were presented at the hearing on his motion. Lee County Deputy Glenn Kraft testified that while on road patrol he noticed a ear with three occupants parked in front of a burned-out house. It was about 9:00 in the morning and the car was legally parked. Deputy Kraft pulled in behind the parked car and walked toward it. Horton was in the back seat. As the deputy approached, he “saw several items fall from [Horton’s] hands onto the back floorboards.” Kraft attempted to open the back door of the car, but it was locked. He ordered the driver to unlock the door and the driver complied. The deputy then saw Horton throw a silver-colored item on the car’s floorboard. He pulled Horton out of the car and placed him in his patrol ear. Kraft checked the floorboards and removed a pipe, a plastic container of marijuana and some screening used in smoking rock cocaine.
A police officer does not need a founded suspicion of criminal activity in order to approach a citizen. This is considered a consensual encounter, during which the citizen may choose to comply with the officer’s requests or ignore them. Because the citizen is free to leave, constitutional safeguards are not invoked. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186-187 (Fla.1993). Constitutional protections are implicated if there has been a show of official authority from which a reasonable person would conclude that he is not free to leave. Popple, 626 So. 2d at 188; Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla.1985). “[A] police officer may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151 Fla.Stat. (1991).” Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186.
Deputy Kraft’s attempt to enter the ear and his order to open the locked door constituted an official show of authority. No reasonable person would believe he was free to leave or to disregard the deputy’s order. Horton’s detention began at that point. While the fact that the ear was parked in front of a burned house and the fact that Horton dropped something on the floorboard might raise a suspicion of criminal activity, these facts do not provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to detain a person. This case is very similar to G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). There, two police officers noticed an occupied car parked in an alley. Although they had no reports of stolen vehicles, the officers decided to approach the car. As they did, they saw G.J.P., the front seat passenger, make a quick movement with his head and hand. The officers ordered the occupants out of the car and then discovered drugs on the passenger side of the vehicle. We reversed the trial court’s denial of G.J.P.’s motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the officers did not have a founded suspicion to detain him.
We hold that Horton’s detention was illegal and the officer’s resulting acquisition of the paraphernalia and drugs was the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure. Accordingly, we reverse the lower court’s denial of Horton’s motion to suppress evidence, and remand with directions to discharge him.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, 33., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…n motion where police only observe legally parked car in parking lot); Alvarez v. State, 695 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(reversing denial of suppression motion where police observe legally parked car in parking lot at 4:00 a.m.); Horton v. State, 660 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(reversing denial of suppression motion where police only observe car legally parked); Fourth District: Miranda v. State, 816 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(reversing denial of suppression motion where police observe legally parked…
-
Bowen v. State, 685 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…on v. State, 662 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), the court found it was unreasonable to order defendant out of car at 1:08 a.m. in area where robberies had been committed in the past, but where none had been committed that night. In Horton v. State, 660 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the court held it was unreasonable to order defendant out of a legally parked vehicle where he dropped something on the floorboard. Under Popple, Harrelson and Horton, Crose did not have a well-founded, articula-ble suspicion of…
-
Forman v. State, 128 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…d not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to order Popple to exit his vehicle when the officer observed him merely sitting in a legally parked car acting nervous, reaching [*820] under the seat, and “flipping” about in the car); Horton v. State, 660 So. 2d 755, 756 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that Horton’s motion to suppress should have been granted because the officer did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to order Horton to exit the lawfully parked vehicle in which he was a backseat passenger s…
Authorities Cited
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985)
- G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)