CRISELDA LOPEZ, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE E. RANDOLPH BENTLEY AS CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Criselda Lopez petitioned for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from proceeding with an indirect criminal contempt hearing for allegedly violating a domestic violence injunction. The court denied the petition, holding that trial courts retain inherent constitutional power to enforce such injunctions through indirect criminal contempt proceedings despite statutory provisions limiting certain enforcement mechanisms.
Trial courts retain their inherent constitutional power to enforce injunctions for protection against repeat violence through indirect criminal contempt proceedings. Although section 784.046(9)(a) provides for civil contempt enforcement, it does not statutorily prohibit the exercise of the court's inherent indirect criminal contempt powers.
[1] A trial court has the inherent power to enforce compliance with an injunction for protection against domestic violence through indirect criminal contempt, notwithstanding…
[2] A trial court possesses the inherent power to enforce compliance with an injunction for protection against repeat violence through indirect criminal contempt.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court in this district retains its constitutional inherent powers of indirect criminal contempt under section 741.30, even when section 741.2901(2) specifically denies those powers to the trial court”
Establishes that trial courts possess inherent constitutional contempt powers that cannot be legislatively restricted under separation of powers doctrine.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLopez was charged with indirect criminal contempt of a court order styled 'Injunction for Protection Against Domestic/Repeat Violence' entered pursuan…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Injunction For Protection Against Repeat Violence cases and more on FLexlaw
PARKER, Acting Chief Judge.
Criselda Lopez filed a petition for writ of prohibition to this court seeking to prohibit the trial court from proceeding with a hear- mg in which Lopez is charged with indirect criminal contempt of a court order entered one month earlier. The earlier order, styled “Injunction for Protection Against Domestic/Repeat Violence,” entered pursuant to section 784.046(9)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), enjoined Lopez from abusing, threatening, or harassing the petitioner1 named in the order. We rely upon this court’s opinion in Walker v. Bentley, 660 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) and deny the petition.
Walker involved an alleged violation of a domestic violence injunction filed pursuant to section 741.30, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which is a statute enacted specifically for domestic violence cases.
Pursuant to section 741.2901(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), indirect criminal contempt may no longer be used to enforce compliance with injunctions for protection against domestic violence. Instead, a state attorney intake system for prosecuting domestic violence by filing criminal charges shall be utilized. The majority in Walker concluded that the trial court has the inherent power to enforce compliance with section 741.30 by indirect criminal contempt because the legislature has no authority under the doctrine of separation of powers to limit the trial court’s jurisdiction to exercise its inherent power of contempt.
Turning to the statute in this case, section 784.046(9)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) provides for filing and hearing procedures for victims of repeat violence. This statute provides that the trial court shall enforce a violation of an injunction under this statute through a civil contempt proceeding. Unlike section 741.2901(2), there is no legislative prohibition against a trial court exercising its indirect criminal contempt powers to enforce an injunction for protection against repeat violence under section 784.046(9)(a).
Because of Walker, a trial court in this district retains its constitutional inherent powers of indirect criminal contempt under section 741.30, even when section 741.2901(2) specifically denies those powers to the trial court. Clearly if the trial court has those inherent powers to enforce an injunction against domestic violence, we conclude that the trial court has those same inherent powers to enforce an injunction for protection against repeat violence.
The petition for writ of prohibition is denied.
PATTERSON and LAZZARA, JJ., concur. . The petitioner’s relationship to Lopez, if any, is not disclosed in the order.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Criselda Lopez v. Bentley, 678 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1996)…OVERTON, Justice. We have for review Lopez v. Bentley, 660 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), in which the district court denied Criselda Lopez’s petition for writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the trial court from proceeding against Lopez on charges of indirect criminal .contempt based on her violation of a repeat vi…
-
Steiner v. Bentley, 679 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 1996)…view Steiner v. Bentley, 668 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), in which the district court denied Thomas D. Steiner’s petition for writ of prohibition on authority of Walker v. Bentley, 660 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(Walker I), and Lopez v. Bentley, 660 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(Lopez I). In Walker I, the district court certified the following questions as being of great public importance: IS THE WORD “SHALL” AS USED IN SECTION 741.30(8)(a), FLORIDA STAT [*771] UTES (SUPP.1994), TO BE INTERPRETED AS MAND…
-
Ross v. Bentley, 678 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1996)…for review Ross v. Bentley, 668 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), in which the district court denied Wanda L. Ross’s petition for writ of prohibition on authority of Walker v. Bentley, 660 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(Wa¡%er I), and Lopez v. Bentley, 660 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995){Lopez I). In Walker I, the district court certified the following questions as being of great public importance: IS THE WORD “SHALL” AS USED IN SECTION 741.30(8)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.1994), TO BE INTERPRETED AS MANDATORY RA…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Walker v. Honorable E. Randolph Bentley, 660 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)