KOCHA & JONES, P.A., APPELLANT,
v.
PHILIP E. GREENWALD, ROBERT JAMES TAYLOR, THELMA TAYLOR, ERIC NELSON AND RUTH NELSON, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1995-08-09
No. 94-1391
STONE and FARMER, JJ., concur.
660 So. 2d 1074 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1995) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A law firm appeals an award of attorney's fees from a contingency fee agreement after voluntarily withdrawing from representation before the contingency occurred. The court reversed, holding that under Faro v. Romani, an attorney who withdraws by their own choice forfeits all compensation rights unless the client's conduct made continued performance legally impossible or violated ethical rules.


Holding

An attorney who withdraws by their own volition forfeits all rights to compensation when the contingency has not yet occurred. An attorney may only recover if the client's conduct makes continued performance either legally impossible or would cause the attorney to violate ethical rules of the Florida Bar.


Headnotes

[1] An attorney who withdraws from representation voluntarily forfeits all rights to compensation when the contingency of the fee contract has not yet occurred.

[2] An attorney may be entitled to a fee upon the occurrence of the contingency if the client's conduct makes continued performance legally impossible or would cause the atto…

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Key Quotes

“once an attorney withdraws from representation, the contingency agreement, like the attorney-client relationship, terminates.”

Establishes that withdrawal terminates both the contingency agreement and the attorney-client relationship

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Facts & Procedural History

Greenwald, an attorney, entered into a contingency fee agreement with clients the Taylors. Greenwald testified he told the Taylors they should engage …

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Opinion of the Court
GUNTHER, Chief Judge.

GUNTHER, Chief Judge.

Appellant, Kocha & Jones, P.A., intervenor below, (Appellant) appeals the final order and judgment awarding the Appellee, Philip Greenwald, hen-claimant below, (Greenwald) an attorney’s fee from the Appellant in the sum of six thousand dollars ($6,000.00) bearing interest at the rate of 12% a year. We reverse based upon the authority of Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla.1994).

On April 15, 1994, when the trial court entered the final order and judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Greenwald, this court had pending before the Florida supreme court the following certified question of great public importance:

WHETHER IN AN ACTION ON A CHARGING LIEN, A TRIER OF FACT MAY CONCLUDE ON DISPUTED EVIDENCE THAT COUNSEL IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONTINGENCY OF THE FEE CONTRACT, WHERE COUNSEL IS FOUND TO HAVE JUSTIFICATION AND GOOD CAUSE FOR WITHDRAWING APART FROM, OR IN ADDITION TO, DISAGREEMENTS OVER SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS?

Faro v. Romani, 629 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The Florida supreme court answered our question with a qualified affirmative. Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla.1994). In qualifying its answer, the supreme court explained that once an attorney withdraws from representation, the contingency agreement, like the attorney-client relationship, terminates. Id. at 71. The supreme court held that when an attorney withdraws from representation upon his own volition, and the contingency has not occurred, the attorney forfeits all rights to compensation. Id. The supreme court further held, however, that if the client’s conduct makes the attorney’s continued performance of the contract either legally impossible or would cause the attorney to violate an ethical rule of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, that attorney may be entitled to a fee when the contingency of an award occurs. Id.

The client in Romani, John Faro, entered into a contingency fee agreement with Roma-ni and the firm of Farish, Farish, and Roma-ni. Id. Before the case went to trial, Roma-ni filed a motion to withdraw as counsel based on “irreconcilable differences.” The supreme court found that there was insufficient evidence of justification and good cause to warrant a fee in Romani. Id. at 70. Additionally, the supreme court found that the record did not support a finding that Faro breached the attorney contract or legally caused it to be breached. Id. at 71. Nor did the record support a finding that Faro’s conduct placed Romani in an ethical dilemma. Id.

Decisional law and rules in effect at the time an appeal is decided govern the ease even if there has been a change since the time of trial. Lowe v. Price, 437 So. 2d 142 (Fla.1983); see also Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla.1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924, 99 S.Ct. 1254, 59 L.Ed.2d 478 (1979); Collins v. Wainwright, 311 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. dismissed, 315 So. 2d 97 (Fla.1975).

Given that Romani is applicable to this court’s appellate determination, Romani is factually similar to the instant case. Greenwald testified that he told his clients, the Taylors, that he thought it would be best for them to engage other counsel. In addition, Greenwald testified that Mr. Taylor had become increasingly more difficult as a client. At trial, Mr. Taylor testified that Greenwald gave him no reason why Greenwald would not handle the new trial for Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor further testified that Greenwald had quit. Finally, Mr. Taylor testified that he never made the decision to discharge Green-wald.

Thus, the record evidence in the instant case clearly suggests that Greenwald withdrew from representation upon his own volition. Because the contingency had not yet occurred, Greenwald forfeited all rights to compensation. See Romani, supra. Here, we do not find that Greenwald has alleged any conduct by the Taylors that would render the attorney’s continued performance of the contract either legally impossible or would cause the attorney to violate an ethical rule of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. See Romani, supra.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to discharge Greenwald’s lien.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

STONE and FARMER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Roberta Santini, M.D. v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 65 So. 3d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)
    …e client’s conduct made the withdrawal necessary. See, e.g., DePena v. Cruz, 884 So. 2d 1062, 1063-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Carbonic Consultants, Inc. v. Herzfeld & Rubin, Inc., 699 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Kocha & Jones, P.A. v. Greenwald, 660 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We also find cases from other jurisdictions persuasive in holding that withdrawing from a case because of a bar suspension constitutes withdrawing on one’s own volition. See, e.g., Royden v. Ardoin, 160 Tex. 338, 331 S.W.…
  • Carbonic Consultants, Inc. v. Herzfeld & Rubin, Inc., 699 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
    …ithdrawal based on a finding that the client’s conduct either rendered the attorney’s performance legally impossible, or would result in the attorney violating an ethical rule.1 See Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d at 71; Kocha & Jones, P.A. v. Greenwald, 660 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The Supreme Court of Florida in Faro specifically stated: “[I]f the client’s conduct makes the attorney’s continued performance of the contract either legally impossible or tvould cause the attorney to violate an ethical rule o…
  • Chittenden v. Boyd, 669 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
    …nefit of this court’s opinions in Kuutti v. Kuutti 645 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), and Cherradi v. Lavoie, 662 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We must apply the decisional law in effect at the time of the appeal. Kocha & Jones, P.A. v. Greenwald, 660 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In Kuutti, this court, in an en bane opinion, recognized and held that the tender years doctrine had been abolished. More recently in Cherradi this court reversed a primary residential parent designation because the trial court…

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