ERIC NATHANIEL HALL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Eric Nathaniel Hall appealed his conviction and sentences for attempted second-degree murder and discharging a firearm from a vehicle. While the court affirmed the sentences, it found that certain probation conditions were improperly imposed because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing or were unconstitutionally vague.
The court affirmed the sentences but struck certain probation conditions. The portion of condition (4) prohibiting firearm possession was affirmed as a general condition under section 790.23, but the portion prohibiting other weapons without probation officer consent was stricken as not orally pronounced. Condition (7) was partially stricken: the prohibition on excessive use of intoxicants was stricken as a special condition not orally pronounced, and the prohibition on possessing drugs or narcotics was stricken as too vague, but the prohibition on visiting places where substances are unlawfully sold was affirmed.
[1] A condition of probation prohibiting possession of firearms by a convicted felon cannot be waived by a probation officer's consent, as Florida law makes such possession u…
[2] A general prohibition of weapons as a probation condition, as opposed to firearms, must be orally pronounced at sentencing if it is to be enforced.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1991), makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to own, possess, or have in his care, custody, or control any firearm, that part of the condition prohibiting possessing, carrying, or owning firearms is a general condition for which no oral pronouncement is needed.”
Establishes that firearm prohibitions for felons are general conditions not requiring oral pronouncement at sentencing
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHall pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree murder with a firearm and discharging a firearm from a vehicle in violation of Florida statutes. He was…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Oral Pronouncement Of Conditions cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Eric Nathaniel Hall, challenges the judgments and sentences imposed upon him after he pled guilty to attempted second degree murder with a firearm and discharging of a firearm from a vehicle, in violation of sections 782.04 and 790.15, Florida Statutes (1991). The appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to serve fifteen years in prison followed by fifteen years probation on the attempted murder charge. He was also sentenced to serve a three year minimum mandatory sentence on that charge. The appellant received a concurrent fifteen year sentence on the discharging a firearm from a vehicle charge. This timely appeal followed.
Although we find no error in the sentences imposed upon the appellant, we find that the trial court erred by imposing certain conditions of probation upon the appellant.
Probation condition (4) states: “You will not possess, carry or own any firearms. You will not possess, carry, or own any weapons without first procuring the consent of your officer.” Since section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1991), makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to own, possess, or have in his care, custody, or control any firearm, that part of the condition prohibiting possessing, carrying, or owning firearms is a general condition for which no oral pronouncement is needed. Fitts v. State, 649 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Therefore, that portion of condition (4) is affirmed. However, that portion of the condition which prohibits the carrying of weapons other than those enumerated in section 790.23 was not orally pronounced at sentencing and it is therefore stricken. Malone v. State, 652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Furthermore, since the remainder of the condition implies that a felon can possess weapons otherwise prohibited with the consent of his probation officer, that portion is also stricken. Malone.
Probation condition (7) states: ‘You will not use intoxicants to excess or possess any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. Nor will you visit places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used.” We strike that portion of the condition prohibiting the excessive use of intoxicants since it is a special condition which was not orally pronounced at sentencing. Tomlinson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We also strike that portion of the condition prohibiting the appellant from possessing “any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician” since it is too vague. Parsons v. State, 650 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). However, we affirm that portion of the condition which prohibits the appellant from visiting places where certain substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used since it is a more precise definition of a general prohibition and, as such, need not be orally pronounced. Parsons, 650 So. 2d at 177.
We, accordingly, strike the portions of conditions (4) and (7) of the probation order improperly imposed upon the appellant, but affirm the judgments and sentences in all other respects.
Affirmed as modified.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PARKER and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Navarrion Johnson v. State, 701 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…(Fla. 2d DCA 1995). . See Weber v. State, 691 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Levely v. State, 685 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Cooper v. State, 660 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Williams v. State, 658 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Hall v. State, 661 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Parsons v. State, 650 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). . In Houston v. State, 701 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), we noted that the other districts had not adopted our analysis of condition 4. See 701 So. 2d at 373 n. 4. The same s…
-
McCORD v. State, 679 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…Walls v. State, 596 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). However, in order for the written sentence to conform to the oral pronouncement, the latter must be clear and unambiguous, lacking any language which might be considered vague. See Hall v. State, 661 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In the instant case, after a thorough review of the record, we found that the oral pronouncement was vague regarding two conditions. During the February 27, 1996 hearing on the defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence, the…
-
United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2010)…State, 931 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (same); Luciano v. State, 12 So. 3d 917, 918 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (same); Lamb v. State, 668 So. 2d 666, 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (discharging a firearm from a vehicle at a police officer); Hall v. State, 661 So. 2d 63, 63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (guilty plea to attempted murder and discharging a firearm from a vehicle). And, as we explained above, Florida law classifies a violation of section 790.15(2) as a class-two felony, whereas it classifies discharging a firearm…
Authorities Cited
- Tomlinson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Guinn v. State, 652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Fitts v. State, 649 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Parsons v. State, 650 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)